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Introduction
The title already indicates the issue to be discussed in this inquiry: Judith Butler: a political 
theorist? Even though the title is formulated as a question, it takes more the form of a claim 
here. In other words, the aim of this inquiry is to read and present Judith Butler1 as a polit-
ical theorist. 
First of all, to read Butler as a political theorist means to support the claim that Butler 
should be included into the canon of political theory and political science respectively. If 
we consider  introductions  to  political  science  or  lexicons  of  political  thought,2 we are 
confronted with the fact that Butler is often not included in these volumes,3 and when she 
is it is in most cases in the context of a theory of feminism, and, accordingly, the main 
focus is usually on Gender Trouble and the challenge of feminism it presents.4 It is in the 
light  of  this  situation  that  the  present  inquiry  claims  that  Butler’s  work  presents  an 
important contribution to political theory. Even though this claim has yet to find resonance 
in  the mainstream of  the  discipline,  the  present  inquiry  is  not  the  first  one  that  treats 
Butler’s work as a contribution to political theory, as a number of books and articles can be 
found that argue in favor of this cause (Lloyd 2005, Stone 2005 and Loizidou 2007, Distel-
horst 2007 and Chambers/Carver 2008).
But there is also another way of reading the title: Judith Butler: A political theorist. The 
notion ‘political  theorist’ can also be read with emphasis  on  political  theorist.  To read 
Butler  as  a  political  theorist  means  to  suggest  that  her  work  is  political  through and 
through, in other words, that politics is at the core of Butler’s work. Indeed, Butler’s work  
1 Judith Butler studied philosophy at Yale University, receiving her Ph.D. In 1984. She is currently the 
Maxine Elliott Professor in the Rhetoric and Comparative Literature departments at the University of 
California, Berkeley.
2 One might argue that this is the case because Butler’s theory is still relatively new, and the development 
of these kinds of books simply works at a slower pace. However, a brief research in Wikipedia suggests 
that it is not only a matter of the pace of the medium, because in Wikipedia’s list of political philosophers 
– which includes a lot of names whose status as political philosophers could be put into question – Judith 
Butler  is  not  mentioned  either  (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_political_philosophers  (4.7.2010)). 
What is  eye-catching/striking about this list is the general lack of women. Out of approximately 140 
names, less than 10 are women. This is not only due to the fact that there were no women in the history of 
political  philosophy, but  also because  of  non-representation of those women that  could and arguably 
should be on that  list.  For  instance,  whereas Jean-Paul Sartre  is  on that  list,  Simone de Beauvoir  is 
conspicuously missing.
3 An important  exception  is  the article  by Claudia  Creutzberg in the volume  Politische  Theorien  der  
Gegenwart (Creutzberg 2006).
4 In the Handbuch Politische Theorien und Ideologien, Barbara Holland-Cruz, for instance, writes in 2000 
that Gender Trouble is “an already classic text of postmodern feminism” [ein bereits klassischer Text des 
postmodernen  Feminismus] (Holland-Cruz,  2000,  371).  And the  volume  Hauptwerke  der  politischen 
Theorie, published in 2007, also includes Butler’s Gender Trouble as one of the main works of political 
theory (Stammen/Riescher, Hofmann 2007, 102-105).
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certainly deals with the concept of politics. In this context, her writings form a challenge of 
classic political theory, because they put the notion of politics as well as the status of polit-
ical theory into questions. The inclusion of Butler into the canon of political science will,  
therefore, not remain without consequences for the shape of this discipline.
I used the terms ‘politics’ and ‘political’ quite  often in the first  few paragraphs of this 
inquiry and one might argue that the meanings of these terms remain highly vague. Unfor-
tunately, this situation will not change in the course of this inquiry, it will rather become 
intensified and more urgent.  To begin with,  we have to be aware that even within the 
discipline of political science there is not one single notion of politics. Rather, there is an 
ongoing debate about what this term precisely signifies, and, consequently, most research 
approaches work with a provisional definition suitable for the intended analysis. In the case 
of Butler’s work, the situation gets more complicated, because she does not allow for such 
a  provisional  definition,  but  forces  us  to  dig deeper  into the foundation of  our  under-
standing of politics. By challenging those foundations, Butler forces us to think about them 
once again, and this may force us to reconsider those foundations as in themselves already 
political, thus revealing the radical ungrounded nature of all notions of politics.
The present inquiry will deal with two main themes. First, Butler’s account of the political 
subject will be analyzed. Some political scientists may wonder at this point what a theory 
of the subject has to do with what they are doing. Traditionally, political science is not very 
interested in the question of individual political agents, even though they are – as I want to 
show in chapter two – a basic category of the conception of politics. In cases where indi-
vidual agents are included in the analysis, a rather simplistic conception of the political 
agent, which is based on the capacity to make rational decisions and a certain ability of 
self-determination, has been taken for granted. In the light of Butler’s work, this presup-
position of the political agent appears as a form of naivety. Thus, I want to suggest that the 
account of the political subject might turn out to be Butler’s main contribution to political 
thought, because, on the one hand, it forces us to reintroduce the concept of the political 
agent into our notion of politics, and, on the other hand, it requires a reconceptualization of 
the political agent beyond traditional notions of rationality and self-determination. As a 
result of Butler’s challenge, the concept of the political subject needs to be reintroduced 
into the political sphere in order to become a crucial site of political struggle.
Second, the present inquiry presents Butler’s notion of performativity as a political theory. 
This is a new idea in two ways. First, it is unusual to read Butler’s notion of performativity 
in terms of political theory. Second, the notion of performativity is new to political theory, 
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which has not been working with such a concept up to this point. In my view, the notion of 
performativity  has  three distinct  features  that  allow me to  characterize  it  as  a  political 
theory. It offers a comprehensive theory of agency, an explanation of social change, and it 
can be characterized by a main focus on power; three main features that one can tradition-
ally expect from a contribution to political theory. However, this reading of performativity 
as a political theory will also require certain reformulations of Butler’s account. But these 
reformulations  seem  rather  minor  and  justifiable,  as  they  enable  an  appreciation  and 
application of Butler’s account in the discipline of political theory. Most importantly, this 
reformulation will put an emphasis on the connection of a notion of performativity with a 
theory of hegemony. These two concepts work together to make a critical analysis of rela-
tions  of  power  and domination  possible  and they offer  an explanation for  the  relative 
stability of these relations as well as for the possibility of resistance and alteration.
It will require a detailed interrogation of Butler’s account of the political subject and of her 
notion  of  performativity  to  be  able  to  appreciate  Butler’s  complex  notion  of  politics. 
Insisting on the radically ungrounded nature of politics, Butler focuses on the contingency 
and contextuality of all political actions. Because no political category can be taken for 
granted, we have to insist that these categories are radically open for political contestation 
and resignification. I will denote this principal openness of all categories for resignification 
– which is the most crucial aspect of Butler’s notion of politics – with the term resignifiab-
ility. However, resignifiability is not in itself a political strategy. Thus, Butler links the 
contingency  and  openness  of  all  categories  with  a  project  of  radical  democracy  and 
supports the need for multiple political strategies in various contexts.
The present inquiry intends to be a contribution to the reception of Butler’s work. Already 
speaking in a Butlerian terminology, we can say that the reception of an author is discurs -
ively produced from the beginning and remains open for continuous discursive reproduc-
tion. However, certain lines of reception may eventually be so powerful that they can gain 
a hegemonic status, thus suppressing other lines of reception. Therefore, it is necessary to 
take on the history of the reception and to challenge the predominant lines of the reception 
in order to open up new perspectives. My strategy will not be the presentation of new texts. 
All text analyzed in this inquiry are well known and have been commented hundreds of 
times. Nevertheless, I  suggest going back to these supposedly well known texts and to 
reread them. In doing so, I will primarily focus on Butler’s writings of the 1990s – most 
essays on Butler focus on this period of her work while widely ignoring her early begin-
nings as well as her more recent developments, a fact I am critical of, but which I will 
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nevertheless repeat here – because I think that a lot can be found in these texts for a polit-
ical theory which has not been sufficiently interpreted yet. 
However, I want to broaden this narrow focus more and more in the course of this inquiry 
through an inclusion of Butler’s more recent writings. I hope to be able to highlight points 
of continuity  as well  as certain changes that have occurred in these more recent texts. 
There is a certain danger that following the project of this inquiry will lead to an unjusti-
fied unification of Butler’s work. Indeed, I read Butler’s work in a more unified way than it  
eventually is, and also more uniform than Butler herself thinks it should be. In my opinion, 
such a unification is partially necessary in order to present a coherent argument. Neverthe-
less,  I  also  want  to  discuss  certain  aspects  of  Butler’s  work  which  do not  necessarily 
support my argument. In addition, I will not be shy to formulate critique where I think it is 
required. However, the focus will be on the main line of argumentation, and this is the 
presentation of Butler’s contribution to the discipline of political theory.
Part 1: Narrowing down the Question: Methodological 
Considerations
This first part wants to offer an introduction to the approach and the main themes of the 
present inquiry. The first chapter explicates the main thesis and distinguishes two ways of 
reading it, which can be referred to as the weak version and the strong version. The the 
second chapter will discuss the concept of the political subject that is prevalent in main-
stream political science, or, rather, it will highlight how political science lacks an adequate 
conception of the political subject. In the subsequent sections of chapter two, the attempt 
will  be made to give a  first  outlook on the connection of subject  and politics and the 
different notions of the subject to be discussed. The summary of the main tendencies in the 
early reception and contestation of Butler will form the content of chapter three.
1. The Thesis: Butler as a Political Theorist
This inquiry has a very simple and straightforward thesis. I want to defend the claim that 
Butler is a political theorist in her own right. She deals in original and powerful ways with 
problems and challenges of politics as well as with themes and issues of political theory, 
and her work should therefore be considered as an important contribution to contemporary 
political thought.
This thesis, however, is all but self-evident. This is especially true in the context of the 
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German-speaking reception of Butler’s work.5 If we take a look at the reception of Butler 
in the German-speaking area, we can see – particularly in contrast to the developments in 
the Anglo-American debate – “the constriction of the German reception, which was lost in 
a one-sided controversy about the opposition of nature and culture of the  Geschlechter-
difference and the threatening depoliticization of feminist theory” [“welcher Engführung 
die deutsche Rezeption unterlag, die sich in einer einseitigen Auseinandersetzung über den 
Gegensatz von Natur und Kultur der Geschlechterdifferenz und die drohende Entpolitisie-
rung feministischer Theorie verlor”] (Distelhorst 2009, 15)6. Butler was primarily received 
as a theorist of feminism and gender, and the reactions to her contribution in those discip-
lines were in most cases negative or even hostile, because the fear was that her theory 
would  lead  to  a  depoliticization  and  would  put  the  successes  that  had  already  been 
achieved into jeopardy.7 We can already see some of the main tendencies of this reception 
if we take a look at the available introductions to Butler’s thought. Paula-Irene Villa8 for 
example writes in her introduction that she wants to present Butler “mainly as a feminist 
theorist” [“hauptsächlich als feministische Theoretikerin”] (Villa 2003, 16), and she sees 
Butler’s  contribution  to  politics  first  and  foremost  in  connection  with  her  status  as  a 
founder of queer theory. Thus, Villa adds a chapter in her introduction with the heading 
“Queer Politics” in which she concentrates on the subversive resignification of repressive 
categorizations (Villa 2003, 102ff.).  The same is  true of the introduction by Hannelore 
Bublitz9, which also includes a chapter on “Butler′s Political Theory” which narrows it to a 
notion of queer politics that is understood as the subversive proliferation of (gender) iden-
tities (Bublitz 2002, 75ff.). As will be shown in this inquiry, this restricted view of Butler’s 
political  theory  as  “queer  politics”  caused  a  very  one-sided  view  of  the  concepts  of 
performativity – in the reception often tightly linked to performance – and a focus on the 
parody of gender norms and identities. It was this restricted reception in particular that did 
not allow for a comprehensive appreciation of Butler’s account and for a recognition of her 
contribution  to  political  theory. Butler  was  mainly  seen  as  a  theorist  of  feminism and 
5 In this respect, the present inquiry has an ambivalent status, because, on the one hand, it is written in 
English and is primarily based on English sources, but, on the other hand, the author is a German native 
speaker, who has spent most of his studies in German-speaking Vienna, where he is also seeking to get his  
degree.
6 All quotes from German sources are cited in my own translation with the German original in square 
brackets. 
7 I will  deal with these tendencies of the reception of Butler’s work in more detail in chapter three. The 
following remarks will only be an outline for orientation.
8 Paula-Irene Villa  is  a  German-Argentinian sociologist.  She  is  currently a  professor  of  Sociology and 
Gender Studies in the Sociology department at the University of Munich.
9 Hannelore Bublitz is a German sociologist. Since 1995, she is a professor of Sociology at the University 
of Paderborn, Germany.
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gender and her contribution was not  considered as a chance,  but as a danger  by those 
working in those disciplines.
Yet,  in recent  years a significant  change in the reception of  Butler’s thought has been 
observed. In the early reception of Butler, it was commonly accepted that the controversy 
around  Butler’s  work  was  mainly  focused  on  Gender  Trouble  and  the  corresponding 
engagements in feminist and gender theory and the emergence of queer theory. This was 
accompanied by the assumption that there needs to be a “locating” [“Verortung”] of Butler 
“within the context of the USA of the 1990s” [“im Kontext der USA der 1990er Jahre”] 
(Villa 2003, 13). But in recent years, this implicit consent has begun to crumble. Samuel A. 
Chambers and Terrell  Carver10 point  out  that  Butler  should  not be contextualized as  a 
thinker of the 1990s, as if her theory was already outdated. On the contrary, they want to 
argue “that Butler’s time may have just arrived” (Chambers/Carver 2008, 6). In corres-
pondence with this claim, a variety of books and articles has been published in recent years 
that treat Butler as a political theorist (Disch 1999, White 1999, Coole 2005, Lloyd 2005, 
Stone 2005 and  Loizidou 2007 Distelhorst  2007 and 2009,  Müller  2009, Sauer 2009). 
Birgit Sauer11, for instance, suggests that a reconstruction of Butler’s texts “as contribu-
tions to a feminist theory of democracy and the state” [“als Beiträge zu einer feministi-
schen Demokratie- und Staatstheorie”] might make it possible to conceptualize “the ability 
of junction to a gender critique in political science, in particular to a democratic theory and 
a theory of the state that argues along a theory of hegemony” [„die Anschlussfähigkeit an 
die politikwissenschaftliche Geschlechterkritik, vornehmlich an eine hegemonietheoretisch 
argumentierende Staats- und Demokratietheorie”] (Sauer 2009, 151). 
Even though the thesis that Butler is a political theorist is still far from being self-evident, 
it can be located within the context of an ongoing shift in the reception of Butler’s work. In 
approximately the last five years, several new lines of interpretation of Butler’s work have 
opened up, lines I want to follow and support in this inquiry.
The Weak Version
Butler is a political theorist in her own right – that means that her work can be read as an 
important contribution to contemporary politics and the corresponding efforts in political 
10 Samuel A. Chambers is currently an assistant professor of Political Theory and Cultural Politics in the 
department of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University. Terrell Carver (born 1946) is a professor of 
Political Theory at the University of Bristol.
11 Birgit Sauer is a German political scientist. She is currently a professor of Political Science in the depart-
ment of Political Science at the University of Vienna.
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theory. This thesis corresponds with the claim that Butler’s work should be read as an 
important input for the endeavors of political theory. If Butler is a political theorist in her 
own right, it should be clear that her work accordingly needs to be read as a contribution to  
political theory. 
As already mentioned, I am luckily not the first to support this thesis and to make this 
claim that might still seem far-fetched in the eyes of many scholars. Chambers and Carver, 
for instance, seek, in a very similar way, “to defend a straightforward and direct argument: 
Butler is a crucially important political theorist in her own right.” (Chambers/Carver 2008, 
6) But they also point out that there is “a whole host of problems” with that thesis and that 
they  therefore  “will  neither  articulate  nor  defend  that  thesis  in  a  direct  or  sequential 
manner”  (Chambers/Carver  2008,  6).  What  problems  are  there  with  this  thesis?  First, 
Chambers and Carver point out that it is simply too general, because arguing for this thesis 
requires a long list of preliminary questions (Chambers/Carver 2008, 6). We would first of 
all need a clear-cut conception of political theory or the political theorist. In a next step it 
would be necessary to adopt criteria that allow us to determine who counts as a political 
theorist under those certain conceptions. And then, maybe, we could judge if Butler meets 
those criteria and can therefore count as a political theorist. It should be immediately clear 
that such a project is absolutely hopeless from the beginning. As a consequence, I neither 
want to give a clear-cut definition of political theory – as if such a definition exists – nor 
do I want to establish a set of criteria that determine who might count as a political theorist.
In addition, Chambers and Carver point out that there are not only conceptual problems 
with  this  thesis,  it  also  proves  to  be  “highly  contentious and  politically  fraught” 
(Chambers/Carver 2008, 6). Supporting this thesis might put one under fire from all sides. 
To begin with, traditional representatives of the established discipline of political science 
or the subfield of political theory would hardly accept that Butler should be granted the 
status as a ‘political theorist’ and they can present good arguments for their case. If we look 
at Butler’s education and profession, we cannot find anything that qualifies her as a polit-
ical theorist. She has a PhD in philosophy, she is a professor at a department of rhetoric 
and comparative literature and it could also be pointed out that her major scholarly contri-
bution has been in other fields – feminist or queer theory, for example – but not within the 
established academic discipline of political theory. Thus, for a traditional representative of 
the discipline of political science, Butler could never be a political theorist in her own right 
(Chambers/Carver 2008, 6). Chambers and Carver then say that there is another group of 
scholars  that  might  discredit  the  thesis,  even  though  this  time  from  the  opposite 
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perspective: 
These critics (made up almost entirely of scholars working outside the disciplinary boundaries 
of political science) will loudly insist that Butler is obviously a political theorist, and they will 
therefore reject not so much the locutionary meaning of the thesis, but the illocutionary force. 
In other words, this group will assume that our intention in posing the claim ‘Butler is a polit-
ical theorist’ must be to question it (Chambers/Carver 2008, 6).
Hence, Chambers and Carver convincingly show that to defend this thesis puts one in a no-
win situation and they make clear: “We take the time to narrate the rules of the game here 
so as to clarify our choice not to play it” (Chambers/Carver 2008, 7).
They continue with three further difficulties one has to face when defending such a thesis. 
First,  Butler  is  neither  an  analytic  thinker  that  presents  her  argument  in  a  systematic 
fashion, nor can she simply be reduced to a skeptical critique of such traditional lines of 
thought. Second, she accordingly does not present a systematic theory of politics and there-
fore it would be a mistake to discuss something like ‘the political theory’ of Judith Butler. 
Third, Butler’s work is intrinsically interdisciplinary, she refuses to work within the tight 
boundaries of traditional academic disciplines and she therefore deals with a broad variety 
of fields and disciplines (Chambers/Carver 2008, 7). Chamber and Carver point out the 
conclusion for the method of their book:
For all these reasons, we will evade any direct encounters with the thesis ‘Butler is a political 
theorist′, and we will resist the possible temptation to play games of categorisation (e.g. ‘it’s 
feminist  theory!’, ‘no, it’s gender theory!’, etc.). Instead, we will work in a non-systematic 
manner to investigate, elucidate and elaborate Butler’s writings as they relate (taken in a broad 
sense) to politics and political theory (Chambers/Carver 2008, 7). 
As an alternative, Chambers and Carver suggest the “elaboration of Butler and political 
theory through a series of very specific and focused engagements […]. It is the detailed 
elaboration of these engagements that, taken as a whole, should give the reader a clear 
sense of Butler′s places within contemporary political theory” (Chambers/Carver 2008, 7).
This  investigation  into  specific  themes  also  corresponds  with  Butler’s  own  approach, 
insofar as she is not interested in general questions about the discipline of political theory, 
but rather wants to deal with concrete issues of politics. Therefore, it would not be in line 
with Butler’s approach to talk about political theory, instead Butler’s thought requests us to 
become involved in political theory. The question if Butler is a political theorist or not is 
ultimately futile, as long as it is only debated  on an abstract level of classifications. The 
relevant question is if and in what way Butler is able to contribute to concrete queries of 
political theory, and what consequences her contributions entail. In conclusion, the aim of 
this investigation should not be to talk about political theory on a meta-level, but to deal 
with concrete tasks of political theory and to productively contribute to it. 
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In the present inquiry, I want to focus on two specific engagements of Butler with political 
theory. First, I want to raise the question of the political subject and investigate the contri-
bution Butler makes in this respect. As I want to claim in chapter two, the query of the 
subject is a major theme that – even though this fact is usually not recognized and remains 
a presupposition that is taken for granted – every encounter with political theory has to sort 
out before it can turn to subsequent matters. As I will present in chapter three, the early 
reception of Butler’s thought was, paradoxically, also centered around the question of the 
political subject, but in that context, Butler was not received as a chance, but as a threat to 
the feminist subject and the possibility of agency. Against this main tendency of the early 
reception, I want to argue that the political subject turns out to be the theme where Butler 
could have the most significant impact on political theory. Second, I want to show how the 
notion of performativity can be read as a contribution to political theory. Even though it 
cannot provide an answer to all challenges of this discipline – it is unrealistic to expect that 
from any single approach – it deals with at least three important aspects of political theory: 
The critical analysis of relations of power and domination, the question of social stability 
and change and the theory of political agency.
Finally, I want to mention one last objection to the thesis of this inquiry, which Chambers 
and Carver do not mention. There might be scholars in the disciplines of feminist theory, 
gender studies or queer theory to whom Butler is an important source of inspiration, and 
these scholars could get the impression that the thesis ‘Butler is a political theorist’ is an 
attempt to downplay her influence on their respective disciplines. Even though I will, in 
fact,  treat  the  issues  of  gender  identity  and  the  query  of  the  subject  of  feminism as 
examples  for  more  general  claims  about  the  concept  of  identity  and the  status  of  the 
subject, that will not be done in order to downplay the importance of Butler’s contribution 
to the thinking about identities and subject positions in those specific disciplines; quite on 
the contrary, it will be done to highlight it and to point out how these insights might be 
valid not only for gender identities and the feminist subject, but for identities and subject 
positions in general. One needs to take into critical consideration – as I have shown before 
– that it  was in the wake of a certain interpretation of Butler’s work that the tendency 
developed to reduce politics to a certain limited notion of politics, for instance a – again 
quite  restricted – concept  of  ‘queer politics’ (Bublitz  2002 and Villa  2003).  But  queer 
politics should not reduce itself to a politics of queer, just as feminist politics should not be 
restricted to politics of feminism (Sauer 2001, 36). Therefore, I suggest that the generaliza-
tion I perform in this inquiry – even though it does not explicitly deal with the respective 
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categories – is ultimately in the interest of a critical theory of feminism and gender as well. 
To deal with identities and subject position in a general way that does not restrict those 
categories to specific notions of identity and certain kinds of subject is also in line with 
Butler’s insistence that identity is always constituted along multiple axes such as gender, 
class, race, ethnicity, sexuality, age, profession  etc. Therefore, only an investigation that 
considers Butler’s engagement with political theory in its whole complexity – and also 
generality – can adequately estimate her contribution to this discipline.
The Strong Version
Thus far the thesis that ‘Butler is a political theorist’ has been read in a way that could be 
reduced to the claim that Butler’s work should be received in the realm of this discipline,  
because it presents an important contribution to contemporary debates in political theory. 
Now I want to denote this claim, which is basically centered around the question of recep-
tion, as the weak version of the thesis, because there is also an alternative way of consid-
ering Butler a political theorist. In this second version, calling Butler a political theorist 
indicates that her work taken for itself should be read as an essentially  political  theory. 
This strong version of the thesis claims that it is useful and fruitful to read Butler as a 
political theorist, because her work is most convincing when read as a contribution to a 
political  theory. On that note, Butler’s work can be read as an argument for the political  
and for engagement with political theory.
In order to comprehend Butler’s  political  theory, we have to be aware that it cannot be 
treated within the realm of conventional conceptions of politics.  Butler’s notion of the 
political cannot be reduced to interest-group politics or party politics. Butler is very critical 
of any liberal  model  of politics,  because she rejects  the premises  of  such models.  For 
instance, already in Gender Trouble Butler formulates her problems with the concept of a 
social contract, as presented in Rousseau or Locke, because it “is understood to presuppose 
the rational choice or deliberate will of those it is said to govern” (GT 168). Butler refuses 
“the classical liberal and existential model of freedom”, because she insists that “power is 
not reduced to volition” and that the deliberate will cannot be presupposed, and suggests 
instead a model in which “power-relations can be understood, as I think they ought to be, 
as constraining and constituting the very possibility of volition” (GT 169). Similarly, she is 
also critical of a notion of politics that is based on dialogue, because, first, she notes that 
“the very notion of ‘dialogue’ is culturally specific and culturally bound”, and, second, 
before such a model of dialogue can be established, “the power relations that condition and 
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limit dialogic possibilities need first to be interrogated” (GT 20). Butler’s point is that “the 
model  of  dialogue”  otherwise  “risks  relapsing  into  a  liberal  model  that  assumes  that 
speaking agents occupy equal positions of power and speak with the same presuppositions 
about what constitutes ‘agreement’ and ‘unity’ and, indeed, that those are the goals to be 
sought” (GT 20). But Butler’s suspicion is not only directed towards classic liberal notions 
of politics. In Gender Trouble she also develops her critique of identity politics, more or 
less for the same reasons. To sum up, we can state that Butler challenges any notion of 
politics  that  presupposes  a  fixed  subject  –  whether  an  individual  or  a  group –  whose 
interests merely need to be represented. She radically puts into question the premise of a 
subject prior to the political  that can serve as foundation of politics. She asks for new 
modes of politics that do not presuppose a fixed subject, but instead includes the constitu-
tion of political identities in the realm of the political.
The term ‘the political’ is not used in a prominent way in Butler’s work, but it might be 
useful to give a preliminary illustration of her project here. The issues Butler focuses on 
are not reducible to the political sphere or the political system in a conventional sense. As  
Thomas Bedorf12 points out, the distinction of the political and politics is first of all due to 
the  dissatisfaction with the current  political  situation and the  corresponding notions  of 
politics. So,  the political  is a critical term that is distinguished from politics, which has 
degenerated to a sub-system designed for interest coordination in the liberal societies. In 
that regard,  the political is also a sign for a renewal of political theory, a political theory 
that is not satisfied with the options liberal societies currently provide. The main character 
of the political, common to all variations of the use of the term, is the contingency that it 
intrinsically implies. Whereas politics is traditionally deemed to be based on a fixed found-
ation, the political is considered to be without such a substantial origin or ground, on which 
it could once and for all be founded. (Bedorf 2010, 232f.) And, most importantly, the polit-
ical does  not  presuppose  pre-established  identities  that  seek  for  representation 
subsequently, but takes place precisely at the very moment when identities are constituted:  
“The Political  occurs where collective identities are  founded, politics takes place where 
institutionally  ensured  identities  are  negotiated and  bargained  with”  [“Politisches 
geschieht dort, wo kollektive Identitäten  gestiftet werden,  Politik vollzieht sich dort,  wo 
mit institutionell gesicherten Identitäten ge- und verhandelt wird.”] (Bedorf 2010, 237).
As already said, Butler does not use this distinction in her work and this is only one of the 
12 Thomas Bedorf is a German philosopher. He is currently employed in the department of Philosophy at the 
FernUniversität in Hagen.
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reasons why it will not be used in the present inquiry either. The other reason is that it 
seems to me that Butler’s project does not aim at a distinction between these two spheres, 
but rather at a transformation of politics itself in order to show that it is actually already in 
the realm of the political. For instance, she writes in the conclusion of Gender Trouble that 
“this theoretical inquiry has attempted to locate the political in the very signifying practices 
that establish, regulate, and deregulate identity” (GT 201). “This effort”, she continues, 
requires to “extend the very notion of the political” (GT 201), which – given the distinction 
of politics and the political – would refer to politics. And a few pages earlier, Butler high-
lights that the argument she presented in Gender Trouble “opens up other configurations, 
not only of gender and bodies, but of politics itself” (GT 194). In the course of this inquiry 
I hope to be able to point out the new notion of politics that is on its way to take shape in 
Butler’s work, and I hope to be able to show how Butler turns out to be a crucially political 
theorist, in the sense of the term political that was just introduced.
2. The Topic: The Political Subject as Category of Political Theory
In this inquiry, I have the ambition to reread Butler’s work as a political theory in its own 
right. In oder to do so, I want to focus on Butler’s theory of the political subject.  The 
primary objection such a project has to face arguably is: What has the subject to do with  
politics? Why should a theory of the subject be important for a theory of politics and for 
political practice? And more specific: What role does the subject play in political theory? 
Does political theory actually need a theory of the political subject? I want to defend the 
claim that it does. However, I am aware that this claim will not receive unanimous agree-
ment. In fact, there is probably a significant number of scholars in the discipline of polit-
ical science that might disagree. The question then is: Why should political science open 
up for a theory of the political subject? What is the benefit for the discipline of political 
science if it does so?
Mainstream Political Science
To begin with, I want to take a look at some mainstream theories in political science. I can 
certainly not cover all theories in political science and I do not even intend to be represent-
ative  in  my  selection.  The  following  very  general  and  simplistic  outline  only  has  the 
purpose of showing the way in which mainstream theories of political science deal – or 
rather, do not deal – with the question of the political subject. I can certainly not provide a 
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comprehensive account of the history of the discipline,13 and I will especially be forced to 
ignore all the achievements that have already taken place to enrich the scope of this discip -
line.14
In the 1950s and 1960s, political scientist have tried to reestablish their discipline as a 
more  empirically  oriented,  more  ‘scientific’ discipline  within  a  broader  field  of  social 
sciences. David Easton15, for instance, developed a theory that tried to understand politics 
as  a  system. In this  theory,  the political  system was conceptualized as  a  never-ending 
process of feedback circles. The main idea is that the environment of the political system 
produces inputs to the political system in the form of demands and supports for political 
decisions. Those inputs lead to certain outputs which the political system produces in the 
form of decisions and actions. Those outputs act on the environment and effect change in  
it. The effect of the output on the environment and the changes caused in the environment 
may lead to new demands and supports, basically setting the process up to start again from 
the beginning, thus leading to never ending policy circles (Easton 1965).
Another  common  paradigm we  can  consider  in  this  context  of  a  renewal  of  political 
science – and the social sciences in general – is the AGIL-scheme developed by Talcott 
Parsons16. AGIL is an acronym for the four functions every social system has to accom-
plish: adaptation, goal attainment, integration and latency. Adaptation means the capacity 
of the system to interact with its environment and to exchange resources of all kinds with 
it. Goal attainment denotes the ability to define goals, to make decisions that lead to the 
achievement of these goals and to evaluate the success of those decisions. Integration is the 
harmonization of the system, guaranteeing the cohesion of the society.  Finally,  latency 
means securing the structures of the system by maintaining its main elements. It is about 
the maintenance and the passing on of institutional settings, values and systems of belief. 
In Parsons’s point of view, every system has to permanently accomplish all four functions 
to sustain itself as a system. The claim is that every society, in fact every organized group 
of people can be seen and conceptualized as a system of such a kind (Patzelt 2003, 50f.).
What  is  common to both of those paradigms is  that  both are  oriented towards system 
13 For a comprehensive account of history and scope of political  science see  Goodin/Klingemann 1998, 
Patzelt 2003, Brodocz/Schaal 2006 and Shively 2007.
14 Several  contributions  of  The  Oxford  Handbook  of  Political  Theory,  for  instance,  discuss  important 
matters that are similar to Butler’s challenges of traditional political theory (Dryzek/Honig/Phillips 2006).
15 David Easton is a Canadian political scientist. He is a former President of the American Political Science 
Association and currently Distinguished Research Professor in the Department of Political Science at the 
University of California, Irvine.
16 Talcott Parsons (1902-1979) was an American sociologist at Harvard University. He first developed an 
action theory in line with the paradigm of positivism and later turned to the paradigm of system theory.
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analysis and do not employ a notion of the political subject. Instead, the paradigm of the 
political system is combined with a behavioral approach to political action. The introduc-
tion of behavior as a central unit for analysis also played an important role in establishing 
political science as an empirical discipline. The notion of behavior reduces political actions 
to empirically observable occurrences, thus allowing political science to reestablish itself 
after the model of natural sciences (Easton 1965). 
In his introduction to political science, Werner Patzelt17 explains that theories in political 
science can be systematized according to two axes of characterization. The first axis is 
whether they operate on a micro or on a macro level. The second is whether they are more 
concerned with the behavior  of  individual  or  collective agents  or  if  they focus  on the 
dimensions of the system (Patzelt 2003, 477). The two paradigms considered above clearly 
fall into the category of macro-system-theories, even though the categorization is not that 
clear because – as seen in the case of Easton – it is important even for system oriented 
theories to develop some theory of political action. Regarding theories that Patzelt labels as 
focusing on political action, we can see that they move in a similar direction as Easton did 
with  his  approach.  Patzelt  mentions  behaviorist  accounts,  rational  choice  theories  and 
game theory as examples  for theories dealing with political  action (Patzelt  2003 478). 
Thus, all  the theories which he considers in his introduction intend to explain political 
action  either  as  empirically  observable  behavior  or  as  some  sort  of  rational  decision 
making. In other words, they try to conceptualize political action by means of models taken 
from the methods of the natural sciences. We can add that this orientation of the methods 
along these lines does not seem to be an important matter of discussion among political 
scientists,  but rather a basic agreement.  Accordingly, there seems to be no need to ask 
about the specifics of political action, or to wonder if there might be specifics that cannot 
be conceptualized by the described methods.
In this context, I would like to consider the definition of politics Patzelt provides: “Politics 
is  the  kind of human action that  aims at  the  production and enforcement  of  generally 
binding regulations and decisions within and among groups of humans” [“Politik ist jenes 
menschliche Handeln, das auf die Herstellung und Durchsetzung allgemein verbindlicher 
Regelungen und Entscheidungen (dh. von allgemeiner Verbindlichkeit) in und zwischen 
Gruppen von Menschen abzielt”] (Patzelt 2003, 23). One of the main, if not the main term 
in this definition of politics is the notion of human action, and, furthermore, the kind of 
17 Werner Patzelt is a German political scientist. He is currently a professor of Comparative Politics in the 
department of Political Science at the TU Dresden.
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human action that can be further specified to be a distinct political action. This central 
placement of political action in the definition of politics makes it even more urgent to point 
out that this notion gets, again, no attention at all or is explained by behavioral theories or 
by rationalistic accounts that reduce it to empirically observable or mathematically predict-
able behavior. 
To sum up, the specifics of political action – even though the notion of political action is 
crucial  for the definition of politics itself  – remain for the most part  without  adequate 
consideration in the discipline of political science. The result is a reductionist account of 
political action and human action in general. If we do not agree to accept this methodolo-
gical reduction as the basis for political science, however, we have to raise a series of ques-
tions that are necessarily beyond the scope of that reductionist methodological paradigm. 
The most urgent questions are: What makes an action a political action? Who is actually 
the agent that can perform political action? What constitutes his/her agency? 
The Subject and Politics
As we can see, one major problem with the claim I want to defend in this inquiry is that 
Butler’s insistence on the importance of the political subject is foreign to the main method-
ological paradigms of mainstream political science. In mainstream political science, the 
notion of the political agent is normally not at all seen as an important theoretical concern. 
The main questions political scientists ask is: What is politics? and they are normally not as 
concerned with the question: Who is doing politics? Political scientist usually focus on an 
investigation of collective subjects (e.g. political parties, interest groups, institutions) and 
the emergence of these subjects is normally not seen as a concern for research. If indi-
vidual agents come into the focus of research, they are usually conceptualized by means of 
behavioral or rationalist theories, as seen in the previous subsection. Hence, the political 
subject – individual or collective – and its emergence do not become a significant problem 
for the political scientist.
For Butler, in contrast, it is clear that every theory of politics must begin with an investiga-
tion into the subject of politics. Who is doing politics? thus becomes one of the main ques-
tions for political analysis. The question has to be asked more precisely: Who can count as 
a political subject? Who is entitled to be a political agent? That means, who is in the posi-
tion to be the origin of political action? The answer to those questions is not a given, it is 
not self-evident who the political agent is.
The main concern for the present inquiry is: What are the implications when Butler claims 
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that the subject and its agency are the basis for every theory of politics, probably even for 
every theory of the social?18 If she was right, we would have to state that the ignorance of 
this question is  one of the major shortcomings of classic social  theories. Social  theory 
would then be confronted with the challenge that it basically leaves its most crucial ques-
tion unsettled. In is in this respect that Butler can call the subject “ an inevitable stumbling 
block in social theory“19 (PLP 14). Informed about Butler’s theory of the subject, one is 
inclined to support the claim that every theory of politics has always already implicitly 
made a  decision about  the political  subject,  even though the question has likely never 
become explicit. In other words, every theory of politics needs to presuppose an answer to 
the questions: What is a political subject? and: Who can count as such a subject? in order 
to possess its basic unit of analysis, political action. As Diana Coole20 states: “Agency has 
been central to modern conceptions of politics since it is agents that are accredited with the 
power to bring about effective change in collective life” (Coole 2005, 124).
Maybe this is one of the reasons why Butler was regarded with so many reservations, 
because she puts into questions what seems to be the obvious, forces one to challenge what 
previously seemed to be a common ground. The question is: Is Butler’s insistence on the 
category of the political subject a challenge of political science in general? Or can the 
political subject be integrated into the theoretical framework of this discipline? Or, to take 
one step further, could it even be that Butler’s theory pushes for new modes of political 
science? Those alternatives would at least need some serious consideration. Moya Lloyd21, 
“a political  theorist  by training” (Lloyd 2005, 7) as she states herself,  begins her book 
Beyond Identity Politics with a chapter named “the subject and politics” (Lloyd 2005, 1). 
In this introduction, she states that her aim is the reconfiguration of politics by what she 
calls “subject-in-process” (Lloyd 2005, 1), a term that is meant to describe the idea that the 
subject is not a stable and fixed entity, but constituted of multiple dimensions. Lloyd’s 
book – which is clearly influenced by Butler’s theory, but also by other ‘poststructuralist’ 
thinkers  such  as  Foucault  or  Derrida  –  intends  to  present  a  “radical  rethinking  of  the 
subject-politics relation” and to investigate the consequences such a reconceptualization 
18 We have to notice that even the notion of human action employed in Patzelt’s definition of politics might 
turn out to be far less clear than it seems on the first glance. However, this leads to long and complex 
questions of political philosophy, which I do not want to address here.
19 I will have to come back to this statement again in the course of the investigation of Butlers notion of the 
political subject (chapter six).
20 Diana Coole is a British political scientist. She is currently a professor of Political and Social Theory in 
the School of Politics and Sociology at Birkbeck, University of London.
21 Moya Lloyd is a British political scientist. She is currently a professor of Political Theory in the depart-
ment of Politics, History and International Relations at Loughborough University.
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has for our thinking of crucial concepts “such as agency, power and domination” (Lloyd 
2005, 2). Lloyd’s book is clearly an attempt to utilize Butlerian insights within the realm of 
political  theory.  Her main claim is  that  a  rethinking of the subject  and the subsequent 
reconsideration of the subject-politics-relation does not lead to a dismissal of politics, but 
to a reconfiguration of politics. It is precisely these opportunities for a reconfiguration of  
politics through the rethinking of the political subject that the present inquiry also tries to 
investigate.
Liberal and Postliberal Notions of the Subject
In his introduction to political science, W. Phillips Shively22 lists “two defining character-
istics  of  politics”  which are  that  “(1)  politics  always involves the making of  common 
decisions for groups of people and (2) those decisions are made by some members of the 
group exercising power  over  other  members  of  the  group” (Shively 2007,  4).  Shively 
names his introduction “power and choice“ because these are the two main characteristics 
that  define  politics  in  his  opinion.  He,  however,  shows  a  clear  preference  for  choice, 
thought as a common decision everyone can share. That should  not come as a surprise, 
because in this theory power is thought as always being exercised as some form of domina-
tion of one individual or group over another. In this view, power is clearly a bad thing and 
should be as limited as possible, so individuals can develop free from all forms of subor-
dination (Shively 2007, 25). 
We should be aware, however, that this point of view presupposes a certain notion of the 
political subject that can be called liberal. The two main aspects of this notion are, first, 
that human beings are originally self-sufficient, autonomous individuals that only socialize 
in a second step. And, second, that all humans have certain intrinsic features and capacities  
such as rationality and accountability that qualify them as subjects for ethics and politics 
(Maihofer 1995, 151ff.).  If such a liberal notion of the subject is presupposed, then, of 
course, any kind of subordination is principally bad, because it contradicts the highest good 
of every liberal society, that is “the ability of the members of that society to develop their  
individual capacities to the fullest extent” (Shively 2007, 24). But if we start to ask – as 
Butler does – what the consequences are in case that subordination is not always a bad 
thing, but also necessary to the extent that there would not even be a subject without a 
certain subordination that calls it into existence in first place, then the situation might turn 
22 W. Phillips Shively is an American political scientist. He is currently a professor of Political Science in 
the department of Political Science at the University of Minnesota.
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out to be much more difficult. We would not only be forced to revise our thinking of the 
political  subject,  but also to reconsider our notion of power as a solely repressive and 
therefore entirely bad thing.23
This  point  of  view must  be  highly  provocative  to  the  representative  of  such  a  liberal 
conception,  because  it  seems to  be  very  important  for  those  thinkers  –  even within  a 
broader spectrum of liberal theory – to defend the core of a liberal notion of the subject. 
Seyla Benhabib24, for instance, wrote in an article25 that there must be some possibility to 
reformulate the “traditional attributes of the philosophical subject of the West, like self-
reflexivity, the capacity for acting on principles, rational accountability for one’s actions 
and the ability to project a life-plan into the future, in short some form of autonomy and 
rationality” (Benhabib 1995a, 20).
In  recent  years,  however,  more  and  more  concerns  have  been  formulated  about  this 
“Western liberal ideal of autonomy as self-determination” (Thiem 2008, 59). Could it be 
that the liberal notion of the subject is only one of many historically and culturally contin-
gent ways of conceptualizing the subject? But even without reference to historical and 
cultural alternatives, it has become doubtful in the minds of several scholars, if “the ‘self-
sufficient individual’ and the ‘autonomous will’ that serve as the bedrocks and ‘fighting 
concepts’ of liberalism” (Thiem 2008, 59) are really our only – and even the most favor-
able – alternatives for the foundation of ethics and politics. Annika Thiem26 states that the 
suspicion about  this  notion of  the subject  as  an autonomous,  rational  agent  goes  even 
further:
The subject as an autonomous knowing and acting subject in control of him- or herself has 
come into question not only because of the theoretical interventions from various intellectual 
camps, such as psychoanalysis, poststructuralism, feminism, and postcolonial studies. Much 
more mundanely, our daily experience often make us – sometimes painfully – aware of the 
limits of our knowledge of and control over ourselves, others, and the situations in which we 
have to act. […] The individual who can know herself and has the capacity to know the good 
and just from the bad and unjust, this individual – in collective or individualized form – can no 
longer function as a backdrop to ethics and politics, if she ever really could (Thiem 2008, 51).
A variety of intellectual camps – Thiem names some of them – share the diagnosis of an 
insufficiency of the liberal model, which is also supported by our every-day experience. 
Thus, we can find a broad spectrum of attempts to find alternatives that go beyond the 
23 I will discuss this matter in chapter six of this inquiry.
24 Seyla  Benhabib  is  a  Turkish  political  scientist  and  philosopher.  She  is  currently  the  Eugene  Meyer 
Professor of Political Science and Philosophy in the department of Political Science at Yale University.
25 This article  (Benhabib 1995a)  was one of  the first  encounters with the theory Butler  put  forward in 
Gender Trouble, and will be further discussed in the following chapter.
26 Annika Thiem is a German philosopher who studied in Germany and the US. She is currently employed 
at the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, Villanova University.
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scope of the liberal model. Those attempts, however, do not aim to get rid off the achieve-
ments of liberalism, the intention is not to go back to some pre-liberal condition. But there 
is some sense of urgency that liberalism cannot have the final say, that there most be some 
alternative that goes beyond the limits of liberal accounts. 
Butler can clearly be located within these efforts to go beyond the opportunities that liber-
alism offers. In this way, her theory can be read as a contribution to an ongoing debate. Her 
work is developed on the basis of the “postliberatory insight” (PLP 17) into the insuffi-
ciency of a liberal notion of the subject as autonomous, rational agent. Thus, the aim is to 
develop notions of the subject which are able to challenge the liberal paradigm. Butler’s 
more specific concern is a concept of the subject that considers it as fundamentally condi-
tioned and subordinated, but nevertheless equipped with a certain, conditioned but never-
theless rather strong agency. What such a concept might look like, and which consequences 
it might have for political theory will be one of the main research topics for the following 
inquiry of Butler’s notion of the political subject.
3. The Background: The Early Criticism of Butler’s Work
In this chapter I want to deal with the reception of Butler’s work during the 1990s in order 
to highlight the main lines of the controversy with and about Butler. I will consider the 
American  reception  first,  focussing  on  the  debate  between  Butler  and  Benhabib  in 
Feminist Contentions. This volume, published in 1995 in English and already one year 
earlier  in  German  translation,  displays  the  debate  between  Butler,  Benhabib,  Nancy 
Fraser27 and Drucilla Cornell28 that  took place in  1991. Martha Nussbaum’s29 defaming 
article  The Professor of Parody  will be discussed  as a second example of the American 
reception.  In  the  second  subsection,  I  will  continue  with  a  summary  of  the  German-
speaking reception, focusing on the contributions of Isabell Lorey30, Christine Hauskeller31 
and Andrea Maihofer32.
27 Nancy Fraser is an American philosopher. She is currently the Henry A. and Louise Loeb Professor of 
Political and Social Science at The New School.
28 Drucilla Cornell studied philosophy and law. She is currently a professor of Political Science, Compar-
ative Literature, and Women's Studies at Rutgers University.
29 Martha Nussbaum is an American philosopher. She is currently the Ernst Freund Distinguished Service 
Professor of Law and Ethics at the University of Chicago.
30 Isabell Lorey is a German political scientist. Recently, she had guestprofessorships at the University of 
Vienna and the Humboldt University, Berlin.
31 Christine Hauskeller studied philosophy, sociology and psychoanalysis at the University of Frankfurt. She 
is currently a senior research fellow in the department of Sociology and Philosophy at the University of 
Exeter.
32 Andrea Maihofer studied philosophy, german studies and educational science in Mainz, Tübingen and 
Frankfurt. She is currently a professor of gender studies and the chair of the Zentrum Gender Studies at 
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If the reception of an author or thinker is discursively produced and reproduced – as stated 
in the introduction – than it is important to know how this reception has taken shape up to 
this point in order to be able to productively re-write it. Therefore, the image of the estab-
lished reception of Butler’s work presented here is meant to constitute the background for 
the following elaboration on Butler’s political theory. I want to give an overview of the 
main arguments and concerns of the reception of Butler’s work, because it also presents 
many of the major themes that need to be dealt with in the following inquiry of Butler’s 
notion of the political subject.  The alterations and innovations of my reading of Butler 
hopefully become clearer in contrast to the common interpretations of her work.
Early American Contestation
Chambers and Carver summarize the main theme of the reception of Butler’s work very 
accurately  when they write:  “Many of  Butler’s  critical  readers  find  something terribly 
worrisome in her writings, particularly the books from the early 1990s. These critics often 
give a name to this  supposedly troubling dimension of Butler’s  work; they call  it  ‘the 
disappearance of the subject’ or ‘the loss of agency’ ” (Chambers/Carver 2008, 8).
We can paradigmatically see this tendency already in the first major discussion of Butler’s 
work, which took place in the course of the debate published as  Feminist Contentions. I 
want to restrict my discussion on Benhabib’s contribution, because I consider it the most 
significant one (Benhabib 1995a and 1995b). In her first article, Benhabib attacks certain 
positions labeled as ‘postmodern’. In Benhabib’s eyes, Butler is a leading representative of 
such a ‘postmodern theory’. Benhabib reinforces her criticism in her second article, where 
she tries to spell it out in more detail. She writes: “At the core of the disagreement between 
Butler and myself lie issues of subjectivity, selfhood, and agency” (Benhabib 1995b, 108). 
Benhabib’s  concern  throughout  the  whole  debate  is  that  Butler  does  away  with  these 
concepts altogether, and she sees in Butler’s work a “complete debunking of any concept 
of selfhood, agency, and autonomy” (Benhabib 1995a, 21). For Benhabib, Butler’s position 
leads to the end of agency, autonomy, and, eventually, politics; what remains is the assump-
tion of a complete determination by discourse, a steady reproduction of the conditions that  
constitute us. In such a theory, there is clearly no room for alteration and resistance. She 
wonders, if Butler’s “view of the self is adopted, is there any possibility of changing those 
‘expressions’ which constitute us” (Benhabib 1995a, 21)? In Benhabib’s reading there is 
clearly not, and, therefore, she is seriously worried about the dangerous consequences of 
the University of Basel.
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Butler’s theory.
But  go  a  bit  deeper  into  the  matter  discussed  here:  What  are  the  specific  objections  
Benhabib has  against  Butler’s  theory? What  aspects  of  Butler’s  account  are  especially 
worrisome? First, Benhabib doubts whether “Butler’s performative theory” can do justice 
to the complexity of the constitution of the subject or the self at all and whether she can  
contribute  at  least  something  to  a  rethinking  of  a  “new configuration  of  subjectivity” 
(Benhabib 1995b, 108).  Benhabib asserts  that  “the historical  study of the formation of 
discursive practices of individuality” – this seems to be the way she characterizes Butler’s 
project – cannot explain the processes by which a “human infant […] becomes a distinct 
self” with certain abilities we attribute to it (Benhabib 1995b, 109). However, one needs to 
consider with Jessica Benjamin33 that “the distinction between the subject and the self” – 
which Benhabib uses here – “is crucial“. But one has to critically add that it is problematic 
that “Benhabib outlines a notion of self that may not be sufficiently distinct from that of 
the philosophical subject” (Benjamin 1998, 83).34 
A further suspicion of Benhabib is  that  Butler’s  theory of subject  constitution remains 
solely within the realm of language and linguistic practices and that she, therefore, cannot 
deal with other relevant practices such as “family structures, child-rearing patterns, chil-
dren’s games, children’s dress habits,  schooling, cultural habitus etc” (Benhabib 1995b, 
109). Butler might reply with the following counter questions: Why does Benhabib only 
consider the socialization and education of children as a matter of subject constitution? 
Can the theoretical question of subject constitution really be reduced to matters of child-
raising? We will see that subject constitution is a very different kind of process than the 
socialization and education of children.
But the main objection, again, is the suspicion that Butler’s theory of the constitution of the 
subject by discourse leads to a deterministic view of the subject and a loss of agency and  
autonomy, which makes any form of resistance and change impossible. 
Indeed the question is: how can one be constituted be discourse without being determined by 
it? A speech-act theory of performative gender constitution cannot give us a sufficiently thick 
and rich account of gender formation that would also explain the capacities of human agents 
for self-determination. What is it that enables the self to ‘vary’ the gender codes such as to 
resist hegemonic discourses (Benhabib 1995b, 110)?
33 Jessica Benjamin is an American psychoanalyst. She is currently on the faculty of New York University’s 
Postdoctoral Psychology Program in Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy and of the New School for Social 
Research’s Program in Psychoanalytic Studies. Benjamin’s The Shadow of the Other includes one of the 
very few discussions of the Butler-Benhabib-debate (Benjamin 1998, 80ff.). Another discussion of this 
debate is Webster 2000.
34 The distinction of subject and self remains a relevant question one certainly has to address when dealing 
with Butler’s theory of the political subject; therefore I will revisit this topic in chapter four.
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Already the following question, which Benhabib adds, shows that in her view the answer 
to this question can only be found in an inner capacity of the self: “What psychic, intellec-
tual, or other source of creativity and resistance must we attribute to human subjects for 
such variations to be possible” (Benhabib 1995b, 110)? It will be shown in this inquiry that 
the position Benhabib displays here is precisely the point of view which Butler wants to 
challenge with her analysis of the subject. For Butler, the ability of resistance and change 
cannot be based on a  source  internal  to the ‘self’,  some intrinsic  capacity  we have  to 
attribute to the ‘human subject’.
The second contestation of Butler’s  work I  want  to  discuss  is  Nussbaum’s article  The 
Professor of Parody.35 Besides all the polemic, there are also a few arguments in this article  
worth  consideration.  Generally  speaking,  Nussbaum’s  main question  is  a  remainder  of 
Benhabib’s main objection: Where does the ability for agency come from, if not from an 
inner capacity of the subject? In contrast to Benhabib, Nussbaum admits that Butler intends 
to think agency, but the question remains for her: “But where does this ability come from, 
if there is no structure in the personality that is not thoroughly power’s creation” (Nuss -
baum 1999, 8)? In this context, Nussbaum also shares Benhabib’s troubles with Butler’s 
concept of subject constitution. She asks: “What does it mean, tell us please, for the agency 
of the subject to presuppose its own subordination” (Nussbaum 1999, 4)? Nussbaum has to 
confess that she is not able to find any answer in Butler’s texts. The conclusion she draws 
from her disappointing reading experience is again in line with Benhabib, as she claims 
that Butler does not “provide any account of the concepts of resistance and oppression” 
(Nussbaum 1999, 9). Butler’s performative theory – once again reinforcing Benhabib’s 
argument – does not allow for any change. In Nussbaum’s view, the “reactive and parodic 
performance”  which  Butler  supports  “never  destabilizes  the  larger  system“(Nussbaum 
1999, 7).
Nussbaum adds a new objection with the allegation that Butler’s theory lacks a normative 
dimension. Nussbaum goes on to show why she thinks this causes serious problems for 
Butler’s theory: “Butler cannot explain in any purely structural or procedural way why the  
subversion of gender norms is a social good while the subversion of justice norms is a 
social bad” (Nussbaum 1999, 9). In my opinion, Nussbaum hits a weak spot of Butler’s 
theory here, and therefore one has to take this objection very seriously.36 The conclusion 
Nussbaum draws from it, however, is again in line with the general polemic she employs 
35 A critical discussion of this article is offered by Bell 2002.
36  I will come back to this objection in chapters eight and nine.
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and does not add a lot to a serious analysis of Butler’s theory. She calls Butler out for a 
“naively empty politics” that can lead to nothing else than a “dangerous quietism” (Nuss-
baum  1999,  10),  basically  repeating  the  headline  that  Butler  is  only  a  “Professor  of 
Parody”.
Early German-speaking Reception
As already mentioned in chapter one, the German-speaking reception of Butler was for a 
long time “lost in a one-sided controversy about the opposition of nature and culture of the 
Geschlechter-difference and the threatening depoliticization of feminist theory” [“in einer 
einseitigen Auseinandersetzung über den Gegensatz von Natur und Kultur der Geschlech-
terdifferenz und die drohende Entpolitisierung feministischer Theorie verlor”] (Distelhorst 
2009,  15).  Butler’s  politics  was  reduced  to  a  notion  of  queer  politics,  and  she  was 
subsequently criticized, because her “politics remains on the level of performative resigni-
fications”  [“politische  Praxis  verleibt  auf  der  Ebene  performativer  Bezeichnungsver-
fahren”] (Bublitz 2000, 88).
What reasons for this restricted perspective of the German-speaking reception can be iden-
tified? To begin with,  the central  role  of  Gender Trouble is  certainly a very important 
factor. This book was – and for a large part still is – the main reason for Butler’s worldwide 
fame. Hence, it is not surprising that it has guided the reception of Butler’s work. For the 
German-speaking area, one can state the initial reactions to Gender Trouble were for most 
parts quite hostile. “Without a doubt, these severe reactions have to do with the German-
speaking tradition of materialist feminist and gender research in terms of social theory. In 
the  1980s,  this  tradition  stood  at  the  beginning  of  a  systematic  re-formulation  of 
Geschlecht  as a category of social sciences” [”Ohne Zweifel haben diese heftigen Reak-
tionen  mit  der  gesellschaftstheoretischen,  materialistischen  Tradition  deutschsprachiger 
Frauen-  und Geschlechterforschung zu tun,  die  in  den 1980er Jahren am Beginn einer 
systematischen Neu-Formulierung von Geschlecht als sozialwissenschaftlicher Kategorie 
stand”] (Sauer  2009, 145f.). One has to understand that especially for feminist political 
science it was crucial to argue against the tendency in mainstream political science to work 
with a merely functionalist notion of politics. If one goes back to the introductions to polit-
ical science discussed in the previous chapter one can see how the mainstream positions 
focus on a notion of politics as a system and work with a solely behavioral notion of polit-
ical  action.  Against  this  tendency it  was important  for  a  feminist  notion  of  politics  to 
defend and maintain the  concept  of  political  agency (Sauer  2000,  36).  In  this  specific 
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constellation,  Gender Trouble  was received as a severe threat to this promising develop-
ment, and, consequently, it had to be repelled. The perception of Butler’s theory as a threat 
to the achievements of feminism and the gender movement was certainly responsible for 
the one-sided reception of her work, which was almost solely organized around this issue.
Against the predominant reception, I want to suggest that, in fact, Butler and the tradition 
of German-speaking feminist political science share some common ground in their critique 
of the mainstream notion of politics. The specific constellation, however, was not really 
favorable for a reception of Butler’s work that allowed to acknowledge this potential alli-
ance.
Another main point of controversy was Butler’s challenge of the sex-gender-distinction. In 
this context, the German-speaking reception was especially concerned with the status of 
the  body.  Once again,  the controversy was dominated  by  a  very hostile  tone.  Barbara 
Duden37 even went so far that she wrote a very personal article about Butler with the title 
“Die Frau ohne Unterleib” [The woman without womb] (Duden 1993). These reactions 
should  again  be  seen  against  the  background  of  the  materialist  tradition  of  German-
speaking feminist  and gender research.  Butler’s  statement about the constitution of the 
body had to appear much more provocative to somebody coming from such a materialist 
tradition.
In addition to this thematic differences, one also has to consider that the language gap 
might  have  contributed  to  the  situation.  Several  of  Butler’s  books  were  published  in 
German with a significant delay and several of the articles in which Butler evolved her 
theory have never been translated into German.
In the German-speaking reception we can also observe that the question of the political  
subject  and  the  ability  of  resistance  and  change  soon  became  the  main  issues.  As 
Hauskeller  observed:  “The  topic  subject  pervades  Butler’s  texts  as  the  central  theme” 
[“Das Thema Subjekt durchzieht Butlers Texte wie ein roter Faden”] (Hauskeller 2000, 
54).  Similarly,  Lorey  summarized  the  main  questions  of  that  debate:  Do  ‘constituted 
subjects’ have agency? Are they in position to change the conditions they are living in? Is 
radical social change still thinkable if we consider a constituted subject? Or  has such a 
notion of the subject the effect that agency, critique and political action become funda-
mentally unthinkable (Lorey 1996, 8)? Another common theme in most of the discussions 
of Butler’s work was the focus on the connection between Butler and Foucault. The books 
37 Barbara Duden is a German historian and sociologist. She is currently a professor in the department of 
Sociology at the University of Hannover.
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by Lorey (1996) and Hauskeller (2000) are instances of this tendency. The main approach 
of these books is, first, to show how Butler misread Foucault with regard to several crucial 
aspects, and, second, to argue that Foucault’s conceptions are superior to Butler’s deviating 
adoption.38
Focussing on the content, we can state that the main line of argument is more or less the 
same as in the case of Benhabib.39 Hauskeller  is  worried about Butler’s “denial of the 
connection  of  subjecthood  and  the  ability  to  perform  resistance”  [“Verleugnung  des 
Zusammenhangs  von  Subjekthaftigkeit  und  der  Fähigkeit,  Widerstand  zu  leisten”] 
(Hauskeller 2000, 120). She detects a contradiction in Butler’s theory, because, on the one 
hand,  Butler  wants  to  deconstruct  the  subject,  but,  on  the  other  hand,  she  employs  a 
concept of resistance that forces her again to assume that it has its origin in the subject 
(Hauskeller 2000, 141). The conclusion one has to draw from this contradiction is that 
Butler cannot think resistance after all. The subject is determined by the discourse and the 
power  relations  it  is  formed  by  and,  hence,  there  is  simply  no  room  for  alteration 
(Hauskeller 2000, 149). The result of Hauskeller’s investigation into Butler’s concept of 
subject is, “that it is insufficient for a critical, political-practical oriented theory” [“dass 
dieses  nicht  für  eine  kritische,  politisch-praktische  orientierte  Theorie  hinreicht”] 
(Hauskeller 2000, 152).
Lorey’s argument sounds slightly different, but she comes more or less to the same conclu-
sion. Her main worry is that Butler limits processes of subject constitution to legal prac-
tices and that this restricted view has the effect that for Butler nothing can exist outside of 
power relations (Lorey 1996, 142). Because no position independent of power relations is 
possible in Butler’s theory, she is forced to explain that the outside is also constructed by 
the very same power relations, thus leading her to a point of view where she cannot chal-
lenge the established power relations, but is compelled to stabilize them again. Because 
subject constitution is always bound to power relations, and those are ultimately thought as 
38 I have the general suspicion that such an approach is not very productive to begin with; why would one 
even read Butler, if only to proof that her thought is inferior to somebody else’s, who one has already 
read?
39 It might be surprising to see that the main themes of all these critics are very similar, if we consider that 
they come from rather different theoretical backgrounds, and it might be of interest to locate these critics. 
Nussbaum is clearly located within analytic philosophy and American liberalism , and – as has been 
shown by Loizidou – her harsh criticism can be explained because of this background (Loizidou 2007, 
158). Benhabib is also located within an American context, but in contrast to Nussbaum a supporter of 
discourse ethics and hence foremost influenced by the work of the later Habermas. Hauskeller and Lorey 
have a more materialistic German-speaking background in the context of a critical theory that opened up 
for a Foucaultian power analysis. On the other hand, the intriguing similarities of the criticism might also 
indicate that they are all based on the same basic, liberal assumptions. Maybe it is precisely this common 
ground that all critics want to defend against Butler’s critique.
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legal conditions, no challenge of the law is possible (Lorey 1996, 44f.). Hauskeller shares 
the  critique  that  Butler  “is  totalizing  a  certain  conception  of  power”  [“totalisiert  eine 
bestimmte Machtkonzeption”] (Hauskeller 2000, 227), and agrees that Butler’s conception 
of power is a solely legal one (Hauskeller 2000, 169 and 213). Thus, Lorey and Hauskeller 
are  not concerned that Butler  dismisses categories which are important  for  progressive 
politics, on the contrary, they are worried that she sticks with the established, hegemonic 
categories, and offers no way of challenging them (Lorey 1996, 139). In such a conception, 
the subject can only be thought as subjected (Lorey 1996, 140), and subject constitution is 
always a  solely heteronomous determination (Hauskeller  2000, 215).  This  mono-causal 
logic of subject constitution,  Hauskeller concludes, allows for no resistance and makes 
agency effectively impossible (Hauskeller 2000, 250).
Another  consequence  of  this  reading  of  Butler  is  that  any  conception  of  historicity  is 
impossible, as Lorey points out (Lorey 1996, 36). Butler’s research is located on a struc-
tural, but entirely ahistorical level, making any consideration of concrete power relations 
unnecessary and implausible (Lorey 1996, 116).  Butler  does not consider any concrete 
agents, she always stays with the subject, which is always already a subjected, that means 
determined, one (Lorey 1996, 118). Due to all those problems, we have to conclude that 
her conception of subversion is terribly weak (Lorey 1996, 45).
Already one year earlier than the publication of Lorey’s book, Maihofer released a book 
that included an interpretation of Butler that suggests that the image of Butler’s theory, 
which Lorey and Hauskeller are presenting, is overly simplistic. In her reading of Butler, it 
turns out to be very clear that gender is conceptualized as “the effect of a discursive praxis 
that  is  historically  specified”  [“Effekt  einer  historisch  bestimmten diskursiven Praxis”] 
(Maihofer 1995, 46). Thus, according to Maihofer Butler insists on the historical contin-
gency of gender norms, and she makes clear that Butler’s concepts of parody and resigni-
fication have to be seen within that context (Maihofer 1995, 42). Maihofer was thereby 
maybe the first  one to see the key role  that  denaturalization plays in Butler’s theory.40 
Maihofer still criticizes Butler, because she thinks that her analysis remains solely on a 
synchronic level and does not include diachronic dimensions, while being very clear that 
Butler in no way supports a theory that is ahistorical (Maihofer 1995, 47). Formulated in 
this way, her critique is much more profound than Lorey’s simplistic suspicion of ahistor-
icity,and definitely requires serious attention.
The final concern I want to mention deals with Butler’s link of speech and action (Lorey 
40  I will come back to this matter in chapter five.
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1996, 141). This is once again a concern we have already seen in Benhabib. Hauskeller 
detects a one-sided location of of all constitutional processes and all abilities for alteration 
and change within language (Hauskeller 2000, 50). Consequently, that leads to a view in 
which  language  supposedly  remains  the  only  means  of  change  Butler  can  consider. 
Hauskeller even goes as far as to claim that “Butler accepts only language as means of 
change and denies the effectiveness of non-discursive means” [“Butler läßt nur die Sprache 
als Mittel der Veränderung gelten und bestreitet die Effektivität nicht-diskursiver Mittel”] 
(Hauskeller 200, 115). This is already a very questionable statement, but Lorey takes it 
even one step further, arguing that for Butler, ultimately, there exists no difference between 
speech and action at all: “words are actions” (Lorey 1996, 115). In Lorey’s defense one has 
to  say  that  her  interpretation  had  been  written  before  Butler’s  Excitable  Speech was 
published, a book in which Butler investigates into the performative force of language and 
specifies the connections and differences between discursive and non-discursive practices. 
While  unknown to Lorey,  one certainly needs to  consider  the remarks  on language  in 
Excitable Speech when dealing with Butler’s theory. 
In  this  context,  I  want  to  suggest  that  one  of  the  main  problems  with  Lorey’s  and 
Hauskeller’s reading of Butler is that they are presupposing a certain theory of language, 
which is certainly not the same as the one Butler supports. Maihofer was more careful in 
this respect, clearly noticing that one needs to consider that Butler is employing a certain  
notion of language. That allows her to  formulate her concern in a more appropriate and 
cautious way (Maihofer 1995, 47).41 
Summary
To sum up this short survey of the reception of Butler’s work, I want to bring together the 
main objections and concerns that  appeared in the American and the German-speaking 
context. 
It  can be stated that the question of the political  subject has been a focal point of the 
controversy about Butler’s work already from the beginning. The main suspicion was that 
Butler  cannot  think  the  political  subject  and  that  her  work  therefore  cannot  attribute 
anything to a theory of politics, but rather that she puts any effort in this direction in jeop-
41 Maihofer’s concern that Butler might after all be in danger of supporting a “semiotic idealism” (Maihofer 
1995, 47) is formulated in a very plausible way and would be worth further investigation. Unfortunately I 
cannot deal with this issue in this inquiry. Hauskeller’s reading of Bodies that matter, which is maybe the 
best  part  of  her  book, should also be mentioned in  this context  (Hauskeller  2000, 97ff.).  To prevent 
further misreadings of Butler’s texts – but also of my own inquiry – I will try to bring some light into the 
conception of language at work in Butler’s texts in chapter five.
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ardy. In particular, the concern was that Butler could not offer any conception of agency, 
and, similarly, that she could not explain political action at all. Based on that interpretation, 
the additional suspicion was that she was ultimately unable to explain any kind of altera-
tion and resistance, and thereby made any notion of change implausible. Another concern 
was that Butler reduced everything to linguistic practices. It does not matter whether we 
speak about the body, relations of power and domination, or political action, the suspicion 
was that those ‘actual’ ‘facts’ – that are certainly and rightfully very important to theorists 
working in a variety of disciplines – are all considered to be merely linguistic phenomena 
in Butler’s work. As a consequence, readers were frightened that they would lose track of 
‘real’ bodies, ‘real’ power relations and so forth when complying with Butler’s theory. In 
the case of Lorey and Hauskeller, we found the additional objection that Butler’s theory is 
ahistorical, and, in correspondence with it, that her conception of power was monolithic, 
mono-causal, and did not allow for the analysis of concrete situations and relations. As a 
consequence of all those tendencies, the view on Butler’s notion of politics – assumed that 
she was even granted to have something like that – was very limited. 
In the course of this inquiry, I want to show that these objections and concerns are for the 
most part based on a misinformed reading of Butler’s texts. That does not mean that I 
suggest  that  we  should  adopt  an  uncritical  attitude  towards  Butler’s  work.  Quite  the 
contrary, such a critical approach is, indeed, necessary in order to evaluate what Butler’s 
theory can and cannot  accomplish.  Such an evaluation is  certainly  the purpose of  this 
inquiry.
Part 2: Butler’s Conception of the Political Subject
This part will discuss the subject as a category of political theory. The aim is the reintro-
duction of the subject into the realm of politics and the resignification of the subject as a 
major political concern. Whereas the subject has traditionally been seen as prior to politics, 
Butler reveals that the claim that the subject is beyond the scope of political analysis and 
contestation is,  in fact,  the result of a political strategy of naturalization that intends to 
immunize a specific conception of the subject against political contestation. In this context, 
Butler shows that the foundations of politics are themselves political. Whenever something 
is claimed to be beyond the realm of politics, we need to ask critically about the naturaliza-
tion processes at work in making that claim. Butler highlights the importance of a strategy 
of  denaturalization,  which  implies  a  deconstruction  of  naturalness  and  a  genealogy of 
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naturalization  processes.  The  result  is  a  project  of  radical  repoliticization, and  in  this 
context we have to contextualize the reintroduction of the subject into politics.
Especially in The Psychic Life of Power, Butler offers an analysis of processes of subjec-
tion, which reveals the relation of subject and power. Power and subject are linked together 
in the process of subjection. This link of power and subject makes an expansion of the 
scope of analyses of power possible, which can no longer solely focus on the power that is 
enforced by one subject on another, but which also need to take into consideration the 
power that is at work in the constitution of those very subjects. In this context, the present 
inquiry suggests reading Butler’s notion of subjection in the light of a theory of hegemony. 
This enables us to appreciate Butler’s notion of normative violence, that means the viol-
ence enforced by the  norms that  regulate  the processes  of  subjection  and the  possible 
subject positions. Butler especially focuses on the precarious status of those that cannot 
confirm with the norms and are, therefore, banned from the realm of intelligible life. This  
will confront us with the question of the conceptualization of the outside in Butler’s theory.
4. Contextualizing Butler’s Question about the Political Subject
This chapter begins with an outline of the scope of Butler’s account of the subject. It espe-
cially deals with the following questions: Why and in which way can we state that her 
analysis of the subject is an investigation into the political subject? How is an account of 
the political subject located within a wider field of theories about subjectivity and the self? 
What are the consequences of raising the question about the subject explicitly as a question 
about the political subject?
Two Notions of the Subject
As a starting point, I want to refer to an entry on ‘subject’, which Butler composed for a 
compendium on political and social philosophy (SUB). In this text, Butler points out that 
there were two distinct traditions in which the term ‘subject’ was used. Firstly, ‘subject’ 
was used in a metaphysical sense in which it meant the ultimate foundation for a set of 
attributes, which are thought as following in a second step. In this sense it was either iden-
tified with Descartes’ res cogitans or with the protagonist in Hegel’s  Phenomenology of  
Spirit. Secondly, ‘subject’ was employed in a political sense, in which the status of the 
subject was theorized as empowered and subjected at the same time. In this context, being 
a  subject  meant  being subjected  to  a  sovereign power or  a  government.  Butler  names 
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Hobbes and Foucault as representatives of this second tradition. The existence of these 
distinct traditions poses the question, how the two are interrelated. Is the political subject 
dependent on the metaphysical subject? Or is the metaphysical subject, on the contrary, 
bound to the history of the subject in the political sense (SUB 1302f.)?
In recent years, Butler continues, we can observe a turning away form traditional conceptu-
alizations of the subject. In this context, Butler refers once again to Foucault and explains 
that  Foucault’s  critique  was  not  directed  towards  the  subject  itself,  but  rather  against 
certain notions of the subject. In his critique of traditional notions of the subject, he espe-
cially opposes the distinction between epistemological and political theories of the subject. 
In Foucault’s view not only the political, but also what is said to be the epistemological or 
metaphysical subject  cannot be separated from its subjection under a certain regime of 
power (SUB 1303f.).  Butler  also links Nietzsche’s famous thesis that there is ‘no doer 
behind  the  deed’ to  that  critique  of  the  notion  of  a  metaphysical  subject.  In  Butler’s 
reading, Nietzsche wants to point out that the subject has to be constituted in the first place 
and that it therefore has to deal with a history of its formation, which it can never be fully 
aware of (SUB 1305).
Butler, however, does not say that we can or should completely abandon the notion of the 
subject. Quite on the contrary, she argues that we need an adequate theory of the subject 
that can serve for critical analysis. In this article, Butler goes on to defend a conception of 
the subject which is linked to a certain reading of Hegel. Hegel was conventionally criti-
cized, because he supposedly based his theory of the subject on a hypostatization that was 
in line with the metaphysical tradition. Against this line of reception, Butler argues that 
Hegel supports an ‘ec-static’ conception of the subject,  which is not at all a self-identical 
foundation,  but  rather  develops  through  the  process  of  its  interrelation  with  alterity 
(SUB1304).42 
Butler’s goal seems to be to open up opportunities for new conceptions of subjectivity,  
42 Butler’s reading of Hegel dates back to her  student  years  and already crystallized in her  dissertation 
Subjects of Desire. In the volume  Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, which displays a dialogue of 
Butler  with Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj Žižek the diverging reception of Hegel is  one main aspect of 
disagreement between Laclau and Butler, who in that respect is supported by Žižek – whereas for the rest 
of the book, Laclau and Butler share the same opinions most of the time while considerably disagreeing 
with Žižek. In this thesis I will not be able to address Butler’s reception of Hegel. When dealing with that 
topic one also has to raise the question what it eventually means to present a reading of a classic like 
Hegel and what the main purpose of such a reading is and should be. Is it the goal to give an account of 
the intention of the author that is as adequate as possible? Is it even possible to give such an account? 
How  can  the  intention  of  an  author  be  determined?  Who  has  the  authority  to  decide  on  that 
determination? Are other readings also possible and legal? Could it even be that a misreading of a classic 
can  be  productive,  as  it  opens  new  perspectives?  Is  there  something  like  a  practice  of  productive 
misreading?
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which do not need to be grounded on the notion of a metaphysical subject. Butler argues in 
that  line of  thought  when she  states  that  Foucault’s  writings  should be  seen  less  as  a 
critique of the subject,  but rather as the promotion of new modes of subjectivity (SUB 
1302). The question, which Butler is concerned with, is to establish notions of the political 
subject that are not based on a metaphysical foundation and cannot be reduced to an isol-
ated first-person perspective, but rather have to take into account the primary relations of 
the subject with others (SUB 1306).
The Subject Versus the Self
The discussed article is of some interest, because, on the one hand, it gives some insights 
into Butler’s view about a broader and more general philosophical inquiry of subjectivity 
and selfhood, and, on the other hand, it was written for a compendium on political and 
social philosophy, so it is located within the discipline the present inquiry also wants to 
focus on. Additionally, it is a relatively recent text that gives an insight into Butler’s current  
point of view. Butler seems to have been dealing with wider questions about subjectivity 
and selfhood more and more in recent years – at least since Undoing Gender and Giving 
an Account of Oneself. In her writings of the 1990s, in contrast, Butler usually does not 
deal with these wider contexts, but focuses on a rather narrow question. This restricted 
concern can especially be seen in  Gender Trouble,  where Butler explicitly  clarifies the 
redefined scope of her account: 
Within philosophical discourse itself, the notion of ‘the person’ has received analytic elabora-
tion on the assumption that whatever social context the person is ‘in’ remains somehow extern-
ally related to the definitional structure of personhood, be that consciousness, the capacity for 
language, or moral deliberation (GT 22f.).
Butler wants to avoid an investigation into the subject that is based on the assumption of 
some internal features. Instead, she shifts the focus of her investigation: 
Whereas  the question of  what  constitutes  ‘personal  identity’ within philosophical  accounts 
almost always centers on the question of what internal features of the person establishes the 
continuity of self-identity of the person through time, the question here will be: To what extent 
do regulatory practices of gender formation and division constitute identity, the internal coher-
ence of the subject, indeed, the self-identical status of the person? To what extent is ‘identity’ a 
normative ideal rather than a descriptive feature of experience (GT 23)?
In comparison to those traditional accounts, Butler’s starting point is already based on a 
significant relocation of the main questions. In order to comprehend this move, one has to 
distinguish between the different levels an inquiry might be concerned with. Therefore I 
suggest  distinguishing  the  conception  of  the  ‘subject’ from a  notion  of  the  ‘self′.  The 
meaning of the term ‘self’ is not clear either, as there is a dispute among scholars about the 
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requirements to count as a self.  In a minimal sense, the ‘self’ could describe what one 
might call mineness – Heidegger’s Jemeinigkeit –, the fact that my life is mine, my experi-
ence is  mine, this kind of first-person-givenness. As the phenomenological tradition has 
shown, mineness does not presuppose a notion of the ‘subject’, nor does it imply the refer-
ence to an ‘I’; it is certainly not a Kantian ‘I think’ (Heidegger 2001, 42 and 316ff.). But in 
the opinion of most scholars, to be a self implies more then only mineness, even though it 
can certainly not be thought independent of it.  To sum up, we can state that  there  are 
multiple levels of selfhood that can be distinguished, all based on some kind of mineness, 
and the solution might be to adopt a multi-dimensional account of the self, corresponding 
to those different levels (Zahavi 2009). 
However, in  Gender Trouble, Butler makes it clear that she does not want to investigate 
into those philosophical aspects of a theory of the self. Therefore, I think that it would be a 
mistake to read Butler’s work as a coherent and comprehensive account of the self, which 
is supposed to include all traditional features of such a theory, and to judge her theory 
according  to  those  criteria.  Furthermore,  I  think  that  it  would  also  be  wrong  to  even 
demand Butler to have an opinion on all those aspects, which a comprehensive discussion 
of the self might have to include. No theory can cover everything, and consequently we 
have to take into account that there are questions that are simply not within Butler’s area of 
concern – even though they might be of great interest. This is especially the case with 
Gender Trouble, which should certainly not be read as Butler’s final word on a theory of 
the self.  One has to keep in mind that  Gender Trouble – even though it  was a highly 
profound, provocative and radical book that rightfully has had a major impact on contem-
porary thinking of subjectivity – in fact had a rather narrow point of departure within a 
theory of gender.43 In a  rejoinder to Benhabib’s critique, Butler is very clear about this 
point: “Indeed, if I were to offer a ‘theory of the self,’ which I do not, it would not be redu-
cible to a theory of gender“ (CR 133).44 Thus, at least for Butler’s early work we can state 
43 Therefore it  is  misleading, when Hauskeller  criticizes that Butler is overestimating the importance of 
sexuality for the constitution of the subject (Hauskeller 2000, 273). Butler does not claim that the sexual 
is the only institution of subject formation, she does not even claim that it is the most important. Quite on 
the contrary, she is insisting that the constitution of the subject and its identity has to be considered along 
a variety of axis. It is simply the focus of the book Gender Trouble that requires that she is dealing with 
specific instances of “such defining institutions: phallogocentrism and compulsory heterosexuality” (GT 
xxxi). In  Bodies that Matter, Butler raises the question how gender interacts with other axis of subject 
formation such as race. Her point seems to be that those axis cannot be considered separately from each 
other, except for the purpose of theoretical research that is based on an abstraction. Butler, however, does 
not go on to investigate into the details of those interactions among axis of subject formation and it is 
therefore not possible to consider her account in more detail (BM 117).
44 I want to point out that there is a crucial mistake in the German translation of this sentence. This is of 
major importance, because this article was first published in German. The German reads: “Würde ich in 
der  Tat  eine ‘Theorie des Selbst’ anbieten – was ich nicht  tue –, dann wäre sie  reduzierbar auf  eine 
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that it was not her intent to offer ‘a theory of the self’. Hence, it is kind of odd to criticize 
Butler for not having a theory of the self, because, on the one hand, it is even in Butler’s 
own opinion a correct statement that she does not provide such a theory, but, on the other 
hand, that cannot really be an objection against her theory, because Butler nowhere claims 
to offer such a theory, but rather explicitly refuses even to deal with the question of the self 
in such a broad way.
I think that this differentiation has often been overlooked in the reception of Butler’s early 
work and caused some confusion. Lorey, for instance, criticizes Butler for lacking a theory 
of the self. Her own solution is an existentialist model of self-crafting in which the self-
constitution of the subject as a self-relation has to be taken into account (Lorey 1996, 
152ff.). First of all, one can respond that Lorey’s objection clearly shows that she does not 
go along with Butlers  shift  of  focus.  Second,  one might  wonder if  Lorey is  not again 
employing a notion of personhood – even though conceptualized as a process of becoming 
– that Butler wants to avoid in her analysis. In  Gender Trouble,  Butler writes that “the 
‘coherence’ and ‘continuity’ of ‘the person’ are not logical or analytical features of person-
hood, but, rather, socially instituted and maintained norms of intelligibility” (GT 23). This 
passage should also be read against the background of the shift in focus towards a theory of 
the political subject. Butler’s point seems to be that an investigation into something like the 
‘coherence’ and ‘continuity’ of a ‘person’ is always already a question about identity. And 
she furthermore seems to indicate that a question about identity is a social question all 
along. The fact that these features of the self are ‘socially instituted and maintained’ then 
indicates that they are always already social in nature.
However,  this  critique  can  be  reformulated  in  a  way that  entails  that  the  reference  to 
Butler’s shift in focus is no longer enough to reject the objection. In Shadow of the Other, 
Benjamin presents such a critical evaluation of Butler’s account, focusing on the restric-
tions it is based on and what problems these may cause. I will not give a full account of 
Benjamin’s evaluation, but only deal with Benjamin’s contribution to the matter discussed 
in  this  chapter.  Benjamin  declares  clearly  that  “identity  is  not  self.  Self  is  a  category 
distinct from that of identity” (Benjamin 1998, 87). And she concludes that “the critique of 
identity does not prevent us from postulating a psychic subjectivity” (Benjamin 1998, 87). 
From that perspective Benjamin can highlight the problematic aspect of Butler’s restricted 
point of departure. Her suspicion is that “Butler collapses self and subject, as if political, 
Theorie des Gender.” There is obviously a “nicht” missing in the last part of the sentence. This mistake 
completely alters the sentence, which then in German means exactly the opposite of which was originally 
said in English. 
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epistemological positions, such as the ‘identity’ of women as a unified political subject,  
fully correspond to a psychological concept of the self” (Benjamin 1998, 85). When doing 
so, Butler “misses the psychoanalytic concept of self” (Benjamin 1998, 87). Benjamin asks 
for a theory of the self that, first, takes into account the encounter of the self with alterity, 
and, second, also untangles how this encounter goes hand in hand with a process of recog-
nition. She, at least implicitly, comments that Butler seems to lack a position about those 
matters. 
But is this in fact the case? Is Benjamin right with her suspicion that Butler abolishes a 
notion of the self that can take into account the relation with otherness and processes of 
recognition by reducing these aspects to a matter of political identity? It seems to be the 
case that Butler adopts the criticized point of view at least in some of her most famous 
works of the 1990s, precisely those works which are also the primary focus of the present 
inquiry. However, if we take an overview of Butler’s oeuvre, we can also see that she was, 
at least at some points, clearly concerned with those questions. In “Longing for Recogni-
tion”, which is published in Undoing Gender, Butler offers a reply to Benjamin’s critique, 
and  it  turns  out  that  she  agrees  with  Benjamin  for  most  parts.  The  questions  which 
Benjamin raises, clearly begin to play a bigger role in Butler’s more recent writings, where 
she deals with theories of recognition and gives an account of human vulnerability based 
on their bodily being in the world (PL). A further investigation into these issues would 
need to  take  Butler’s  intellectual  point  of  departure  in  certain  traditions  of  continental 
philosophy into consideration, especially her reading of Hegel through the lens of French 
Hegelianism (recognition) and her contact with a existentialist interpretation of Phenomen-
ology (Leiblichkeit and vulnerability).
Overall, if we consider Butler’s more recent texts, we can clearly see that she is dealing 
with such wider questions about the self and it is therefore obvious that she does not object 
to those investigations in general.45 However, if we stay with Butler’s works from Gender 
Trouble to The Psychic Life of Power, the question still remains if the theory she presents in 
those texts radically contradicts philosophical investigations into the notion of selfhood, or 
if her remarks can be integrated into such a wider field of research. The stance defended in 
the present inquiry is the following: If Butler were to believe that the account of the subject 
she presents covers everything there is to say about a theory of the self – and the clarifica-
45 I will widely ignore this fact for the first eight chapters of this inquiry, focussing on the notion of the 
subject Butler uses in her writings of the 1990s. However, beginning with chapter nine, I will evaluate the 
shift in Butler’s account from a critical genealogy of the subject to a more psychologically grounded 
notion of the self.
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tion in  Contingent Foundations quoted above clearly indicates that  she is not – then it 
would be a significant shortcoming of her theory. But if she is clear about  the restricted 
focus of her theory, then her investigation into the subject and identity can stand on its own 
as an important contribution in this respect.
The  present  inquiry  will  follow Butler’s  shift  of  research  interest, and  work  with  the 
specific  notion  of  the  subject  that  Butler  employs  in  her  works  at  least  from  Gender 
Trouble to  The Psychic Life of Power. Therefore, it is required to make explicit that this 
inquiry will exclude philosophical questions about subjectivity and the self. Thus, Butler 
will not be defended as a theorist of subjectivity or the self. Instead, the aim is to invest-
igate into her theory of the subject, which is marked as a theory of the political subject, and 
make clear how this is an important contribution to political theory.
The Subject as a Critical Category
The present inquiry wants to focus on Butler’s conception of the political subject. But what 
does  the  term ‘subject’ mean in  this  context?  What  are  the  distinguishing  features  of 
Butler’s  notion of  the  subject?  In  particular,  what  does it  indicate  to  label  the  subject 
discussed here as a  political  one? In a famous passage from The Psychic Life of Power, 
Butler points out that we should be clear about what is meant when referring to the subject:
‘The subject’ is sometimes bandied about as if it were interchangeable with ‘the person’ or ‘the 
individual.’ The genealogy of  the subject  as a  critical  category, however,  suggests that  the 
subject,  rather  than  be  identified  strictly  with  the  individual,  ought  to  be  designated  as  a 
linguistic category, a placeholder, a structure in formation. Individuals come to occupy the site 
of the subject (the subject simultaneously emerges as a ‘site’), and they enjoy intelligibility 
only to the extent that they are, as it were, first established in language. The subject is the 
linguistic  occasion for  the individual  to  achieve and reproduce intelligibility,  the linguistic 
condition of its existence and agency (PLP 10f.).
Whereas in everyday language we use the term ‘subject’ more or less interchangeable with 
other  terms  such  as  ‘person’ or  ‘individual’,  Butler  suggests  that  we  should  employ 
‘subject’ in a technical sense as a critical category of social theory. 
With  that  definition,  Butler,  interestingly  enough,  is  in  line  with  Ernesto  Laclau46 and 
Chantal Mouffe’s47 use of the term subject in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Laclau and 
Mouffe point out that the question of the subject has to deal with two distinct problems that 
need to be distinguished: First, “the problem of the discursive or pre-discursive character 
of the category of the subject“; second, “the problem of the relationship among different 
46 Ernesto Laclau is an Argentinian political theorist. He is currently a professor of Political Theory at the 
University of Essex.
47 Chantal Mouffe is a Belgian political theorist. She is a professor in the Department of Politics and Inter-
national Relations at the University of Westminster.
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subject positions” (Laclau/Mouffe 2001, 114f.). Concerning the first problem they refer to 
the critique of classic conceptions of the subject, which they say had “three conceptual 
targets: the view of the subject as agent both rational and transparent to itself; the supposed 
unity and homogeneity of the ensemble of its positions; and the conception of the subject 
as origin and basis of social relations” (Laclau/Mouffe 2001, 115). In Laclau and Mouffe’s 
view, these critiques are already well  known so that they do not need refer to them in 
detail. Anyway, there is no doubt about their general position concerning the first question 
and  they  can,  thus,  give  the  following  definition:  “Whenever  we  use  the  category  of 
‘subject’ in this text, we will do so in the sense of ‘subject positions’ within a discursive 
structure” (Laclau/Mouffe, 2001 115). For Laclau and Mouffe, subjects are neither fully 
rational nor transparent to themselves, their unity and homogeneity cannot be presupposed 
and they are certainly not the origin of social relations. The subject has to be investigated 
in its embedding into discursive formations and, therefore, the second problem, the ques-
tion of the relation of different subject position, becomes the major concern.48
To sum up, in Butler’s texts of the 1990s – similar to the move exhibited by Laclau and 
Mouffe – ‘subject’ is used in a terminologically fixed sense as a category that names a site 
within a discursive structure. It is thereby not the same as an individual, rather it is the 
placeholder that allows individuals to achieve a place within this structure by occupying 
the site of the subject. The fact that Butler also describes the subject as a linguistic category 
led to the common critique that she is reducing the complex structure of the subject purely 
to a scene in language. The next chapter will offer an inquiry into the notion of language 
that is in the background of Butler’s conception in order to show that this critique is based 
on the fact that Butler works with a different notion of language than most of her critics do. 
Still, the question remains how to think the relation of the ‘subject’ and the ‘individual’. If 
these terms are not the same, but rather have to be strictly distinguished, what then is the 
connection between them? An answer could be to say that they are  simply located on 
different levels; parallel to the distinction of subject and self,  Butler simply locates the 
notion of the subject on a specific level relevant to her theory and excludes other levels and 
possible approaches from her analysis. This, however, is not a very satisfying answer. That 
is why it is necessary to present a further argument that might run as follows: If we refer to 
an ‘individual’,  it  is necessarily a reference within  language. But if the reference takes 
48 One has to consider, however, that Laclau’s notion of the subject has shifted since the publication of 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy and moved closer to a Lacanian notion of the subject as lack and negat-
ivity (Distelhorst 2007, 86). Butler appears to be rather critical about this shift, because in her eyes it 
implies a certain unjustified resubstantialization (RU and CU).
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place within language,  we are not anymore referring to the individual,  instead,  we are 
already dealing with the linguistic category of the ‘subject’. As a conclusion, it might turn 
out that we cannot refer to the ‘individual’, because the ‘individual’ only becomes intelli-
gible by occupying the position of the ‘subject’ within a linguistic structure. As Butler 
writes: “Paradoxically, no intelligible reference to individuals or their becoming can take 
place without a prior reference to their status as subjects” (PLP 11). The reason is that “it 
makes little sense to treat ‘the individual’ as an intelligible term if individuals are said to 
acquire their intelligibility by becoming subjects” (PLP 11).
The same line of thought is repeated in Bodies that Matter when Butler writes about “the 
instability and incompleteness of subject-formation” and continues: “The ‘I’ is thus a cita-
tion of the place of the ‘I’ in speech, where that place has a certain priority and anonymity 
with respect to the life it animates: it is the historically revisable possibility of a name that 
precedes and exceed me, but without which I cannot speak” (BM 226). So even if I say ‘I’, 
I cannot base my speaking on the notion of an ‘I’ existing prior to language. There is no 
simple reference to an ‘I’ possible on which I could base my use of this pronoun. Instead, 
my capacity to use the term ‘I’ is based on the possibilities that language offers to occupy 
the site of this pronoun within a historically variable linguistic structure.
The shift in perspective of Butler’s account of the subject allows for new fields of research. 
Butler wants to investigate the discursive formations that enable individuals to occupy the 
site of a subject, which opens up their opportunity to raise their voices. It is the investiga-
tion into the location and formation of  these sites  that  her investigation of the subject 
focuses on. Butler indicates that the task of social theory is to work on a genealogy of 
subject formation and the discursive structure in which it takes place. She calls for a “crit-
ical evaluation of subject formation”, which requires two things: First, “a suspension of the 
‘I’ in the interest of an analysis of subject formation”, but then, second, also “a reassump-
tion of the first-person perspective” which “is compelled by the question of agency” (PLP 
29). Thus, Butler’s theoretical strategy does not want to do away with the subject. Rather, it  
is meant to enable us to ask questions about the constitution of subjects within a social 
structure. It is supposed to sharpen our awareness for different modes of subject formation. 
Thereby Butler establishes the research design for a “critical analysis of subjection”, and 
she mentions three main topics such research involves: First, “an account of the way regu-
latory power maintains subjects in subordination“; second, an investigation into the limits 
of subject formation, which she locates in a certain “melancholia”; and third, “an account 
of the iterability of the subject that shows how agency may well consist in opposing and 
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transforming the social term by which it is spawned” (PLP 29). 
Even though Butler’s elaborations, which have been discussed in this chapter, are quite 
abstract, the main critical argument of her theory is rather simple. Whereas the subject was 
traditionally seen as  a  metaphysical  category,  which was prior  and outside of  political 
analysis – and, hence, no concern for political science – Butler – with reference to this 
other, political tradition of the term, which is bound with the names Hobbes and Foucault – 
tries to reinvoke the term as a political category. If subject is understood as a political 
category, it no longer needs to be seen as a given. Rather, it allows for the critical analysis 
of the process of  subjection and the critical  evaluation of  subject  formation.  Thus,  the 
subject is not prior or outside of the realm of politics, but the constitution of the subject 
turns out to be a major political concern. In addition, the critical analysis of subject forma-
tion is – as will be discussed at length in the following chapter – always an analysis of the 
relations of power at work in this formation. In this sense, the subject – now understood as 
a political category – can function as a new starting point for a critical political theory.
5. Denaturalization and Genealogy
Butler’s contribution to the discussion in Feminist Contentions can serve as an important 
clarification of her position in several crucial aspects. She argues that traditionally it has 
been presupposed that “any theory of politics requires a subject, needs from the start to 
presume its subject, the referentiality of language, the integrity of the institutional descrip-
tions it provides. For politics is unthinkable without a foundation, without these premises” 
(CF 35f.). It is exactly this presupposition that Butler wants to put into question. Is it really 
true that politics is unthinkable without these premises? Butler employs a twofold strategy 
to contest  this traditional foundation of politics.  First,  she rejects every single of these 
premises separately. Second, she suggests that these premises do not provide a necessary 
precondition for politics in general, but rather “secure a contingent formation of politics 
that requires that these notions remain unproblematized features of its own definition” (CF 
36). So it could be “that a specific version of politics is shown in its contingency once 
those  premises  are  problematically  thematized”  (CF  36).  In  order  to  support  Butler’s 
second strategy, which apparently has to be counterintuitive for someone who is grounded 
within the traditional notion of politics, it is necessary to take a closer look at Butler’s first 
strategy, that is, her challenges of those premises that serve as the foundation of that notion 
of politics, which she wants to overcome. In other words, we need to examine how those 
premises are challenged in order to contest them as foundations of a notion of politics, 
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which presents itself as the only possible notion, but might turn out to be only one contin-
gent version of politics among others.
Language and Referentiality
This chapter will focus on the first and second premises and leave the third one, which is 
focused on institutional descriptions, aside. First, the second premise which claims that 
there is a ‘referentiality of language’ will be discussed. Then, the inquiry will come back to 
the first premise, which deals with the question of the subject. The embedding of Butler`s 
thought within an elaborate and very complex theory of language has often been over-
looked, which has lead to several crucial misreadings of her work. This is also due to the 
fact that Butler is very reluctant about making her theory of language explicit. However, as 
Anna-Lisa Müller49 pointed out  recently,  Butler’s  notion of  language is  crucial  for her 
theory, and, additionally, it can be stated that there is also a continuity in Butler’s account 
of language throughout all her works (Müller 2009, 126).
This chapter will only present a short outline of Butler’s contesting of classic conceptions 
of language that are based around the notion of referentiality. Butler is attached to a tradi-
tion of philosophy of language that puts the referentiality of language radically into ques-
tion. Foucault’s notion of discourse, Austin’s theory of performative speech (Austin 1975), 
Derrida’s reading of Austin (Derrida 1988), and the poststructuralist critique of Saussure’s 
structuralist theory of language (Derrida 1983) are specifically important for Butler in this 
respect.50 What is the view of language, of which Butler – following these predecessors – is 
convinced that it needs to be criticized and overcome?
If we consider the classic notion of the semiotic triangle, which dates all the way back to 
ancient philosophy, the belief was that a word or symbol evoked a thought or reference and 
that the thought or reference again referred to an object or referent. Via these relations it is 
possible that a word (in language) stands for an object (external to language). Describing 
the relation the other way round, we can say that an external object is in a first step repres-
ented by an internal thought and that this thought is then, in a second step, symbolized or 
represented by a symbol or word. In this conception of language it seems to be natural and 
self-evident that a word – via these relations of representation – refers to some external 
49 Anna-Lisa Müller is a graduate student at the Bielefeld Graduate School in History and Sociology.
50 There is not one text where Butler deals extensively with a philosophy of language, but there are several 
text in which she deals with the topic. Several such passages will be discussed in the following para-
graphs. Additionally, the discussion of performativity and iterability in chapter eight will begin with a 
brief discussion of the influences mentioned here.
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object. It appears guaranteed that there are ‘real’ things we can relate to, which in a subor-
dinated step can be symbolized in language. Thus, language can be defined as a mere 
description of the ‘real’ world. In that understanding, the term ‘women’ – to take Butler’s  
famous example – seems to necessarily refer to certain individuals, which have specific 
attributes that exist independently of language and allow us to distinguish those individuals 
from others. The term ‘women’ appears to be the representation in language for this fixed 
group of individuals.
What are the reasons that this view of language turned out to be insufficient in the opinion 
of – in fact – most 20th century philosophers and linguists? What is problematic about this 
view? In which way does it need to be corrected? First of all, we have to be aware that this  
conception implies quite a complicated procedure, which includes several identifications. 
To use the same example, the term ‘women’ needs to be identified with certain attributes 
that describe the group the term refers to and those attributes again must be identified with 
certain individuals. But how are those identifications to be guaranteed? Are they distinct 
and unequivocal or do they allow for variation? The suspicion is that neither the attributes 
nor the individuals in question can be found separated from these operations of identifica-
tion. Individuals are only identified and represented as this or that through processes of 
identification. And these are processes ‘within’ language that are not once and for ever 
fixed,  but  open  for  constant  alteration.  In  other  words,  those  identifications  can  be 
contested and are permanently under contention. To turn again to the example of ‘women’, 
there is not something like a ‘real’ woman that merely needs to be represented by the term  
‘woman’. Rather, what the term ‘women’ represents, that means, what rightfully can be 
identified with that category, is constituted precisely through the operation of identifica-
tion.
That does certainly not mean that everything is reducible to language, as the suspicion 
might be.  This conception of language does not assert  that  there is nothing outside of 
language. Still, what it denies is that this so called ‘outside’ is something pregiven, inde-
pendent from language that only needs to be represented in language subsequently. The 
main insight is that everything that is given to us, our experience and the intelligibility of 
the objects experienced, is constituted in and through language. Consequently, there is no 
‘real’ world ‘independent’ of language. There certainly is still a ‘real’ ‘outside’, but this 
outside is always already experienced in and though the structuring and articulation of 
language. To fix something outside of language is an operation within language. In Contin-
gent Foundations Butler gives two instances of the consequences of this understanding of 
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language. First, she refers to the body: 
If the body signified as prior to signification is an effect of signification, then the mimetic or 
representational status of language, which claims that signs follow bodies as their necessary 
mirrors, is not mimetic at all: on the contrary, it is productive, constitutive, one might even 
argue  performative, inasmuch as this signifying act produces the body that it then claims to 
find prior to any and all signification (CF 57 (13)).
Here, Butler describes precisely how language has to be reconsidered as not merely repres-
entational, but rather as productive in the sense that it does not simply describe something 
given as prior – for instance a body – but constitutes and structures it through the process 
of  signification.  Butler’s  formulation  that  signification  “produces”  what  it  signifies  is 
certainly too strong, and can easily cause misinterpretations. What is meant here is not a 
creation in a material sense, the productive dimension of language can certainly not be 
thought in analogy with the production of a craftsman.
Butler’s intention becomes clearer in the second example, where Butler once again talks 
about the category ‘women’: “In a sense, what women signify has been taken for granted 
for too long, and what has been fixed as the ‘referent’ of the term has been ‘fixed’, normal-
ized,  immobilized,  paralyzed  in  position  of  subordination”  (CF  50).  We  can  see  that 
Butler’s main critical point is that the referent has traditionally been mistaken for being 
something fixed. She claims that we cannot refer to a fixed referent, instead, we need to 
consider the operations by which the referent gets ‘fixed’. And Butler goes even further: 
“In effect, the signified has been conflated with the referent, whereby a set of meanings 
have been taken to inhere in the real nature of women themselves“ (CF 50).51 Butler wants 
51 Butler confronts her reader here with a host of difficult terminology without explaining it or making the 
origin explicit. In this instance, she uses structuralist vocabulary in the succession of the Swiss linguist 
Ferdinand de Saussure. For Saussure a sign, which is the basic unit of language, consist of the signifier 
(the sound-image) and the signified (the meaning). Saussure’s innovative point is that both the signifier 
and the signified can vary (it does, for example, not matter if we say ‘tree’, ‘Baum’ or ‘arbor’) and that 
the relation between signifier and signified is  arbitrary. The meaning of a sign is therefore – in both 
aspects –not stable in itself, but constituted only by its differences from and relationships with other signs. 
Furthermore, the meaning of a sign is neither determined by the intention of an utterer, nor by the refer-
ence to an object external to these relations (a referent). That implies, that for the determination of the 
meaning of a sign no referent is needed, the meaning of a sign is merely constituted within a system of 
signs, that is language (Saussure 2001).
In the case of Saussure, language is conceptualized as a closed system and the meaning of signs is there-
fore considered as relatively fixed. The poststructuralist critique mainly disputes this notion of language 
as a closed system and insists on the openness of the system and the permanent alteration. Butler summar-
izes this critique in Gender Trouble: “The totality and closure of language is both presumed and contested 
within structuralism. Although Saussure understands the relationship of signifier and signified to be arbit-
rary, he places this arbitrary relation within a necessarily complete linguistic system. All linguistic terms 
presuppose a linguistic totality of structures, the entirety of which is presupposed and implicitly recalled 
for any one term to bear meaning. This quasi-Leibnizian view, in which language figures as a systematic 
totality,  effectively suppresses the moment of  difference between signifier  and signified,  relating and 
unifying that moment of arbitrariness within a totalizing field. The poststructuralist break with Saussure 
and with the identitarian structures of exchange found in Lévi-Strauss refutes the claim of totality and 
universality  and  the  presumption  of  binary  structural  oppositions  that  implicitly  operate  to  quell  the 
insistent  ambiguity and openness of linguistic and cultural  signification. As a  result,  the discrepancy 
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to contest precisely this notion of ‘real nature’. She puts specific emphasis on the aspect 
that language is “never merely descriptive, but always normative” (CF 50). “For if the term 
permits of resignification, if its referent is not fixed, then possibilities for new configura-
tions of the term become possible” (CF 50). When considering this notion of language, it is 
important to see that for Butler this is not merely a possibility within language, but has 
significant impacts on political opportunities: “To recast the referent as the signified, and to  
authorize or safeguard the category of women as a site of possible resignification is to 
expand the possibilities of what it means to be a woman and in this sense to condition and 
enable an enhanced sense of agency” (CF 50).
It might seem unnecessary or even out of place to discuss Butler’s theory of language to 
such an extent, but I want to suggest that it is not. First, several misreadings of Butler’s 
concepts seem to be related to a misunderstanding or neglect of the notion of language it is  
based  on.  Benhabib,  for  instance,  transfers  in  her  critique  a  very  narrow  and  solely 
descriptive conception of language, that additionally presupposes an overly sharp distinc-
tion between linguistic and other practices, onto Butler. That results in a misreading of 
several  crucial  Butlerian concepts such as discourse,  power or norm (Benhabib 1995b, 
109).  Second,  it  has to  be  taken into account  that  Butler  establishes  a  very  tight  link 
between language and politics already in the first chapter of  Gender Trouble, when she 
refers to “representation” that ,on the one hand, “serves as the operative term within a 
political process” and, on the other hand, “is the normative function of a language” (GT 2). 
Butler makes immediately clear that these two aspects cannot be separated – especially 
when considering an identity category such as ‘women’. The excursus into Butler’s theory 
of language enables us to comprehend this interrelation of linguistic and political repres-
entation. In the same way as in the case of linguistic representation, political representation 
cannot be based on a pregiven referent. Political representation functions not like a mere 
description of preexisting identities. On the contrary, representation is always normative, 
and in and through the act  of representation it  signifies and resignifies the identities it 
supposes to represent. The fact that neither linguistic nor political representation can be 
based on a pregiven referent is precisely what opens up new opportunity for political resig-
between signifier and signified becomes the operative and limitness differánce of language, rendering all 
referentially into a potentially limitless displacement“ (GT 54). In this passage, Butler is basically reas-
sembling Derrida’s deconstruction of Saussure (Derrida 1983) ending with a direct reference to  differ-
ánce,  a quasi-concept introduced by Derrida as a consequence of his deconstruction of structuralism. 
Against the background of those elaborate theoretical engagements, Butler can give a very brief notion of 
her concept of language: “Abstractly considered, language refers to an open system of signs by which 
intelligibility is insistently created and contested” (GT 198).
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nification. In Bodies that Matter, Butler is very clear about these connections:
Political signifiers, especially those that designate subject positions, are not descriptive; that is, 
they do not represent pregiven constituencies, but are empty signs which come to bear phantas-
matic  investments  of  various  kinds.  No signifier  can be  radically  representative,  for  every 
signifier is the site of a perpetual méconnaisance; it produces the expectation of a unity, a full 
and final recognition that can never be achieved. Paradoxically, the failure of such signifiers – 
‘women’ is  the one that  comes to mind – fully  to describe the  constituency they name is 
precisely what constitutes these signifiers as sites of phantasmatic investment and discursive 
rearticulation. It is what opens the signifier to new meanings and new possibilities for political 
resignification (BM 191).
To  summarize,  Butler  argues  for  a  theory  of  language  that  can  be  called  “anti-
descriptivism” and she makes immediately clear that this position “provides a linguistic 
theory for an anti-essentialist identity politics” (BM 208). When adapting this view we can 
notice that the process of naming – for example naming somebody a ‘woman’ – “entails 
both  the  effectivity  and the  radical  contingency  of  naming  as  an  identity-constituting 
performance” (BM 208). Butler’s aim is to think language as “freed from the fixity of the 
referent” (BM 211). Butler wants to rethink the referent as a signified in the way that the 
referent cannot be conceptualized as prior to the process of signification. That does not 
mean that we can get rid of referentiality in general. That is why I think that Chamber and 
Carver’s description of Butler’s view of language as “non-referential” (Chamber/Carver 
2008, 48) is not completely adequate. Butler’s aim is not to eliminate referentiality utterly, 
but to put into question the idea of a fixed and external referent and to rethink the referenti-
ality of language as a permanent process of resignification. Referentiality has still its place 
within this conception of language, but that language can no longer be centered around the 
notion  of  a  fixed  referent.  This  is  especially  comprehensible  in  the  case  of  identity 
categories. Above all, Butler wants to draw our attention to the political consequences and 
opportunities that follow from this view of language, when she repetitively points out that  
“to understand political  signifiers on the model of a performative theory of names can 
provide for the kind of variation and rearticulation required for an anti-essentialist radical 
democratic project” (BM 211).
Questioning the Subject
After that excursus into the embedding of Butler in a complex theory of language, which 
binds linguistic and political representation in a model of permanent resignification, that  
can no longer be grounded in a preexisting referent outside of signification processes, I 
want to return to the question of the subject. Analogously to her theory of language, which 
does not entail that language has no referential function at all, but that it cannot be founded 
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on a preexisting referent, Butler’s argument is not that there is no subject after all,  but 
rather, that the subject cannot be taken as a pregiven. 
To refuse to assume, that is, to require a notion of the subject from the start is not the same as 
negating or dispensing with such a notion altogether; on the contrary, it  is to ask after the 
process of its construction and the political meaning and consequentiality of taking the subject 
as a requirement or presupposition of theory (CF 36).
To refuse the notion of a preexisting subject requires to draw the attention to processes of  
subject formation. This shift of perspective is in Butler’s view also always a shift towards 
the political, and she argues against the non-political status of traditional theories of the 
subject: “To claim that politics requires a stable subject is to claim that there can be no 
political opposition to that claim. Indeed, that claim implies that a critique of the subject 
cannot be a politically informed critique but, rather, an act which puts into jeopardy politics  
as such” (CF 36).
Butler’s perspective allows for political inquiries into the formation of the subject – which, 
as we shall again see shortly, continues to function as a critical category that names a site 
within a structure – that requires and entails a variety of investigations into “subjectivating 
processes”, “institutional histories of subjection and subjectivation”, or “the grammar of 
the subject” (CF 41f.).  Intriguingly,  Butler continues to speak in the first  person when 
asking how “a position becomes a position”, implying that she does not exclude herself 
from the implications of her theory: “My position is mine to the extent that ‘I’ – and I do 
not shirk from the pronoun – replay and resignify the theoretical positions that have consti-
tuted me, working the possibilities of their convergence, and trying to take account of the 
possibilities that they systematically exclude” (CF 42). Butler then goes on to argue that “it 
is simply not a strong enough claim to say that the ‘I’ is situated” (CF 42)52, because that 
would still sound as if the individuals relation to these constitutive subject position would 
be one of “shuffling through them instrumentally, casting some aside, incorporating others” 
(CF 42). Butler admits that we might sometimes act like that, choosing freely among posi-
tions, but she insists that that is definitely not always the case and that it is not the main 
relation that an individual has towards those positions: “The ‘I’ this ‘I’, is constituted by 
these  positions,  and  these  ‘positions’  are  not  merely  theoretical  products,  but  fully 
embedded organizing principles of material practices and institutional arrangements, those 
matrices of power and discourse that produce me as a viable subject” (CF 42). In this 
passage Butler is also very clear that what she is talking about is not a mere language 
52 That was Benhabib’s formulation in her first contribution to Feminist Contentions (Benhabib 1995a, 26), 
which Butler replies to here.
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game. What she is interested in are ‘material practices and institutional arrangements’, the 
‘institutional histories of subjection and subjectivation’, as well as ‘matrices of power and 
discourse’; it is really about concrete social and material dynamics. Given Butler’s theory 
of language, however, these dynamics can never be separated from linguistic practices of 
identification  and  resignification.  Thus,  for  Butler  there  is  really  nothing  like  a  sharp 
distinction between “structural processes and dynamics of socialization and individuation” 
and “historical and hermeneutical processes of signification and meaning-constitution”, as 
Benhabib  suggests,  arguing  that  Butler  deals  with  the  latter  but  ignores  the  former 
(Benhabib 1995b, 109f.).
So far  in  this  chapter,  I  have  referred to  texts  from the early  1990s.  But  interestingly 
enough, it  seems as if Butler has not changed her opinion in this respect. In  Giving an 
Account of Oneself she reiterates that “there is no ‘I’ that can fully stand apart from the 
social conditions of its emergence” (GA 7). A ‘matrix of norms’, as she now calls it, is “the 
condition for the emergence of the ‘I’, even though the ‘I’ is not causally induced by those 
norms” (GA 7). Butler goes on to refer to the many critics of her work and their worries of 
the implications this theory of the subject supposedly entails: “Although many contem-
porary critics worry that this means that there is no concept of the subject that can serve as 
the ground for moral agency and moral accountability, that conclusion does not follow” 
(GA 8). This, again, clearly follows already from the scope of Butler’s investigation, which 
she was very clear about from the outset: “The critique of the subject is not a negation or 
repudiation of the subject, but, rather, a way of interrogating its construction as a pregiven 
or foundationalist premise.” (CF 42) That requires to ask once again the question about the 
scope of Butler’s work, and what asking the kind of question she is raising implies .
Contingent Foundations
In her contribution to the debate in Feminist Contentions, Butler repeatedly insists that she 
does not know what ‘postmodernism’ or ‘poststructuralism’ are, but at one point she says 
that if there was one insight that she would call ‘poststructuralist’, then it would be “that 
power pervades the very conceptual apparatus that seeks to negotiate its terms, including 
the subject position of the critic” (CF 39). That insight implies the famous dictum that 
there could be no position outside of power and that therefore no resistance is possible that 
is  not  priorly  based  in  the  power  it  wanted  to  criticize  and eventually  overcome.  But 
Butler’s number one priority at this point is, in fact, not the question where resistance is 
located, but, reversely, what it implies to establish such a position outside of power, even if 
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it  might be the position of the critic.  She writes:  “To establish a set of norms that are 
beyond power or force is itself a powerful and forceful conceptual practice that sublimates, 
disguises, and extends its own power play through recourse to tropes of normative univer-
sality” (CF 39). We can see that what Butler criticizes are positions that base themselves on 
a foundation they presuppose as natural and pregiven, because Butler’s suspicion is that 
these reportedly pregiven foundations disguise that they are themselves established through 
certain operations of power. Butler makes clear that 
the point is not to do away with foundations, or even to champion a position that goes under 
the name of antifoundationalism. Both of those positions belong together as different versions 
of foundationalism and the skeptical problematic it engenders. Rather, the task is to interrogate 
what  the  theoretical  move  that  establishes  foundations  authorizes,  and  what  precisely  it 
excludes of forecloses (CF 39).
So Butler’s point of view is not the nihilistic or relativistic one that there are no founda-
tions whatsoever, but rather that the notion of a foundation must not be taken as pregiven 
and natural in a sense that allows for no further interrogations. Butler’s strategy is to open 
up so-called foundations for further investigations, what in her point of view is “the very 
precondition of a politically engaged critique” (CF 39).
Already in the 1990 preface of Gender Trouble Butler – in very strong and controversial 
language – declares as her goal to “expose the foundational categories […] as effects of a 
specific formation of power”, which “requires a form of critical  inquiry” that Butler  – 
following Foucault  – calls  “genealogy” (GT xxxi).  It  is  important to highlight that  the 
scope of  Gender Trouble is  to  argue against  “foundationalist  reasoning” (GT 194)  that 
“falsely presumes”  that  “agency can only be  established  through recourse  to  a  predis-
cursive ‘I’ ” (GT 195). Butler’s point of departure is this critique of foundationalism and 
she therefore starts with a shift toward an interrogation of processes of subject and identity 
formation.  For  Butler  it  is  no longer  possible  to  take  identities or  subject  positions as 
pregiven facts that only need to be described within politics or theory, instead, we need to 
take a close look on how they are constituted within a discursive field of power. “The shift 
from an  epistemological  account of identity to one which locates the problematic within 
practices of signification permits an analysis that takes the epistemological mode itself as 
one  possible  and contingent  signifying  practice”  (GT 197).  In  Gender  Trouble,  Butler 
outlines the conclusions of those insights for a theory of gender:
There is no ontology of gender on which we might construct a politics, for gender ontologies 
always operate within established political contexts as normative injunctions, determining what 
qualifies as inteligible [sic] sex, invoking and consolidating the reproductive constraints on 
sexuality, setting the prescriptive requirements whereby sexed or gendered bodies come into 
cultural intelligibility (GT 203).
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The reference to an ontological foundation is an act that always already operates within a 
political context and establishes the very notion of foundation it supposes to represent. In 
Bodies that Matter, Butler describes this act with a paradoxical formulation: “The pointing 
to a ground which is never recovered becomes authority’s groundless ground” (BM 108). 
Hence, the reference to a ground has to be rethought as an act of signification that in and 
through the signification signifies a specific configuration as the ground. “Ontology is, 
thus, not a foundation, but a normative injunction that operates insidiously by installing 
itself into political discourse as its necessary ground” (GT 203).
As Chambers and Carver point out about Butler’s account, “the form and content of her 
discussion – while polemically cast as trouble for feminism – have an impeccable origin in 
political theory and have broad implications in philosophy” (Chamber/Carver 2008, 21). 
This is already the case in Gender Trouble and is implied in the way she “casts her argu-
ment in very general terms about ‘the subject’ as such” (Chamber/Carver 2008, 20f.). So, 
how can we formulate Butler’s argument in terms that allow for connections with general 
questions of political theory?
Genealogy of Naturalization Processes
The main focus of Butler’s account  can be characterized as questioning “naturalization 
processes”  (Chamber/Carver  2008,  39).  It  is  to  contest  those  “foundationalist  fictions” 
(Chamber/Carver 2008, 20) that serve to secure certain formations of politics by casting  
their origins as something natural and pregiven. Her insight is that “what is said to have 
been ‘already’ in existence in this state of nature (namely the human subject) is thus natur-
alised through the activity of making this claims convincingly. That is, the subject is onto-
logically  secured  in  a  supposedly  pre-political  and  even  pre-social  realm” 
(Chamber/Carver. 2008, 21). As already mentioned, this project goes back to the preface of 
Gender Trouble, where Butler when outlining the scope of this project makes it very clear 
that her aim is the genealogy of such naturalization processes.
A genealogical critique refuses to search for the origins of gender, the inner truth of female 
desire, a genuine or authentic sexual identity that repression has kept from view; rather, genea-
logy  investigates  the  political  stakes  in  designating  as  an  origin or  cause  those  identity 
categories that  are in fact the  effects of  institutions, practices, discourses with multiple and 
diffuse points of origin. The task of this inquiry is to center on – and decenter – such defining 
institutions. (GT xxxi)
In  other  words,  genealogy,  for  Butler,  means  the  deconstruction  and reconstruction  of 
naturalization processes. In this sense genealogy implies two movements. First, genealogy 
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implies to deconstruct notions of naturalness, that means to show that what is thought to be 
natural and pregiven does, in fact, not justify this status after all. Second, the genealogy 
needs to reconstruct the processes that have established something as natural and pregiven, 
that is, the operation that constituted the naturalness of the natural in first place. In this 
sense,  Butler  speaks  of  “a  political  genealogy of  gender  ontologies  (GT 45),  which is 
meant to show that categories of gender are in fact not natural, but result from permanent 
processes of naturalization.
However, Butler is keen to point out that to “deconstruct is not to negate or to dismiss, but 
to call into question and, perhaps most importantly, to open up a term, like the subject, to a 
reusage or reemployment that previously has not been authorized” (CF 49). Or, in other 
words: “To call a presupposition into question is not the same as doing away with it; rather, 
it is to free it from its metaphysical lodgings in order to understand what political interests  
were secured in and by that metaphysical placing, and thereby to permit the term to occupy 
and to serve very different political aims” (BM 30). We can see here that the deconstruc-
tion of naturalness and the genealogy of naturalization processes are not merely epistemo-
logical projects, but in first place political actions. They serve the purposes of challenging 
existing power relations and opening up new political  opportunities. Whereas the tradi-
tional reference to natural foundations which do not allow for critical interrogation leads to 
a  significant  depoliticization,  Butler  seeks  a  radical  repoliticization  of  all  foundations. 
There  are  no  foundations  that  are  independent  of  certain  formations  of  power,  and 
whenever something is stated as prior to power, one needs to wonder which power rela-
tions where at work in this statement. To declare something as prior to power means to 
immunize it against political contestation and to limit political possibilities. Conversely, 
calling presuppositions into question means reintroducing them into the realm of the polit-
ical to open up political opportunities. 
That certainly allows for an application of Butler’s theory within the realm of a critical 
political  theory.  Butler’s  project  of  a  genealogy  of  naturalization  processes  has  to  be 
considered as a radically political project in the sense that it entails a radical politicization 
that  puts  into question any foundation of  politics  that  is  not  open for  further  political  
investigation and critique. It is radical in the original sense of the word, as it goes all the 
way to the grounds of politics and opens up those grounds to be immanently political. 
Hence, it will not be without consequences for the status of politics either.
But before we can return to these matters, we have to take a closer look at Butler’s account 
of the political subject and particularly her investigation into the process of subject forma-
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tion, which will be the topic of the following chapter. In the course of this discussion, the 
link between subject formation and power will also become more pronounced.
6. Theories in Subjection
“As  a  form of  power,  subjection  is  paradoxical.”  (PLP 1)  Butler  starts  her  book  The 
Psychic Life of  Power with this statement.  Correspondingly, the aim of this book is to 
investigate into this paradoxical structure of subjection. In the course of her inquiry, Butler 
points out that  not only the process of subjection has a paradoxical form, but also the 
power involved in the process as well as the subject formed by the process turn out to have 
such a form.
Butler shows that “subjection” is the name of two distinct processes, first, “the process of 
becoming subordinated by power”, and, second, “the process of becoming a subject” (PLP 
2). However, as it will turn out, these two processes are in fact not two separate processes, 
but rather two different ways of looking at the one process of subjection. Precisely because 
of this double form, the process of subjection is paradoxical. In her inquiry, Butler first of  
all draws from Foucault and Althusser’s notion of “assujetissement”, a French term that 
signifies this double process of becoming a subject and of becoming subordinated. It is 
meant to denote that becoming a subject and becoming subordinated are inseparable, that 
becoming a  subject  always implies  a  certain  subordination.  “No individual  becomes  a 
subject without first becoming subjected or undergoing ‘subjectivation’53 (a translation of 
the French assujetissement)” (PLP 11).
In order to investigate into the paradoxical process of subjection, Butler wants to think 
together  two theories  that  usually  have  quite  a  lot  of  reservations  towards  each  other, 
Foucault’s theory of power on the one hand, and a theory of the psyche as developed in 
psychoanalysis  on the other hand. (PLP 2f.)  The issue of subjection dealt  with in  The 
Psychic  Life  of  Power was  already  one  of  Butler’s  major  concern  in  previous  works. 
Accordingly, she asks in  Contingent Foundations  : “Is it not always the case that power 
operates in advance, in the very procedures that  establish who will be the subject who 
speaks in the name of feminism, and to whom? […] What are the institutional histories of 
subjection and subjectivation that  ‘position’ me here now” (CF 41)?  This chapter  will 
investigate Butler’s notion of the process of subjection and the concepts of power and the 
subject implied by it.
53 Butler usually uses the term ‘subjection’ to refer to this double process of subordination and subject form-
ation in its whole complexity. The term ‘subjectivation’ is hardly used.
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The Many Faces of Power
Power is a certainly a crucial concept for political science. Among political scientists it is 
generally considered one of the main categories of politics which political science has to 
investigate  (Shively  2007  and  Patzelt  2003,  39ff.).  However,  what  the  term  ‘power’ 
precisely means is not as clear among political scientist as the agreement on the crucial 
status of this  category.  Indeed,  there have also been long lasting discussions about the 
conceptualization of power, about the questions: What is power? How can it be conceptual-
ized? By which means can it be investigated?
In the 1950s and 1960s there was a dispute about the notion of ‘power’ and specifically its 
distribution across disciplines and research designs. Based on a case study on power in 
American communities Robert  Dahl54 defined power the following way: “A has  power 
over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” 
(Dahl  1957,  202f.)  In  their  article  “Two Faces  of  Power”  Peter  Bachrach and Morton 
Baratz55 argue that this concept of power is insufficient to cover all aspects of an investiga-
tion of power. They write:
Of course, power is exercised when A participates in the making of decisions that affects B. 
But power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and 
political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public 
consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A (Bachrach/Baratz 
1962, 948).
Power is not only exercised when A openly forces B to do what A want, but also through 
the “mobilization of bias” (Bachrach/Baratz 1962, 952), which is in place in every political 
process. Peter Digeser56, however, suggests that “the second face did not alter our concep-
tual map of power”,  because both faces presuppose “agents coercively advancing well-
understood,  self-defined interests  against  the interests  of other agents“.  Therefore,  they 
together  constitute  the  so  called  “liberal  conception  of  power”  (Digeser  1992,  979). 
Against this liberal conception, Digeser refers to Steven Lukes57, who highlights a third 
face of power. “Lukes contented that power could be exerted even if B consciously wants 
to do what A desires. Lukes claimed that if B acts contrary to her objective, real interests 
then power is being exercised.” (Digeser 1992, 979) This conception is clearly a develop-
54 Robert Dahl is an American political scientist. He is a former president of the American Political Science 
Association and the Sterling Professor emeritus of Political Science at Yale University.
55 Peter Bachrach (1918-2007) was an American political scientist. He was a professor of Political Science 
at Temple University.
56 Peter Digeser is an American political scientist. He is currently a professor of Political Science at the 
University of California, Santa Barbara.
57 Steven Lukes is a British political scientist. He is currently a professor of Politics and Sociology at New 
York University.
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ment beyond the liberal conception and Digeser therefore calls it – using Lukes’s termino-
logy – the “radical conception of power” (Digeser 1992, 979). Still,  this conception of 
power  shares  the  fact  with  the  liberal  conception  that  it  presupposes  a  subject  whose 
interest can be clearly determined without reference to power. This presumption, however, 
was radically disputed by  Foucault’s conception of power, and that is why Digeser calls 
Foucault’s  conception the “fourth face of power“.  Digeser also highlights the different 
questions that are central to the respective faces of power: 
Under the first face of power the central question is, ‘Who, if anyone, is exercising power?’ 
Under the second face, ‘What issues have been mobilized off the agenda and by whom?’ Under 
the radical conception, ‘Whose objective interests are being harmed?’ Under the fourth face of 
power the critical issue is, ‘What kind of subject is being produced?’ (Digeser 1992, 980).
In Foucault’s radically shifted perspective on power, power is not conceptualized as some-
thing external to the subject, something that effects a subject that is already preestablished. 
On the contrary, power is at work in subject formation. Therefore, power is not something 
we can simply resist, we cannot escape power, because our existence is dependent on it.
Butler writes about Foucault’s conception of power:
But if, following Foucault, we understand power as forming the subject as well, as providing 
the very condition of its existence and the trajectory of its desire, then power is not simply what 
we oppose but also, in a strong sense, what we depend on for our existence and what we harbor 
and preserve in the beings that we are (PLP 2).
Following Foucault, Butler wants to investigate into the productive dimension of power, 
the way power is producing what it supposedly oppresses. If we consider this productive 
dimension, power is not simply something that oppresses a subject that is priorly estab-
lished. Instead, power has to be reconsidered as constitutive for the subject. Accordingly, 
the subject has no existence prior to its subjection under power, but is formed by its very 
subordination.
Even though Butler owes a lot to Foucault, she also points out certain shortcomings of 
Foucault’s focus on the productive dimension of power. In her eyes, Foucault most notably  
lacks an elaboration on the “specific mechanism of subject formation“, in particular, she 
points out that “the entire domain of the psyche [...] remains unexplored“ (PLP 2). Hence, 
Butler’s question is: “What is the psychic form that power takes?” (PLP 2) This is precisely 
where psychoanalysis comes into play. Butler wants to develop a certain “psychoanalytic 
criticism of Foucault”,  because she believes that  one cannot  investigate  the process of 
subjectivation “without recourse to a psychoanalytic account of the formative or generative 
effects of restriction or prohibition” (PLP 87). But, on the other hand, Butler is also very 
clear that she does not want to fall back on any simple notion of the unconscious as a 
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source of a necessary resistance. Therefore, her inquiry also implies a Foucaultian critique 
of psychoanalysis,  a “reemergence of a  Foucaultian perspective  within psychoanalysis” 
(PLP 87). Accordingly, Butler’s aim is not to use those theories to refute each other, on the 
contrary, she is clear that her inquiry “seeks to explore the provisional perspectives from 
which each theory illuminates the other” (PLP 3). That implies questioning certain aspects 
of Foucault’s theory as well as certain facets of psychoanalysis.
The main questions are: Where can resistance be located? How does alteration take place? 
Which instances account for the ability of opposition? In this context, Butler asks Foucault 
how he seeks  to  theorize resistance:  “How might  he account  for  psychic  resistance to 
normalization” (PLP 87)? The question asked of psychoanalysis, on the other hand, is if a 
notion of resistance can simply be presupposed as a necessary function of the unconscious. 
Is it a capacity that is always in place? Or could it be that the resistance is also something 
socially  and discursively  constructed (PLP 88)? This  complex  question of  resistance  – 
located in the tension of Foucault and psychoanalysis – is the issue Butler wants to face in 
The Psychic Life of Power.
Paradoxical Subjection
In order to deal with the question of resistance, the task is to investigate the “tropological 
inauguration of the subject”, as Butler calls it.58 The problem one is confronted with when 
trying to  give an account of  the subjection of  the subject  is  that  one already needs  to 
presuppose a subject that receives the power by which it is inaugurated in first place. Thus, 
there seems to be a fundamental problem with the project  of giving an account  of the 
inaugurating subjection of the subject. Butler concludes that it might be that “we are no 
longer in the business of ‘giving an account of the formation of the subject’. We are, rather, 
confronted with the tropological presumption made by any such explanation” (PLP 4). We 
cannot speak about subjection without referring to a subject that undergoes the process of 
subjection. At the same time, the process of subjection implies that there is no subject prior 
to subjection, but that the subject comes into existence only through and after undergoing 
its subordination. Thus, there is something wrong with our reference, a remarkable oddity: 
58 A “trope” is a rhetorical figure of speech. The word derives from the Ancient Greek tropos, which means 
‘turn’. We speak of a trope when using a word or sentence in a way other than what is considered its 
literal or normal meaning. For the purpose of her book Butler uses the definition that “a trope operates in 
a way that is not restricted to accepted versions of reality” (PLP 201 (1)). Instances of a trope are for 
example metaphor, metonymy or allegory. In the case in question it may be most adequate to speak of an 
allegory, which means a sustained metaphor that is continued over longer passages, maybe even whole 
paragraphs or texts.
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“The figure which we refer has not yet acquired existence and is not part of a verifiable 
explanation, yet our reference continues to make a certain kind of sense” (PLP 4). We can 
see that the “paradox of subjection” Butler tries to outline in  The Psychic Life of Power 
also implies a “paradox of referentiality: namely, that we must refer to what does not yet 
exist”  (PLP  4).  On  the  one  hand,  our  reference  does  not  work,  there  is  something 
constitutively wrong with our reference. On the other hand, we cannot omit referring to the 
subject and its formation. This paradoxical situation has important consequences for any 
account about the subject:
On the  one  hand,  the  subject  can  refer  to  its  own  genesis  only  by  taking  a  third-person 
perspective on itself, that is, by dispossessing its own perspective in the act of narrating its 
genesis. On the other hand, the narration of how the subject is constituted presupposes that the 
constitution has already taken place, and thus arrives after the fact (PLP 11).
There is a certain limit to the ability to narrate the genesis of the subject, a limit that cannot 
be exceeded, but  forms the limit  of narration itself.59 The consequences of this  insight 
become most apparent if we consider the question of agency.
If we take into account the paradoxical structure of subjection, “the agency of the subject 
appears to be an effect of its subordination” (PLP 12). But does that mean that the agency 
of the subject is determined by its subordination? Do we have to conclude that there is no 
space for variation of power? If the answer is yes, then it is seriously doubtful if it is still 
warrantable to speak of an agency of the subject. But is the answer necessarily yes? This is 
a very important question, since it was the most urgent concern of many of Butler’s critics.  
So far, it seems to be the case that any form of resistance necessarily needs to reinvoke the 
very same power that inaugurates the subject, effectively stabilizing the power in place. 
The determination of the agency of the subject by the power that inaugurates the subject 
seems to be the only possible conclusion. However, it is very clear that Butler does not 
agree with this reasoning. She does not think that all alternatives have been sufficiently 
investigated and forces us to take a closer look at the complex relationship of power and 
the subject.
What can be said about the relation of subject and power? On the one hand, it is certainly 
the case that the subject, through its inaugurating subordination under power, is confronted 
with power that precedes its own existence. The temporality of the power responsible for 
the formation of the subject is not the same as the subjects own temporality. On the other 
hand, however, there is a break between the power that is constitutive for the formation of 
59 This is one of the main issues discussed in Giving an account of oneself. We can see that certain themes 
of this later text, which is sometimes considered as a significant shift in the development of Butler’s 
theory, are not that new after all, but already played an important role in Butler’s works of the 1990s.
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the subject  and the power exerted when the subject  acts. “The power that initiates the 
subject fails to remain continuous with the power that is the subject’s agency. A significant 
and potentially enabling reverse occurs when power shifts from its status as a condition of 
agency to the subject’s ‘own’ agency” (PLP 12). Butler’s conclusion is that “agency cannot 
logically be derived from its conditions” (PLP 12) – as the concern of her critics was – 
precisely because no continuity can be presupposed between the power that is constitutive 
for the subject and the power enacted be the subject’s agency. The break that opens up 
between the enabling power and the enacted power is exactly the site of agency. Thus, the 
notion of an agency that is conditioned by power does not necessarily imply the stabiliza-
tion of the power that enables it. On the contrary, “the act of appropriation may involve an 
alteration of power such that the power assumed or appropriated works against the power 
that made that assumption possible” (PLP 13). Whereas the power enacted by the subject 
remains bound to the power enabling its agency, this link is intrinsically ambivalent. “This 
conclusion is not to be thought as (a) a resistance that is really a recuperation of power or 
(b) a recuperation that is really a resistance. It is both at once, and this ambivalence forms 
the bind of agency” (PLP 13). 
Butler forces us to take a still closer look at the paradoxical structure of power. On the one 
hand, we have seen that power – signifying the conditions that enable and inaugurate the 
subject – has to be thought as preceding the subject. On the other hand, we also have to 
consider the reverse perspective that power is enacted by the agency of the subject. In one 
point of view, the subject is  an effect of power, in the other, power is an effect of the 
subject. Butler, however, goes on to point out that there is no power prior to the subject, 
similarly as there is no subject prior to its subjection. Whereas power is the condition of the 
subject’s emergence, we also have to consider that “a condition does not enable or enact 
without  becoming present”  (PLP 13).  For Butler  – as well  as for  Foucault  –  power is 
certainly not a substance, it cannot be thought as something locatable somewhere external 
to the subject, it is not some kind of entity we can point at. Power is nothing but the condi-
tion of the subject’s  emergence and,  hence,  cannot  be considered independently  of the 
inauguration of the subject. “Because power is not intact prior to the subject, the appear-
ance of its priority disappears as power acts on the subject, and the subject is inaugurated 
(and derived) through this temporal reversal in the horizon of power” (PLP 13f.). Power 
has a remarkable double status: First, it acts on the subject as the condition of its possib-
ility, second, it  is reiterated by the subject’s own agency. We are confronted with “two 
incommensurable temporal modalities”: on the one hand, power is something prior to the 
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subject, always preceding its emergence as the condition of its possibility. On the other 
hand, power is something that follows from the subject,  it  is the effect  of the subjects 
agency (PLP 14).  Butler  highlights  that  this  second modality again carries two sets  of 
meanings. First, we can consider it in the way that “subjection is a subordination that the 
subject brings on itself”. Second, the reiteration of power by the agency of the subject also 
implies that the subjection is at the same time the condition of possibility for resistance and 
opposition (PLP 14).
We are able to comprehend now, why Butler considers “the subject as an inevitable stum-
bling  block  of  social  theory”  (PLP 14).  Traditionally,  the  question  of  the  subject  was 
conceptualized only in the two modalities described,  seen as contradicting alternatives: 
“Many conversations on the topic have become mired in whether the subject is the condi-
tion or the impasse of agency” (PLP 14). Butler suggests that those conversations have 
their justification in the topic, but that we should reverse our perspective and consider that 
“the subject is itself a site of this ambivalence in which the subject emerges both as the 
effect of a prior power and as the condition of possibility for a radically conditioned form 
of agency” (PLP 14f.). So, it is not about choosing between those supposedly contradicting 
alternatives, on the contrary: “A theory of the subject should take into account the full 
ambivalence of the conditions of its operation” (PLP 15). The problem with the traditional 
accounts is that “an irresolvable ambiguity arises when one attempts to distinguish between 
the power that (transitively) enacts the subject, and the power enacted by the subject, that 
is,  between the power that forms the subject and the subject’s ‘own’ power” (PLP 15). 
Therefore, Butler insists on this “ambivalent scene of agency” (PLP 15) that has to be 
taken into account in all its ambiguity. “Power is both external to the subject and the very 
venue of the subject” (PLP 15). We cannot abstract from this “metaleptic reversal in which 
the  subject  produced  by  power  becomes  heralded  as  the  subject  who  founds power” 
(PLP16). Neither can power be explained by reference to the subject, nor can the subject 
be determined by reference to power. Power and the subject are not reducible to each other. 
Therefore, an account of the paradoxical process of subjection has to take into account the 
whole ambivalence of power and agency (PLP 16). 
Reiteration as Alteration
One of the aims of The Psychic Life of Power is to give an account of “political agency in 
postliberatory times” (PLP 18). If we no longer can – leaving aside the question if we ever 
could – ground agency in the simple notion of a subject that intrinsically possesses the 
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capacity to act, then we have to take into consideration the whole ambivalence of a radic-
ally conditioned agency. As we have seen, the agency of the subject cannot be considered 
independently  of  its  subordination  under  power.  That  agency  implies  subordination, 
however, “is not the sign of a fatal self-contradiction at the core of the subject (PLP 17), 
making the agency of the subject implausible,  as some critics have argued (Hauskeller 
2000, 141). “But neither does it restore a pristine notion of the subject, derived from some 
classical  liberal-humanist  formulation,  whose  agency  is  always  and  only  opposed  to 
power”  (PLP 17).  For  Butler,  the  liberal  view characterizes  “naive  forms  of  political 
optimism”,  while  the  other  view  characterizes  “politically  sanctimonious  forms  of 
fatalism“; Butler’s aim is “to steer clear of both these alternatives” (PLP 17).
In its agency, the subject is always reiterating its subjection. But that does not mean that 
the subject’s agency can be reduced to the conditions of its subjection. The power enacted 
by the subject is not the same as the power that enacts the subject. There is a break between 
the power prior to the subject and the power invoked by the subject. The question, then, is 
how subjection can “become a site of alteration” (PLP 11)? We have to consider that the 
break is not a bad break, but an enabling break, a break that allows for the subject’s agency,  
and that opens up space for alteration. Butler asks: “How is it that the power upon which 
the subject depends for existence and which the subject is  compelled to reiterate turns 
against itself in the course of that reiteration? How might we think resistance within the 
terms of reiteration” (PLP 12)? These are clearly main issues one has to face when dealing 
with Butler’s theory of the subject. The question of resistance was also one of the main 
concerns of most of Butler’s critics. We have to ask ourselves: What is meant by this very 
term “reiteration“? What distinguishes the notion of reiteration from a normal repetition? 
Before we can return to these questions in chapter eight, the notion of power at work here 
needs to be discussed in more detail.  We have to remember that the main objection by 
Lorey  and  Hauskeller  was  that Butler  has  a  monolithic  conception  of  power  that  is, 
moreover, limited to discursive practices. In contrast to this objection, Butler states that 
“the subject is not ‘spoken’ into existence and that the matrices of power and discourse that 
constitute the subject are neither singular nor sovereign in their productive action” (PLP 5). 
Power and discourse cannot  be thought  as static,  monolithic  blocks, they are no static 
entities – in fact, they are no entities at all – they do not remain constant over time, even 
though they implicate a certain degree of stability. But in addition to that, we always have 
to remember that “if conditions of power are to persist, they must be reiterated”, and this is 
where the subject comes into play, because “the subject is precisely the site of such reitera-
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tion, a repetition that is never merely mechanical” (PLP 16). Hence, we have to take a 
closer  look  at  the  interplay  of  power  and its  reiteration  by the  subject,  to  adequately 
comprehend  the  status  of  power  at  stake  here.  Butler  discusses  this  interplay  also  in 
slightly altered contexts. What does it mean for the status of power, if power is not only 
seen as the condition of possibility for subject formation, but if power is also considered as 
reiterated by the agency of a radically conditioned subject?
In  Bodies that Matter, for instance,  Butler writes – when discussing the status of gender 
norms – that “the force and necessity of these norms […] is thus functionally dependent on 
the approximation and citation of the law” (BM 14).60 The law “is repeatedly fortified and 
idealized as the law only to the extent that it is reiterated as the law, produced as the law, 
the anterior and inapproximable ideal, by the very citations it is said to command” (BM 
14). Certainly, the law is not the same as its instantiations, it cannot be reduced to certain 
instances of its enforcement. On the other hand, however, the law cannot persist without 
those instances, it is only established and preserved as the law via those iterations that 
idealize it as the law.
In fact, the norm only persists as a norm to the extent that it is acted out in social practice and 
reidealized and reinstituted in and through the daily social rituals of bodily life. The norm has 
no independent ontological status, yet it cannot be easily reduced to its instantiations; it is itself 
(re)produced through its embodiment, through the acts that strive to approximate it, through the 
idealizations reproduced in and by those acts (UG 48).
In this quote, which is taken from Undoing Gender, Butler repeats the main point that the 
norm does not exist  independently of its  instantiations,  but cannot be reduced to them 
either.61 She makes explicit  that  the “norm has no independent ontological status”, that 
means, the norm is certainly not an entity, we cannot see the norm as a norm; all we can 
see are instantiations of the norm, reiterations that repeatedly idealize the norm as the 
norm. In Bodies that Matter, Butler states that it is a common misreading of Foucault “if 
power  is  misconstrued  as  a  grammatical  and  metaphysical  subject”  (BM 9).  Power  is 
certainly not a subject, not a substance, not an entity, and Butler concludes: “There is no 
60 In this quote Butler does not write about “power”, but about “law” and “norms“. I do not think, however, 
that we should put to much emphasis on the specifics of Butler’s terminology here, because Butler really 
is not clear about her terminology. I do not intend to discuss Butler’s lack of a clarification of these 
important concepts and their distinction here. For the purpose of the present inquiry, ‘law’ can be read as 
almost analogical with ‘power’. Maybe we can state a difference so far that power is easier to change, 
while the law is of longer duration and more persistent. Regarding the notion of ‘norm’, I want to show in 
the following chapter that Butler uses this term more often in her more recent writings, where her under-
standing of ‘norm’ and ‘normativity’ becomes more pronounced (Distelhorst 2007, 217).
61 I am trying to highlight the continuity in Butler’s account here and am therefore forced to downplay 
differences and discontinuities. One shift that we can clearly notice between Butler’s earlier texts and 
Undoing Gender is her stronger emphasis on bodily and every day practices in the later text. But, to me, 
that seems to be more of a change of emphasis than a shift in the content. However, the emphasis on those  
practices is clearly an improvement of her account. 
63
power that acts, but only a reiterated acting that is power in its persistence and instability” 
(BM 9). In The Psychic Life of Power, Butler refers back to this sentence from her earlier 
text and warns her reader against a possible misreading. Butler’s explanation, however, 
should not come as a surprise to us, as it is in line with the argument developed so far. She 
writes: “This statement was not meant to suggest that power acts without the subject. On 
the contrary, for power to act, there must be a subject, but that necessity does not make the 
subject into the origin of power” (PLP 203 (5)).
Power  and  the  subject  are  linked  together  in  the  process  of  subjection.  Subjection, 
however, is not a singular process, but a permanent enforcement. The subject is not simply 
produced as a subject at  one point and remains it down the road,  rather,  the subject is 
“repeatedly produced (which is not the same as being produced anew again and again)” 
(PLP 93). Subjection is a permanent process and in and through that process subject and 
power are linked together, not as stable unities, but in their alterability. “It is precisely the 
possibility of a repetition which does not consolidate that dissociated unity, the subject, but 
which proliferates effects which undermine the force of normalization” (PLP 93). Once 
again, Butler wants to focus on this moment of resistance and alteration in the repetitive  
reiteration of subjection: “The Foucaultian subject is never fully constituted in subjection, 
then; it is repeatedly constituted in subjection, and it is in the possibility of repetition that 
repeats  against  its  origin that subjection might  be understood to draw its  inadvertently 
enabling power” (PLP 94).
Considering the consequences for our understanding of power, we can conclude with a 
radical historization of power: “The reiteration of power not only temporalizes the condi-
tions of subordination but shows these conditions to be, not static structures, but temporal-
ized – active and productive” (PLP 16). Not only does Butler emphasize the ontological 
status of power as radically non-substantial, she does not only show the consequent non-
naturalness and alterability of power, she also accentuates the power’s historicity, its histor-
ical discontinuity and the possibility and necessity of change that follows from that radical 
temporalization.
To sum up, the critical analysis of the paradoxical process of subjection lead to an investig-
ation of the complex interrelation of power and subject. Whereas power is traditionally 
considered as something that is exercised by one subject over another – both thought as 
already established and clearly identifiable – Butler suggests that power is already at work 
in the constitution of those subjects that exercise power among each other. Indeed, she 
claims that he most important effects of power have to be found in this process of subjec-
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tion. The focus on subject constitution as an already political process, thus, allows for a 
critical  analysis  of very subtle,  but  nevertheless  very forceful  – and,  indeed,  violent  – 
forms  of  power,  which  traditionally  have  been  overlooked.  But  a  full  appreciation  of  
Butler’s potential  innovations for political  theory requires certain reformulations of her 
theory, which will be the topic of the following chapter.
7. Subjection, Hegemony and Normativity
In  this  chapter,  I  want  to  offer  an interpretation  of  the  complex process  of  subjection 
investigated in the previous chapter in the light of a theory of hegemony as developed by  
Laclau and Mouffe. As already indicated in chapter one, an interpretation of Butler’s work 
along the terms of a theory of hegemony might probably be a productive way of receiving 
Butler in the field of a critical political theory (Sauer 2009, 151). I also want to suggest that 
this perspective on Butler’s work allows for a reevaluation of her notions of ‘normativity’ 
and ‘normative violence’ in the light of a critical political theory. Finally, it gives us an 
opportunity to comprehend and criticize the notion of the ‘constitutive outside’, a concep-
tion that again shows the similarities between the theory of Butler and the theory of Laclau 
and Mouffe.
Subjection as Hegemony
I want to begin with claiming that subjection – which, as we have seen in the previous 
chapter, denotes the inextricably nexus of the formation of the subject and its agency with 
its prior subordination under power – should be read in the light of a theory of hegemony. 
At several occasions, Butler herself points to the importance of a theory of hegemony, but, 
unfortunately, she never elaborates in any detail what such a notion of hegemony might 
look like. To fill  this void I suggest drawing on the theory of hegemony developed by 
Laclau and Mouffe, especially in their book Hegemony and Socialist Strategy.
In the volume  Contingency, Hegemony, Universality,  which displays a dialog of Butler 
with Laclau and Slavoj  Žižek62, Butler refers explicitly to “ ‘hegemony’ – as defined by 
Antonio Gramsci and elaborated by both Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau in Hegemony 
and Socialist Strategy” (RU 29). A few pages earlier she also provides the only description 
of hegemony available in her work. She writes that
hegemony emphasizes the ways in which power operates to form our everyday understanding 
of social relations, and to orchestrate the ways in which we consent to (and reproduce) those 
62 Slavoj  Žižek is a Slovenian philosopher. He is currently a senior researcher in the department of Soci-
ology at the University of Ljubljana and a Professor at the European Graduate School.
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tacit and covert relations of power. Power is not stable or static, but is remade at various junc-
tures within everyday life; it constitutes our tenuous sense of common sense, and is ensconced 
as the prevailing epistemes of a culture. Moreover, social transformation occurs not merely by 
rallying mass numbers in favour of a cause, but precisely through the ways in which daily 
social  relations are rearticulated,  and new conceptual horizons opened up by anomalous or 
subversive practices. (RU 14)
In Butler’s understanding, ‘hegemony’ focuses on every day practices and the question 
what structures and relations of power dominate and prescribe these practices. Butler is 
particularly interested in the potential for alteration that lies within this domain of every 
day life, how a variation of the hegemonic structures of every day practices can provide for 
social change. Bringing together these two emphasizes, she can conclude: “The theory of 
performativity is not far from the theory of hegemony in this respect: both emphasize the 
way in which the social world is made – and new social possibilities emerge – at various 
levels of social action through a collaborative relation with power.” (RU 14)
In his very insightful book Umkämpfte Differenz, Lars Distelhorst63 explores the opportun-
ities that  lie in a conflation of Butler’s political theory of performativity and Laclau’s64 
theory of hegemony. Distelhorst points out that it is a hopeful project to bring together the 
theories of these two thinkers, because, first, there has been an ongoing exchange between 
them – as for instance in  Contingency, Hegemony, Universality –,  second, they have a 
common theoretical background – for example they are in a basic agreement on a set of 
postliberatory and poststructural insights – and, finally, their respective theories are shaped 
in a way that makes it relatively easy to conflate them, because they seem to be a comple-
ment to each other in certain instances, providing opportunities to fill  voids and weak-
nesses in each other’s conceptions (Distelhorst 2007, 68). In short, Distelhorst claims that 
Butler’s theory can win from a conflation with Laclau’s theory and vice versa. Since the 
present  inquiry is foremost interested in Butler’s thought, it will only focus on the way 
Laclau can help to  advance Butler’s  theory,  leaving the other  direction of this  relation 
aside.
What can be gained for Butler’s theory from a reading that connects it with a theory of 
hegemony as developed by Laclau? Distelhorst suggests that the utilization of Laclau’s 
conceptions might allow us to reformulate and systematize Butler’s theory along the line of 
63 Lars Distelhorst studied political science in Bremen and Berlin. He wrote his dissertation about Butler 
and Laclau (Distelhorst 2007) and was the author of an introduction to Butler’s work (Distelhorst 2009).
64 Distelhorst focuses primarily on the work of Laclau, even though he admits that it is hard to separate the 
individual contributions of Laclau and Mouffe to their joined work. In the context of the discussion of 
Distelhorst’s interpretation, I will follow Distelhorst and only refer to the name Laclau, but I invite the 
reader to add the name Mouffe while reading if he or she thinks – as I do – that one should not disregard 
her contribution.
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a more political terminology (Distelhorst 2007, 17). Whereas the concept of hegemony in 
an implicit way pervades Butler’s whole theory, this driving force is never made explicit, 
and, more urgent, a definition of this central concept is obtrusively missing. In other words, 
the importance of the concept of hegemony in Butler’s work stands in sharp contrast to the 
difficulty to find any elaboration on this concept in her work, and precisely at this point 
Laclau can help to fill the void (Distelhorst 2007, 64f.).
One specific suggestion,  which Distelhorst  makes in this context,  is to utilize Laclau’s 
concept of discourse to broaden and enrich Butler’s notion of the term (Distelhorst 2007, 
64). As we have seen in chapter three, one of the main points of criticism against Butler’s 
theory is that it is focussing on linguistic categories only, while ignoring other important 
(social  or  bodily)  practices.  This  criticism  has  its  justification  when  we  consider  the 
specifics of Butler’s notion of discourse, which seems to be rather narrow and primarily, if 
not only, focussing on the linguistic level. However, this narrow notion of discourse in 
Butler’s work can – without taking away anything from her theory, as I want to suggest in 
line with Distelhorst – easily be broadened in a way that allows it to include non-linguist 
practices as well, and thus avoiding the criticism. The concept of discourse developed in 
Hegemony  and  Socialist  Strategy  can  provide  this  required  broadening.  In  their  text, 
Laclau and Mouffe give the following definition of discourse: 
In the context of this discussion, we will call  articulation any practice establishing a relation 
among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice. The 
structured  totality  resulting  from  the  articulatory  practice,  we  will  call  discourse. 
(Laclau/Mouffe 2001, 105)
As Distelhorst accurately interprets, this notion of discourse is not limited to language and 
linguistic  practices,  but  includes  any  system  of  differentiated  moments,  including  for 
instance  gender  identities,  political  identities  or  the  like  (Distelhorst  2007,  93).  As  a 
consequence, Laclau and Mouffe can reject “the distinction between discursive and non-
discursive practices” and instead claim
(a)  that  every object is  constituted as an object  of discourse,  insofar as  no object  is  given 
outside every discursive condition of emergence; and (b) that any distinction between what are 
usually called the linguistic and behaviourial aspects of a social practice, is either an incorrect 
distinction  or  ought  to  find  its  place  as  a  differentiation  within  the  social  production  of 
meaning, which is structured under the form of discursive totalities. (Laclau/Mouffe 2001, 107)
I want to suggest that Laclau and Mouffe’s notion of discourse is very much in line with 
Butler’s project to overcome a sharp distinction between linguistic and non-linguistic prac-
tices. In this context, Laclau and Mouffe’s notion of discourse offers a convincing example 
of a conception that  can cover all kinds of articulations of identities within a system of 
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differences. In that way, their  notion of discourse allows to transcend the distinction of 
linguistic and material practices in a comprehensible and convincing way. Their insistence 
on “the material character of every discursive structure” makes clear that the statement that 
“every object is constituted as an object of discourse” has nothing to do with the question, 
if all objects are reducible to language or not, if there is a world outside of language or not 
(Laclau/Mouffe 2001, 108). Discourse cannot be reduced to language or linguistic prac-
tices,  and,  therefore,  the  impossible  distinction  between  discursive  and  non-discursive 
levels is not parallel with the distinction of linguistic and non-linguistic practices.
This notion of discourse has two further consequences that are very much in line with 
Butler’s thought and can help to elaborate on aspects of Butler’s theory that might be hard 
to comprehend. First, if discourse means the structured totality of articulatory practices that 
are constantly ongoing and never concluded, then this implies “that a discursive totality 
never exists in the form of a simply given and delimited positivity, the relational logic will 
be incomplete and pierced by contingency” (Laclau/Mouffe 2001, 110). Thus, Laclau and 
Mouffe come to a similar conclusion about the fundamentally ungrounded and contingent 
nature of (political) categories and the permanent possibility for alteration and change. This  
is the simple consequence of the ongoing process of articulatory practices that constitute 
any discursive formation. Second, this notion of discourse leads to a denaturalization of the 
subject,  which  now ought  to  be  thought  “in  the  sense  of  ‘subject  positions’ within  a 
discursive structure” (Laclau/Mouffe 2001, 115), as already discussed in chapter four. This 
discursively constituted subject, like any differentiated moment in a discursive formation, 
cannot be once and for all fixed, and is therefore confronted with the permanent oppor-
tunity and risk of alteration.
The contingent character of any discursive formation is also the reason why Laclau and 
Mouffe move forward to speak of hegemony in this context. “In a closed system of rela-
tional identities, in which the meaning of each moment is absolutely fixed,  there is no 
place whatsoever  for  a  hegemonic practice.  […] It  is  because hegemony supposes  the 
incomplete and open character of the social, that it can take place only in a field dominated 
by articulatory practices” (Laclau/Mouffe 2001, 134). This very openness of the discursive 
formation as the precondition for hegemonic practices marks an important difference that 
distinguishes Laclau and Mouffe’s concept from traditional notion of hegemony, especially 
within the neo-marxist tradition. While classic notions of hegemony usually work along a 
singular and coherent axis of domination within society (classically in marxist theory this 
axis will be class), a consequence of Laclau and Mouffe’s theory is that the “hegemonic 
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formation  […]  cannot  be  referred  to  the  specific  logic  of  a  single  social  force” 
(Laclau/Mouffe 2001,  142).  Thus,  for  Laclau and Mouffe hegemony cannot  mean one 
specific axis of domination, it  cannot refer to one single centre of domination in society, 
because such a monolithic logic of  domination is impossible in a society structured by 
articulatory practices and discursive formations. Against this logic of the “singleness of the 
hegemonic centre”, Laclau and Mouffe argue for a point of view that takes into account a 
“variety of hegemonic nodal points” (Laclau/Mouffe 2001, 139). Hegemonic practices take 
place in such a social field formated by an ongoing process of articulatory practices consti-
tuting a contingent, but nevertheless relatively stable discursive formation. The open plur-
ality of hegemonic axes and centers implied in this theory seems to allow for a productive 
interaction with Butler’s notion of multiple forms of processes of subject formation by a  
variety of contingent and variable but nevertheless societally dominant modes of subjec-
tion.
To sum up, Butler does not provide any elaborated account of hegemony, but the concept is 
implicitly present in her work. It seems therefore productive to read her theory of subjec-
tion in connection with a more elaborate theory of hegemony, which also allows for a 
reformulation of her ideas in the light of a more explicitly political terminology. However, 
we should realize that this is really only a reformulation, because Butler within her own 
terminology steadily tries to address concerns that are similar to the ones a theory of hege-
mony has. This is in particular the case when Butler expresses her worries about the viol-
ence caused by discursive formation and established norms.
Hegemony as Normativity
The notion of the ‘violence of the norm’ or ‘normative violence’ is probably most apparent 
in Butler’s more recent writings, in which she speaks much more explicitly about norms 
and forms of normativity. But, as will be shown, the invoked issue has in fact been a major 
concern throughout Butler’s whole oeuvre. Accordingly, as Distelhorst suggests, the turn to 
the norm should be seen as a modification of Butler’s language, not as a radical shift in her 
theory. Whereas Butler in her early writings was more focussed on the investigation of 
discursive formations, she later turned towards a more detailed elaboration on the norm-
ative character of those formations, which requires some attention for the concept of the 
norm itself. While the explicit emphasis on the norm is a new development, the exploration 
of norms and especially the violence of norms has always been an important issue for 
Butler. Similarly, the focus on norms in Butler’s more recent writings does not imply that 
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the question of discursive formations is irrelevant in this later text.  Rather, the shift  in 
language should be  seen as an attempt to  reformulate  the  same concern within  a  new 
terminology (Distelhorst 2007, 217). 
In fact,  the only text in which Butler explicitly refers to the conception of the norm is 
“Gender Regulations”, which is published in Undoing Gender. Butler’s turn to the norm in 
this  text  must  be  seen  in  context  of  the  question of  “how discourse  might  be  said  to 
produce a subject” (UG 50). Thus, the notion of the norm has to be read in the context of 
an investigation of discourse and hegemony and the question of the power involved in the 
process of subjection. Butler makes clear: “A norm is not the same as a rule, and it is not 
the same as a law” (UG 41). A law is always explicit and functions first and foremost as an 
instrument of restriction. A norm, in contrast, “may or may not be explicit, and when they 
operate  as  the  normalizing  principle  in  social  practice,  they  usually  remain  implicit”,  
hence, they often cannot be seen directly, at least not easily, but appear “most clearly and 
dramatically in the effects that they produce” (UG 41). What is the function of the norm 
then? Butler answers: “The norm governs the social intelligibility of action” only allowing 
“for certain kinds of practices and action to become recognizable as such” (UG 41f.). The 
norm is intrinsically productive, governing a process of normalization that establishes a 
field  of  the  intelligible.  As such a  instance,  the norm “is  a  form of  social  power that 
produces the intelligible field of subjects” (UG 48), thus deciding who can count as an 
intelligible subject and where the limits of the realm of the intelligible are.
The  question  of  an  “intelligible  field  of  subjects”,  while  articulated  in  a  new way  in 
Undoing Gender, has been a major concern in all of Butler’s writings. Already in Gender 
Trouble, Butler was concerned about the “matrix of intelligibility” (GT 24) that governs the 
field of possible (gender) identities. In this early text, she particularly wants to investigate 
into the function of the “heterosexual matrix” (GT 7) in producing stable categories such as  
‘women’. In order to question the stability of this category – ‘women’ – and to reveal the 
hidden work of the ‘heterosexual matrix’ that produces it, she asks for “a feminist genea-
logy  of the category of women” (GT 8). Similarly, Butler formulates this concern in the 
preface of Bodies that Matter, describing the book as “an effort to think further about the 
workings of heterosexual hegemony in the crafting of matters sexual and political” (BM 
xii).
We can see that despite Butler’s employment of different sets of terminology, her major 
concern remains the same. She wants to investigate the norm as a social form of power, or, 
alternatively,  the  discursive  formations  –  both  notions  refer  to  a  similar  process  from 
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different perspectives – that govern the field of socially possible and acceptable identities. 
And, additionally, she wants to reveal the violence that these norms exercise against those 
who are at the limits of the socially acceptable, or, indeed, fall outside the realm of the 
social. When doing so, Butler – especially in her writings of the 1990s – usually focusses 
primarily  on  gender  norms.  In  this  context,  Chambers  and Carver  employed  the  term 
“heteronormativity”  to  signify  the  process  in  which  binary  conception  of  gender  and 
compulsory  heterosexuality  function  as  the  norms  that  establish  the  field  of  possible 
gender. The term “heteronormativity” is also meant to signify the violence that these norms 
exercise  towards  those  that  fall  outside  the  field  of  possible  gender  (Chambers/Carver 
2008, 76, 121 and 136ff.). In her more recent works, however, Butler develops the same 
concern about the violence of the norms in the context of a discussion of war (PL), and it 
becomes clear that it is applicable in all context where norms define the boarders between 
the realm of the acceptable and the domain of the outside.
The use of the term violence in connection with an elaboration on norms might seem odd 
or out of place. Usually, violence is seen to signify an expression of force that can be 
sharply distinguished from power or norms. Commonly, it is used to refer to physical kinds 
of force in particular. Butler’s notion of normative violence contradicts this common use of 
the word. It has to be seen against the background of the idea that violence does not only 
appear in the form of (physical) force, but also in more hidden and subtle forms. These 
subtle forms of violence are much harder to detect, but, at the same moment they might hit 
just as hard as or even harder than physical violence. With clear, but unreported reference 
to Derrida, Butler calls this form of violence also “the violence of the letter, the violence of 
the  mark  which  establishes  what  will  and  will  not  signify,  what  will  and  will  not  be 
included within the intelligible“65 (CF 52). Butler wants to indicate that there is an exercise 
of power that is much more violent than physical force, namely the violence of norms, a 
violence that  stems from the norms and discursive formations  that  establish  the  social 
categories of identity and govern any process of subject formation. 
What is the specific form that normative violence takes? What can hit one even harder than 
physical force? Butler’s answer is that normative violence has the power of banning some-
body from the realm of the intelligible, thereby basically declaring one’s life unintelligible. 
Normative violence confronts individuals with the fact that they are living a life that is 
virtually seen as unlivable. Not all lives are per se considered as livable. On the contrary, 
65  The notion of the “violence of the letter” or “the violence of the mark” stem from Derrida’s Of Gram-
matology (Derrida 1983) and is meant to designate the violence inscribed into linguistic categories. 
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the definition of a livable life is always a contested question. The norm produces and regu-
lates the field of livable life. But as a downside, the norm necessarily also produces and 
regulates a sphere of those lives that cannot be considered livable. Those lives excluded 
from the sphere of the livable form its outside. Butler is particularly interested in investig-
ating and revealing the limits of the field of permitted identities, the limits of the realm of 
lives that are considered liveable or worth living. She especially wants to point out the 
unbearable destiny of those that are rendered outside the field of permitted identities and 
whose  lives  are  therefore  considered  not  worth  living  or,  indeed,  impossible.  Butler’s 
concern at this point seems very plausible: If the norm sanctions the field of possible iden-
tities, then one has to consider the violent consequences the norm has on those that cannot 
fulfill the requirements to count as such an identity.
The reformulation of Butler’s account in the light of a theory of hegemony should enable 
us to appreciate Butler’s contribution to a critical analysis of relations of power and domin-
ation and how her contribution can lead to an important expansion of the scope of such an 
analysis. If we only consider the power enforced by one subject on another, we miss a very 
important form of power that has already been at work in the formation of the very subjects 
that form the basis of our analysis. But, more importantly, if we only notice the power 
which  is  enacted  between  already  established  subjects,  we  ignore  the  power  that  is 
enforced on those that are not granted with the status of being a subject. Because one is not  
automatically a subject, but the subject has to be seen as a site within a social structure that 
an individual can only inhabit if it complies with the norms that regulate the structure. If an 
individual cannot comply with the norms, it will not be granted the status of a subject, and 
this exclusion from the status of the subject is, in Butler’s view, the most violent form of 
power, because it deprives the individual of the basics of its social existence. The power 
that declares one to be excluded from the realm of the possible subjects is the most violent 
form of power.
The Constitutive Outside
However, an important problem emerges at this point when considering the status of those 
that fall outside the realm of the norm. Several questions arise: What is actually meant by 
the outside of the sphere of livable lives here? How can the outside of the norm be concep-
tualized? Who are the ones that are rendered to be outside the norm? What status do they 
have? Which consequences does their status have for their options of emancipation? These 
question are especially important for a rereading of Butler in the context of a critical polit-
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ical theory. Even if we are not concerned with an emancipatory political project, the ques-
tion of the outside is all but subsidiary. Butler points out that this question is of crucial 
importance for any politics, because the question of the outside is constitutive for the very 
field of the socially permitted and acceptable. The main problem is that Butler has concep-
tualized the outside in several ways in her work, ways that cannot be unified and some-
times even contradict one another.
The problem gets an additional dimension if we consider that there are again important 
similarities of Butler’s view with the achievements of Laclau and Mouffe in  Hegemony 
and Socialist Strategy and with further elaborations by Laclau in his subsequent works. 
Accordingly,  in  Bodies  that  Matter  Butler  refers  to  Laclau  and  Mouffe’s  notion  of 
“constitutive antagonism” when explaining that  the formation of  an identity  is  accom-
panied by a processes of exclusion that inextricably bind the identity to an outside that has 
a constitutive function in this very formation of this identity.
In other words, any attempt to circumscribe an identity in terms of relations of production, and 
solely within those terms, performs an exclusion and, hence, produces a constitutive outside, 
understood on the model of the Derridean ‘supplément,’ that denies the claim to positivity and 
comprehensiveness implied by that prior objectivation (BM 194).
In other words, the main idea is that any identity is constituted in relation to an exclusion 
that produces an outside. This outside resists any attempt to fully comprehend it, to fully 
integrate it  within a discursive formation. Thus, we are confronted with the irreducible 
openness of any discursive formation where any attempt to close it finds its limit in this 
unconceptualizable outside. However, as Butler also points out, that does not mean that the 
outside  is  beyond  the  sphere  of  discourse,  that  it  can  be  thought  independently  of 
discursive formations: 
For  there  is  an  ‘outside’ to  what  is  constructed  by  discourse,  but  this  is  not  an  absolute 
‘outside,’ an ontological thereness that exceeds or counters the boundaries of discourse; as a 
constitutive ‘outside,’ it is that which can only be thought – when it can – in relation to that 
discourse, at and as its most tenuous borders (BM 8).
How can an outside, which is said to form the border of discourse itself, be thought? And, 
more importantly,  the question still  remains:  Who does actually count  as outside? And 
additionally: What status have those that are banned there?
In Contingent Foundations Butler refers to the role of the outside in the process of subject 
formation. This text has already been discussed extensively in chapter four and five of the 
present inquiry and we can therefore build on the previous discussion of subject formation 
now to investigate into the role of the outside in this process. In the spirit of the general 
aim of denaturalization prevalent in this text she writes:
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For the subject to be a pregiven point of departure for politics is to defer the question of the 
political construction and regulation of the subject itself; for it is important to remember that 
subjects are constituted through exclusion, that is, through the creation of a domain of deau-
thorized subjects, presubjects, figures of abjection, populations erased from view (CF 47).
Already one page earlier Butler states: “The subject is constructed through acts of differen-
tiation  that  distinguish  the  subject  from its  constitutive  outside,  a  domain  of  abjected 
alterity” (CF 46). These passages reveal a significant uncertainty and vagueness in Butler’s 
conception of the constitutive outside. Formally speaking, we can summarize Butler’s idea 
in  the  following  way:  The  formation  of  the  subject  works  through  an  exclusion  that 
produces an outside, which is required for any process of subject formation and forms its 
very limit. But already in the short passage from Contingent Foundations cited above we 
find an enormous variation of suggestions how to conceptualize this outside. Butler speaks 
of  “deauthorized  subjects”,  “presubjects”,  “populations  erased  from view”,  “figures  of 
abjection” and the “domain of abjected alterity“. There are two possible interpretations of 
this variety of designations: Either Butler thinks that there are several limits of the process 
of subject  formation and therefore also several  versions of the outside that  need to be 
distinguished. In this case, Butler has to be blamed for not providing any clue on how to 
conceptualize these different forms of the outside. The alternative is that the multiplicity of  
notions of the outside is an expression of Butler’s own uncertainty on how to think the 
outside.  If  this  is  the  case,  her  theory  is  in  even  bigger  need  of  further  clarification. 
Anyway, the notion of the outside in this text does not seem very convincing.
This is especially the case when we look at the examples of the outside that Butler herself 
offers. First, she refers to instances “when certain qualifications must first be met in order 
to  be,  quite  literally,  a  claimant  in  sex discrimination or  rape cases.”  (CF 47).  In  this  
instance, Butler employs a very narrow notion of the subject as subject before the law. 
While her example might provide some insight into the specific case, such a notion of the  
subject falls clearly short of covering the whole field of possible subject positions. Second, 
Butler – in the context of the Gulf War at the beginning of the 1990s – names “the Arab” as 
an instance of an “abjected alterity” (CF 46). One could raise the question why “the Arab” 
– to quote this classification, which Butler herself quotes – should count as an outside at 
all. Would it not be more adequate to conceptualize “the Arab” as a subordinated identity 
within an discursive formation that might be specified as a certain hegemonic intercultural 
setting?66 In general, it seems that all the examples Butler offers in this text can easily be 
66 In Precarious Life, Butler reinvokes this concern about “the Arab” as deprived from the stats of a subject. 
In this later work, she makes clear that to count as a subject implies to live a life that is considered worth 
living, and that the life of “the Arab” is not considered a livable life (PL 19ff.) In the light of this later 
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conceptualized as located within a discursive formation as a distinct – even though subor-
dinated – subject position. Hence, it does not become clear why the notion of an outside 
should be of any need, or indeed be the most adequate way to conceptualize these iden-
tities.
Already in Gender Trouble, but to a much greater extent in Bodies that Matter and espe-
cially The Psychic Life of Power, Butler tries to conceptualize the outside as the abject. A 
closer examination of the concept of abjection might help to clarify matters. In the intro-
duction of Bodies that Matter Butler writes: 
This exclusionary matrix by which subjects are formed thus requires the simultaneous produc-
tion  of  a  domain  of  abject  beings,  those  who  are  not  yet  ‘subjects,’ but  who  form  the 
constitutive outside to the domain of the subject. The abject designates here precisely those 
‘unlivable’ and ‘uninhabitable’ zones of social life which are nevertheless densely populated by 
those who do not enjoy the status of the subject, but whose living under the sign of the ‘unliv-
able’ is required to circumscribe the domain of the subject. This zone of uninhabitability will 
constitute the defining limit of the subject’s domain; it will constitute that site of dreaded iden-
tification against which – and by virtue of which – the domain of the subject will circumscribe 
its own claim to autonomy and to life. In this sense, then, the subject is constituted through the 
force of exclusion and abjection, one which produces a constitutive outside to the subject, an 
abjected outside, after all, ‘inside’ the subject as its own founding repudiation (BM 3).
In a footnote to this passage Butler explains that the notion of abjection “resonates with the 
psychoanalytic notion of Verwerfung” (BM 243 (2)). Usually, Verwerfung is translated as 
‘foreclosure’, and signifies the unconscious, as in the case of Freud, or the realm of the 
‘real’, as in the theory of Lacan. Abjection, in contrast, “designates a degraded or cast out 
status within the terms of sociality” (BM 243 (2)). Thus, the abject denotes individuals that 
do not fulfill  the requirements to count as subjects,  but nevertheless remain within the 
domain of the social, precisely with the status of being individuals that are excluded from 
the status of being subjects.  Drawing on the distinction of individual  and subject –  as 
discussed in chapter four – we can say that the process of subject formation requires a 
domain of individuals that do not count as subject.  Abjection signifies the process that 
produces the zone of those individuals that are excluded from the status as subjects. It is a 
zone of an outside – outside of being a subject – that nevertheless remains inside – inside 
the realm of the social.
In  Undoing Gender, Butler revisits the paradoxical status of those individuals excluded 
from the status of being subjects and thus inhabiting the borders of sociality. In this text, 
Butler speaks in the language of the norm. She writes: “The question of what it is to be 
outside the norm poses a paradox for thinking, for if the norm renders the social field intel-
text, it seem justified to speak of “the Arab” as an “outside”, as this anonymous mass of humans that is 
covered by this term is considered as outside the realm of livable lives.
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ligible and normalizes that field for us, then being outside the norm is in some sense being 
defined still  in relation to it” (UG 42). Butler’s suggestion here is that there are certain 
identities at the border of sociality, that fail to conform to the norms that govern sociality, 
but nevertheless are defined in relation to the norms, and are therefore excluded from the 
norm while still falling under the norm.
But in  Undoing Gender Butler also describes another form of being excluded from the 
norm that goes even further than being abject. Butler calls it the ‘unintelligible’. This is the 
most intriguing conceptualization of the outside, because it is the strongest case of being 
excluded. But, at the same time, it is also the most problematic conceptualization of exclu-
sion. To have this unbearable status means to 
become the other against which the human is made. It is the inhuman, the beyond the human, 
the less than human, the border that secures the human in its ostensible reality. To be called a 
copy, to be called unreal, is thus one way in which one can be oppressed. But consider that it is 
more fundamental than that. For to be oppressed mean that you already exist as a subject of 
some kind, you are there as the visible and oppressed other for the master subject as a possible 
or potential subject. But to be unreal is something else again. For to be oppressed one must first 
become intelligible. To find that one is fundamentally unintelligible (indeed, that the laws of 
culture and of language find one to be an impossibility) is to find that one has not yet achieved 
access to the human. It is to find oneself speaking only and always as if one were human, but 
with the sense that one is not (UG 218).
The most comprehensive interpretation of the notion of the unintelligible in Butler’s work  
has been presented by Chambers and Carver and I want to draw from their reading of this 
passage  here.  They  make  clear  that  “the  unintelligible  is  not  the  marginalised  or  the  
abjected […], the discourse of intelligibility is not the same as a discourse of oppression 
[…]. The ‘unintelligible’ are those ‘others’ who are made invisible by the norm […], the 
unintelligible cannot exist as ‘human’ ” (Chambers/Carver 2008, 126). As they point out 
“the concept of unintelligibility counters our intuitive notion that ‘everyone’ counts as a 
human and is recognisable as such” (Chambers/Carver 2008, 128). Instead, it “suggests 
that the category of the human is not a given, but rather an achievement or production” 
(Chambers/Carver 2008, 126).  Thus, “the ‘unintelligible’ are those for whom the norm 
makes life unlivable” (Chambers/Carver 2008, 128). In this sense, the category of the unin-
telligible is very powerful because it presents the most extreme case of normative violence, 
a form of violence that renders outside the sphere of the human (Chambers/Carver 2008, 
128).
But  the  notion of  the  unintelligible  also  causes  severe problems for  any emancipatory 
project, because “the unintelligible cannot be included given that they do not even exist as  
human”  (Chambers/Carver  2008,  128).  In  other  words,  no  emancipatory  project  can 
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campaign for the inclusion of those who are unintelligible, because they do not even fulfill 
the requirements to be subjects for such emancipatory desires. Strictly speaking, we cannot 
even speak of the unintelligible, because whenever we speak of them we use categoriza-
tions that give them a name, and, thus, provide them with some kind of intelligible status. 
But the unintelligible do not have a name, they fall under no categorizations whatsoever, 
they are unintelligible precisely because they are excluded form all categorizations. 
One might raise the question: Who is the unintelligible? Are lesbians, gays, intersex or 
transgender for example instances of the unintelligible? The answer can only be that none 
of these groups of people can count as unintelligible, simply for the fact that we already 
have names for them. They are not unintelligible, because they fall under certain – subor-
dinated – categories. They are not outside of language, they cannot be rendered unintelli-
gible. If we generalize the case, we have to conclude that it is generally impossible to name 
any instance of the unintelligible, because it is impossible to speak of the unintelligible in 
any direct way. Instead, “the unintelligible can only be brought to light as a category of 
human subjects after they have been rendered intelligible” (Chambers/Carver 2008, 127). 
Maybe some of the categories mentioned above are, even though they are not instances of 
the unintelligible, nevertheless good example of an exemplification of the notion of the 
unintelligible. As we have seen, it is impossible to name an instance of an unintelligible 
identity, because to do so would be a performative contradiction. We can only speak of the 
unintelligible afterwards, once they are granted a certain identity and are, thereby, included 
in the realm of the intelligible. Intersex and transgender seem to be good examples here. 
Only a few years ago, when there was no word for intersex or transgender yet, those people 
literarily did not exist. Strictly speaking, there was no intersex or transgender person before  
the invention of those terms. We can only speak of those people now, afterwards, after they 
entered the sphere of the intelligible. 
We can see that the notion of the unintelligible is a very sharp-minded, comprehensible and 
theoretically  consequent  concept.  But  the  question  remains:  Is  it  a  politically  useful 
concept? As we have seen, it is not applicable to any emancipatory struggles, because these 
struggles already presuppose the field of the intelligible. We might say that the unintelli-
gible is prior to the struggles of the excluded and oppressed. Nevertheless, we can say in 
favor of the notion of the unintelligible that it reveals a form of normative violence that has 
not been seen before and could not be seen otherwise, the violence that takes place at the  
borders of the domain of the human and at  the limits of what counts as a livable life. 
Hence, the notion of the unintelligible is useful for political analysis to the extent that it 
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reveals forms of normative violence,  even though it  does not seem to be applicable to 
emancipatory projects. 
We need to make explicit now that the question of the unintelligible and the entire project  
that forms the background for development of this conception is based on a certain concern 
that has been the driving force behind Butler’s work at least since Gender Trouble. Butler’s 
work over the last 20 years seems to be structured around the question of who can count as 
a human and who is denied this status (Distelhorst 2009, 90). The common theme that 
binds together all of Butler’s work is to analyze the norms and power relations that cause 
people to be outside the realm of the livable. This is linked to the task of altering these 
norms in a way that enables the excluded ones to also live a livable life (Distelhorst 2009, 
111). On the very last page of Gender Trouble Butler writes: “The task here is not to celeb-
rate each and every new possibility qua possibility, but to redescribe those possibilities that 
already exist, but which exist within cultural domains designated as culturally unintelli-
gible and impossible” (GT 203). Maybe this is not only the task of the book, but the task of 
Butler’s whole authorship. Maybe this is the central concern that provides the coherence of 
all of Butler’s work, its hidden ethical task. “Life and the creation of better conditions for 
our survival, but also our recognition as intelligible subjects” (Loizidou 2007, 7), as Elena 
Loizidou67 suggests.  This  very  important  matter,  which  has  become  more  explicit  in 
Butler’s more recent work (UG 1ff., PL 19ff.), needs closer examination, which will be 
conducted  in  chapter  nine.  The  status  of  this  concern  especially  as  an  ethical  task  or 
commitment will cause a set of difficult questions.
Part 3: Performativity as Political Theory
This part will offer a reading of Butler’s notion of performativity and iterability. The aim is 
to provide an interpretation of these terms that allows for an understanding of perform-
ativity  as  a  political  theory.  The  conclusions  that  follow  from  this  understanding  of 
performativity for the conception of politics, however, will not be drawn in this chapter, as 
this will be the topic of the final two chapters. In chapter eight, the discussions of perform-
ativity and iterability will lead to the question of subversiveness. In this context, we will be 
confronted again with the problem of the questionable status of Butler’s ethical commit-
ments. This problem is especially prevalent in Butler’s more recent work. These books will 
be discussed in chapter nine, where the continuity and shifts in Butler’s development will 
67 Elena Loizidou is currently a senior lecturer in Law in the School of Law at Birkbeck, University of 
London.
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be investigated. In the final subsection of chapter nine, the focus will be on Butler’s ethical 
commitment and the question about the ethical dimension in Butler’s work will be raised. 
The result of this discussion will be a confirmation of the claim that Butler should be read 
as a political theorist.
8. Performativity, Iterability and Subversiveness
The discussion in this chapter will resume a question raised in chapter six in the context of 
the interpretation of  The Psychic Life of Power. The question is: “How might we think 
resistance within the terms of reiteration” (PLP 12)? Or, in a formulation that can already 
be found in Gender Trouble: How is “agency, then, […] to be located within the possibility 
of  a  variation on  that  repetition”  (GT 198)?  First,  I  will  introduce  Butler’s  notions  of 
performativity and iterability.  Second, I will  investigate into how Butler conceptualizes 
subversiveness. In this context, then, I will take a closer look at drag and parody as poten-
tial subversive performances. Finally, I will raise the question about the status of ethics in 
Butler’s work.
Performativity and Iterability
In this subsection, I will consider the notion of performativity with reference to “For a 
Careful Reading” (Butlers second contribution to  Feminist Contentions) and  Bodies that  
Matter. In the 1999 preface of Gender Trouble, Butler writes about the complexity of the 
task of describing the notion of performativity: 
Much of  my work in  recent  years  has  been devoted  to  clarify  and  revising  the  theory of 
performativity that is outlined in Gender Trouble. It is difficult to say precisely what perform-
ativity is not only because my own views on what ‘performativity’ might mean have changed 
over time, most often in response to excellent criticism, but because so many others have taken 
it up and given it their own formulations (GT xv).
In “For a Careful Reading”, Butler states that her use of the term performativity is taken 
from J.L. Austin’s68 How to Do Things with Words, from Derrida’s reading of Austin in his 
famous article “Signature, Event, Context”, and Paul de Man’s69 notion of ‘metalepsis’ in 
his  text  Allegories of  Reading (CR 134). Drawing from Austin,  Butler  clarifies that  “a 
performative act is one which brings into being or enacts that which it names” (CR 134), as  
68 J.L. Austin (1911-1960) was a British philosopher of language. He is widely associated with his concept 
of the speech act and the idea of performative speech.
69 Paul de Man (1919-1983) was born in Belgium, but made his Ph.D. at Harvard University. He taught at 
several universities before becoming a professor at the department of French and Comparative Literature 
at Yale University. He was a close friend of Jacques Derrida and a major figure in the distribution of 
deconstruction in America.
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distinct from a constative act which only describes or states what is the case. In this way, 
the performative act “marks the constitutive or productive power of discourse” (CR 134). 
In  contrast  to  a  single  performative  act,  “performativity  must  be  understood  not  as  a 
singular or deliberate ‘act,’ but, rather, as the reiterative and citational practice by which 
discourse produces the effects that it names” (BM 2). Thus, there is an important distinc-
tion between performance as an individual act and performativity as on ongoing practice. 
Again  drawing  from  Austin,  Butler  explains  that  for  a  performative  utterance  to  be 
successful it must follow an established convention, for example, certain words have to be 
spoken and certain social requirements have to be met. It was Derrida’s main innovation to 
point out that this can be read in the way that we can say that the performative force is 
linked to citation and iteration. Because, for an utterance to be performative, it must cite or, 
in other words, iterate an established convention. In Butler’s words: 
For a performative to work, it must draw upon and recite a set of linguistic conventions which 
have traditionally worked to bind or engage certain kinds of effects. The force or effectivity of 
a performative will be derived from its capacity to draw on and reencode the historicity of 
those conventions in a present act. This power of recitation is not a function of an individual’s 
intention, but is an effect of historically sedimented linguistic conventions (CR 134).
Following Derrida, Butler tries to think the required conventions for an effective perform-
ative act not as static and for ever fixed ones, but as the result of the iterability of the act 
itself.  Accordingly,  Butler  calls the convention “a sedimented iterability” (CR 134). Of 
course, that does not mean that the sedimentation can ever be concluded, on the contrary, 
also  the  reformulation  of  the  convention  is  itself  a  permanent  process  driven  by  the 
permanent reiteration of these conventions in unlimited performative acts. The conventions 
can always be reiterated and need to be iterated in order to sustain, a situation that Butler  
signifies – following Derrida – with the term iterability. 
Since the effectiveness of a performative act is in this view no longer dependable on the 
subject’s intention – at least not only – this leads to a decentralization of the subject. “The 
category of ‘intention,’ indeed, the notion of ‘the doer’ will have its place, but this place is 
no longer ‘behind’ the deed as its enabling source” (CR 134). Lloyd interprets that “it is 
Butler’s contention that agency is an effect of action and not a cause. That is, while an 
utterance may appear to declare a prior intention, the prior intention is actually the effect of 
the utterance” (Lloyd 2005, 98). The possibilities of agency have to be found in connection 
with the iterability of the norms, as possibilities of change that are inscribed in the reitera-
tion of the norms. These possibilities of alteration are not formed in the will of the doer, 
rather “there are possibilities in the resignifying process that produces doers that create 
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scope  for  resistance  and  change”  (Lloyd  2005,  98).  Additionally,  the  doer  cannot 
completely control the effects of the reiteration, rather these effects are unforeseeable and 
erratic. In this discussion of performativity we are confronted with a conception of the 
subject as constituted  in and through discourse, and a conception of agency that has to 
account for these processes of the subject formation as well as the iterability of the norms. 
Nevertheless, agency keeps a crucial place as the site of the reiteration of the norms and 
thereby also the site of possible alteration.
Already in Bodies that Matter, Butler develops the notion of performativity in connection 
with an investigation into the function of the norm – and this is where Butler exceeds both 
Austin and Derrida and finds her own, inventive and intriguing notion of performativity. In 
the context of a discussion of the conditions of sexuality, she writes that the oppositions 
between  construction  and  determination  are  insufficient  to  account  for  the  involved 
complexity. It is neither a voluntary  construction, nor a fixed determination, instead the 
complex relation of performativity and norm requires close attention. “The ‘performative’ 
dimension  of  construction  is  precisely  the  forced  reiteration  of  the  norms”  (BM  94).  
Performativity is not a voluntary act, it is not a free or theatrical self-presentation, rather, it 
has to be thought together with the function of the hegemonic norms. These norms are not 
only limiting performativity, but also enabling it. The norms form the condition of possib-
ility  of  performativity,  performativity  is  always in  relation to  the  norms,  only  in  their 
permanent reiteration:
Here, at the risk of repeating myself, I would suggest that performativity cannot be understood 
outside of a process of iterability, a regularized and constrained repetition of norms. And this 
repetition is not performed by a subject; this repetition is what enables a subject and constitutes 
the temporal  conditions for the subject.  This iterability implies that  ‘performance’ is  not  a 
singular  ‘act’ or  event,  but  a  ritualized  production,  a  ritual  reiterated  under  and  through 
constraint, under and through the force of prohibition and taboo, with the threat of ostracism 
and even death controlling and compelling the shape of the production, but not, I will insist, 
determining it fully in advance (BM 95).
Butler’s notion of performativity is sometimes seen as a version of voluntarism in the way 
that it seems to evoke a subject that has the ability to craft or at least present itself in a kind 
of  theatrical  act.  Against  this  interpretation,  it  must  become  clear  that  the  notion  of 
performativity only makes sense when considered in connection with an investigation into 
the function of the norm. In that light, performativity offers a way to understand the agency 
of the subject under hegemonic condition. On the other hand, some have argued that the 
notion of performativity leads to the end of the agency of the subject, because it makes any 
voluntary action of the subject impossible. This is also a very one-sided view of perform-
ativity that misunderstands the major innovation of this concept. It does not respect that 
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performativity is meant precisely as an attempt to explain how – under hegemonic condi-
tions – the agency of the subject is nevertheless possible. To be more accurate, it is an 
attempt to explain the possibility of social change, and in this context the subject is concep-
tualized as the site of reiteration of the norm that guarantees its relative stability, but also 
provides for its openness and alteration. Thus, the agency of the subject lies in this ability 
of reiteration. 
The notion of iterability in Butler’s use of the term is meant to describe what is the issue 
here from the perspective of the possibility of social change. It describes the functioning of 
the norms, their power over the subjects and the subject’s dependency on the norms, but 
also the indigence of the norms that have no ontological status outside its instantiation by 
the subject, thus allowing for the agency of the subject to be the site of the alteration of the 
norms. Iterability is intended to explain both aspects, the relative stability of the norms as 
well as the possibility of their alteration. Iterability does not only imply that the norms can 
always be reiterated, but also that they must permanently be reiterated, because for the 
norms to sustain their function they must permanently be instantiated in and through the 
subject’s agency. The stability of the norms is not linked to a specific ontological status, 
rather, it is the consequence of iterability, an iterability that at the same time inscribes the 
possibility of alteration into every reinstantiation of the norms. The relative stability of the  
norms is the consequence of that stabilization through iteration, it is the temporary result of 
iterability, an iterability that takes place as the subject’s agency.
In the introduction of  Bodies that Matter,  Butler  summarizes five consequences of the 
concept of performativity for the status of gender and the function of gender norms. These 
consequences again highlight the paradoxical status of performativity as warrantor for the 
relative stability  of  the norms,  but  also for  the possibility  of  their  alteration.  The first  
consequence states that “gender performativity cannot be theorized apart from the forcible 
and reiterative practice of regulatory sexual regimes”, thus linking performativity to the 
function of the hegemonic norms. The second implication is that “the account of agency 
conditioned by those very regimes of discourse/power cannot be conflated with volun-
tarism or individualism”, performativity does not presuppose a free and choosing will, but 
a subject that acts under conditions of its prior subordination under power, a subordination 
that nevertheless does not determine its actions, but enables it to be the site of alteration. 
The  third  aspect  deals  with  the  “materiality  of  sex”,  stating  that  performativity  also  
involves a materialization of the norms. Hegemonic norms are materialized in and through 
performativity, not only in the bodies of the subjects, but also in institutionalized settings, 
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thus involving consequences that go far beyond self practices of the subject or the level of 
linguistic  practices.  The final two aspects  elaborate  in more details  about  the status of 
agency. The forth consequence states that “the materialization of the norms requires those 
identificatory processes by which norms are assumed or appropriated, and these identifica-
tions precede and enable the formation of a subject”,  that  is to say,  the agency of the 
subject is precisely invoked as the site of the instantiation of the norms. The final aspect 
highlights  that  this  instantiation can  never  be completed,  but  reaches  its  certain  limits 
within the subjects agency, which Butler in this text marks especially in the body of the 
subject: “the limits of constructivism are exposed at those boundaries of bodily life where 
the abjected or delegitimated bodies fail to count as ‘bodies’ ” (BM 15). In conclusion, we 
can state that Butler’s notion of  performativity wants to give an account of the subject’s 
agency under hegemonic conditions, an agency that is derived from a invoking subordina-
tion under the norms, but which is at the same time also the place for the stabilization and 
alteration of those very norms.
Iterability, Hegemony and Agency
In this subsection, the focus will be on the functioning of the norms and the iterability of 
the norms in and through the agency of the subject. In this context, a chapter from Butler’s 
Excitable Speech will be discussed, in which she investigates into the social conditions of 
performativity. It is an attempt to conflate Derrida’s notion of iterability (developed in the 
context  of  a  philosophy of  language)  with a  theory of  hegemony (as  discussed in  the 
previous chapter) and an account of bodily practices (which Butler draws from Bourdieu’s 
notion of habitus).
Performativity has often been seen as focussed on the linguistic  level  only,  thus  over-
looking that Butler does not restrict her account to linguistic practices, indeed, that they are 
maybe not even the  most important  ones for her, since bodily practices likely play the 
biggest role in Butler’s notion of performativity.70 In the debate with Laclau and Žižek, 
Butler states: “I am, I believe, more concerned to rethink performativity as cultural ritual, 
as the reiteration of cultural norms, as the habitus of the body in which structural and social  
dimensions of meaning are not finally separable” (RU 29). And in the 1999 preface to the  
second  edition  of  Gender  Trouble, she  writes:  “The  notion  of  the  ritual  dimension  of 
70 Diana Coole tries to develop a notion of a phenomenological agency that follows from an account of 
embodiment (Coole 2005). I think that a lot could be gained from a further investigation in this field. In 
this context, I see huge potential for a conflation of Butler’s notion of performativity with a phenomeno-
logical account of embodiment. Unfortunately, I cannot deal with this subject in the course of this inquiry. 
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performativity is allied with the notion of the habitus in Pierre Bourdieu’s work, something 
which I only came to realize after the fact of writing this text” (GT 206 (8)).
Butler  sees  the  strength of  Pierre  Bourdieu’s contribution in  the fact  that  he offers  an 
“account  of how norms become embodied, suggesting that  they craft  and cultivate  the 
habitus of the body” (ES 142). But she is also critical of his account: “What Bourdieu fails 
to understand, however, is how what is bodily in speech resists and confounds the very 
norms by which it is regulated.” (ES 142) In other words, Bourdieu offers a very convin-
cing account of the inscriptions of norms onto the body, but his underdeveloped theory of 
speech – it is important to notice that Butler puts emphasis on the bodily dimensions of any 
speech act and that she additionally insists on including bodily utterances in the notion of 
speech – fails to account for the resistance of the subject and, thus, fails to give an explana-
tion of social change.
Bourdieu and Derrida both refer to Austin’s theory of performative utterances, thus, their 
imaginary discussion – it is Butler who brings the two together – is also a question of how 
to read Austin. The main area of disagreement is the question of the distinction of perform-
ative utterances that work and those that fail to work. For Bourdieu, the success or failure 
of a performative act is solely a consequence of the conventions that make it possible and 
especially the status of the utterer to have the power to perform the act. If the setting is 
according to the conventions and the utterer is empowered to do what he does, then the  
performative utterance will be successful. Derrida, in contrast, points out that the possib-
ility of failure is generally inscribed into any performative utterance. The performative act 
only works, because – paradoxically speaking – it also has the possibility to fail.
The background of this disagreement is formed by very different account of the status of 
the conventions. In Bourdieu’s view, the conventions are socially fixed and precede any 
performative act without being affected by it. Derrida, on the other hand, insists that the 
conventions do not have a status independently of their reevocation in the performative act. 
The conventions need to be instantiated – in Derrida’s words we could also say: cited – in 
and through the performative utterance to gain and keep their status. As a consequence, the 
status of the convention is not indifferent to the failure of an utterance, rather, the possib-
ility of failure affects the convention itself. Conventional formulas can be cited wrong or 
can be invoked by people who are not authorized to do so, and these wrong or unauthor-
ized citations can also entail certain effects, effects that are not governed by the convention 
and therefore undermine its status and work on their transformation. Butler summarizes 
this discussion in the following way:
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The possibility of a resignification of the ritual is based on the prior possibility that a formula 
can break with its originary context, assuming meanings and functions for which it was never 
intended. In making social institutions static, Bourdieu fails to grasp the logic of iterability that 
governs the possibility of social transformation. By understanding the false or wrong invoca-
tions as reiterations, we see how the form of social institutions undergoes change and alteration 
and how an invocation that has no prior legitimacy can have the effect of challenging existing 
forms of legitimacy, breaking open the possibility for future forms. […]
Significantly, the very iterability of the performative that Bourdieu fails to see is what preoccu-
pies the reading of Austin that Derrida provides. For Derrida, the force of the performative is 
derived precisely from its decontextualization, from its break with a prior context and its capa-
city to assume new contexts. (ES 147)
In  contrast  to  Bourdieu,  Derrida  has  the  major  advantage  of  being able  to  provide  an 
explanation for the possibility of alteration. But Butler critically adds that she also sees a 
serious shortcoming in Derrida’s contribution, which is located in the fact that he grants 
alteration with a kind of ontological status. The problem is that “Derrida focuses on those 
ostensibly ‘structural’ features of the performative that persist quite apart from any and all 
social contexts” (ES 148). For Derrida, any sign must have the possibility to break with its 
origin in order to be a sign. In other words, the status of a sign implies that it must remain a  
sign even when departed from its original context. We have to remember that Derrida’s 
notion of iterability is developed in the context of a theory of linguistics. In the context of 
linguistics, Butler does not want criticize to him. But Butler warns us that when transferred 
to a social level, Derrida’s conception involves a certain blindness. This blindness occurs  
because Derrida does not account for the social fact that there are established conventions 
that make certain performative acts possible and inhibit others, that there is a certain hege-
monic setting that determines what is possible and what is not. Even though the iterability 
of the norms puts into question the status of these conventions as stable and fixed, we 
nevertheless have to account for their relative stability and persistence. Thus, Derrida’s 
notion of iterability offers a convincing explanation of the possibility of change, but he 
fails  to  present  a  theory  of  the  social  conditions  –  and,  more  importantly,  the  social 
obstacles – for change. For Derrida, iterability “has a structural status that appears separ-
able from any consideration of the social” (ES 148), thus seems to have a blind spot when 
it  comes  to  the  investigation  of  existing  power  structures  that  govern  the  field  of  the  
socially possible.
In conclusion, Butler argues for a theory that tries to link together the conceptions of Bour-
dieu  and  Derrida:  “The  question  of  what  constitutes  the  ‘force’ of  the  performative, 
however, can be adequately answered by neither formulation, although both views, taken 
together, gesture toward a theory of the social iterability of the speech act” (ES 152). The 
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crucial questions are: Is everything iterable to the same extend? Are all iterations equally  
valid? What are the social conditions of iterability? What is actually possible, here and 
now, in our specific hegemonic situation? Which power relations and norms make change 
possible and which ones hinder it? These question are all  within the realm of Butler’s 
theoretical innovation. But there are also additional questions that we have to ask critically 
about Butler’s own conception.
First of all, especially from the perspective of the political scientist, we have to ask: Can a 
notion of iterability – even if enhanced by consideration of the body and a theory of hege-
mony – really explain the relative stability and persistence of existing power relations? I 
certainly want to suggest that the answer has to be yes, but I also want to point to certain 
shortcomings of Butler that are very striking when receiving her in the field of political 
theory. First, Butler seems to lack any account of political and social institutions. Even 
worse, she does not only lack an account of these institutions, she furthermore seems to 
misunderstand their status. This is especially obvious in Butler’s discussion of censorship 
in  Excitable  Speech, which  is  based  on  an  extremely  poor  conception  of  the  state,  a 
conception  that  can  neither  account  for  the  formation  of  the  state,  nor  for  its  inner 
complexity, nor for the unique status of the state within society. This is connected to the 
second shortcoming,  namely  that  Butler  does  not  provide  for  any  account  of  concrete 
historical conditions of emergence of certain cultural and institutional settings. I want to be 
very careful at this point, because I believe that Butler’s notion of performativity and iter-
ability offers – on a theoretical level – a very convincing explanation for the historical and 
cultural contingency of norms and institutions as well as for their stability. When it comes 
to  the task of  a  concrete  investigations  into the emergence of  these settings,  however, 
Butler’s account appears strangely thin and weak. Thus, when applying Butler’s notion of 
performativity and iterability in the field of political science, it seems to me that it is, first,  
important to develop its conflation with a theory of hegemony more explicit and elaborated 
than Butler herself does.  That allows us to highlight its critical  potential.  Second, it  is 
necessary to supplement Butler’s notion of performativity and iterability with a corres-
ponding theory of political institutions that fills the void in Butler’s account. Third, the task 
is  to  historically  contextualize  it  in  order  to  make  it  applicable  for  investigations  of 
concrete cultural and historical settings.
Subversiveness
The second critical request is concerned with the questions of social evaluation and moral 
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judgement. The questions are: Are all iterations equally desirable? Or is there a distinction 
between iterations that can be affirmed and those that have to be refused? In the light of a 
critical  political  project,  which  iterations  have  to  be  supported,  which  need  to  be 
dismissed? How can such a distinction be made? How can those iterations that have a 
subversive effect be detected and distinguished from other iterations that cause conser-
vative effects? 
There is a general agreement that something is wrong with Butler’s notion of subversion, 
that  it  involves  severe problems that  are  highly worrying (Lorey 1996,  42;  Nussbaum 
1999,  9;  Salih  2002,  95,  97  and  115f.;  Lloyd  2005,  148  Distelhorst  2007,  33; 
Chambers/Carver 2008, 138ff. and Thiem 2008, 207). In a nutshell, the main issue that all 
these critics point to is the following: Iterability is not subversive in itself, iterations can 
just  as  likely  take  on  conservative  forms.  Whereas  most  critics  agree  that  there  are 
subversive and conservative iterations and that the problem is only the distinction of the 
two forms, there are also some that go further and argue that there is no reason why an iter-
ation should be subversive after all, or, at least, that Butler does not provide such a reason. 
Alison Stone71 shows that this was already an important topic in the discussion in Feminist  
Contentions.  She  summarizes  that  Benhabib  and  Fraser  focussed  on  two  aspects,  “(1) 
whether Butler can adequately explain how subversion is possible, and (2) whether she can 
satisfactorily explain why subversion is desirable, or ought to be practiced” (Stone 2005, 
14). Stone suggests that Butler provides a convincing answer to the first question – and the 
discussion of iterability in the present inquiry should be enough of a proof here – but that 
the same cannot be said about the second question. In other words, she claims that Butler 
develops a strong account of subversion, but that she fails to give an account of the ethical 
judgments that she nevertheless makes:
This means, however, that Butler continues to need an account of why, in general, it is better to 
subvert and democratize entrenched and exclusive norms. That this account must be cast in a 
culturally specific lexicon, and must be fallible and contestable, does not affect the fact that 
Butler needs some such (fallible, specific) account to justify her normative claims – claims that 
recur whichever level of theoretical analysis she operates at (Stone 2005, 17).
To overcome this problem in Butler’s theory, Stone suggests reading Butler together with a 
theory of genealogy. She especially refers to Nietzsche in this context and tries to highlight 
the materialist  aspects  of Nietzsche’s genealogy. She claims more precisely that Nietz-
sche’s notion of ‘bodily forces’ might help to fill the normative void in Butler’s account 
(Stone 2005, 17ff.). Stone’s proposal is certainly worth discussion, but we have to take into 
71 Alison Stone is a British philosopher. She is currently senior lecturer in the department of Politics, Philo-
sophy and Religion at Lancaster University.
87
account – as she herself points out in a self-critique at the end of her paper – that this is 
clearly an adaptation of Butler’s theory and that Butler would have severe problems with 
the notion of ‘bodily forces’ (Stone 2005, 20f.).
Therefore, I want to go back to a discussion of Butler. In my opinion, the critics of Butler 
often overlook or  ignore  that  Butler’s  notion of  iterability  and performativity  certainly 
wants to serve as a theory of agency in its whole complexity, and not only as a theory of 
subversion. What Butler writes about iterability and performativity has to be applied to any 
iteration, not only to subversive ones. We could even go as far as to say that Butler’s theory 
is located prior to the distinction of conservative and subversive forms of iterations, that it 
is actually forming the very possibility of this distinction. It is, therefore, already a limited 
approach to Butler’s theory if we consider it only in the light of the question of subversion 
and resistance, as this is often the case.72
Still, the question remains and Butler even asks it herself: “What constitutes a subversive 
repetition within signifying practices of gender” (GT 199)? The contextualization of the 
question within the realm of gender is not only caused by the specific concern of Gender 
Trouble, it might also indicate that the question: what constitutes a subversive iteration? 
always has to be asked within a specific cultural setting and cannot be answered at a level 
independent of all cultural conditions. But still, the question remains and Butler can justifi-
ably be asked to provide for an answer. In Contingent Foundations, Butler explicitly refers 
to Fraser’s question, why resignification should be seen as a good, but she – just as expli-
citly – refuses to provide an answer. It seems that in her refusal to answer the question she 
implicitly suggests that the question was misleading or wrong, appearing almost offended 
that somebody dares to raise this question. She writes: “My question is not whether certain 
kinds of signification are good or bad, warranted or unwarranted, but, rather: what consti-
tutes the domain of discursive possibility within which and about which such questions can 
be posed” (CR 138)? But, accepting all these precautions, we still have to insist on the 
question:  What  –  under  the given  cultural  settings,  in  the  hegemonic  situation we are 
located in and in the language dominated by the current norms – allows for a distinction of 
a subversive iteration from a conservative one?
It seems that we have to accept that Butler cannot provide for an answer, and, in fact, is not 
even willing to do so. However, I want to suggest that there is a criterion to be found in 
Butler’s theory that enables us to distinguish between conservative and subversive itera-
tions. We can see this criterion if we reconsider the notion of subversion in the light of 
72  Thiem formulates a similar argument (Thiem 2008, 87f.).
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Butler’s  aim of  denaturalization.  She  writes  in  Gender  Trouble that  “the  repetition  of 
heterosexual constructs within sexual cultures both gay and straight may well be the inevit-
able site of the denaturalization and mobilization of gender categories” (GT 43). Thus, we 
can conclude that denaturalization can serve as the criterion for the subversiveness of a 
performative act. In other words: an iteration of the norm is subversive if it shows the non-
natural status of the norm and thereby works on denaturalizing and destabilizing it. Lloyds 
interpretation of Butler focusses on this aspect, designating denaturalization as the main 
political action in Butler’s theory. In connection with the question of the normative dimen-
sion of Butler’s theory, she even states that denaturalization is valuable in itself and serves 
as the normative ‘foundation’ of Butler’s work (Lloyd 2005, 176). Thus, it seems that the  
commitment to the radical ungroundedness, contingency and constitutive openness of all 
social formations is the ethical bottom line of Butler’s work that we have to accept. 
However, I am still not convinced and agree with Thiem:
Yet it seems to me to that with this move to openness as a normative criterion, if we left the 
consideration at that point, we would run into the problem either that this account remains too 
formalistic or that the ultimate normative criterion turns out to be settled with this openness 
(and thus no longer open for discussion), leaving the question theoretically settled but retaining 
the normative dimension only as a practical question of application and implementation (Thiem 
2008, 279 (22)).
In more recent writings, Butler also seems to see the insufficiency that lies in the implicit 
reference to openness and contingency as normative criteria. Indeed, it seems that she has 
changed her mind about this question and now suggests herself that – even though denatur-
alization is an important task – it is not sufficient as an account for subversive political 
action. 
Which action is right to pursue, which innovation has value, and which does not? The norms 
that we would consult to answer this question cannot themselves be derived from resignifica-
tion. They have to be derived from a radical democratic theory and practice; resignification has 
to be contextualized in that way (UG 224).
In her recent writings, Butler continues to insist that criteria cannot be settled formally. But 
instead of the refusal to even allow for the question about criteria, she now suggests that 
they have to be derived from concrete, contextualized political contexts. That, of course, 
implies that the criteria keep their contingent, contextual status that links them inextricably 
to their origin. Hence, contingency and openness still play a significant role, because they 
form the requirement for the settlement over criteria in an contingent and open context. But  
Butler is clear now that contingency and openness are not themselves the criteria and that 
criteria cannot be derived from them in a formal way either. I agree with Thiem about the 
strength of Butler’s account:
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The force of Butler’s argument lies, in my opinion, in her insistence that criteria and norms 
cannot be settled in advance or apart from understanding all criteria, norms, and normative 
aspirations as politically and historically conditioned. If  this situation presents  a theoretical 
impasse, it is one because on the one hand we have a limited perspective, while on the other 
hand there is the aspiration not to settle for a thorough relativism. In other words, we have 
nothing but contingent grounds, historically and socially conditioned knowledge, and so there 
is nothing that can function as criteria in a way that could adjudicate between different claims 
of what ought to be done (Thiem 2008, 209).
The main objection against this interpretation might be that it leads to a version of cultural 
relativism. But Thiem argues that this is not the case, because such a cultural relativism 
itself knows already too much about the status of different claims. Thus, she concludes that 
“only if one refuses the retreat into relativism does it become possible to take seriously 
how positions conflict with each other and deny each other’s validity” (Thiem 2008, 209). 
This is a very difficult matter which will be revised in the following chapter. But first, it is 
necessary to go into Butler’s remarks on subversiveness and subversive acts in more detail. 
Drag and Parody
Parody and drag are often seen as the paradigmatic cases of subversive acts, especially 
because of the central discussion of these performances towards the end of Gender Trouble 
(GT 175ff.). But in Bodies that Matter, Butler clarifies that her account of drag might not 
be just as central as some of the readers expected:
Although many readers understood Gender Trouble to be arguing for the proliferation of drag 
performances as a way of subverting dominant gender norms, I want to underscore that there is 
no necessary relation between drag and subversion, and that drag may well be used in the 
service of both the denaturalization and reidealization of hyperbolic gender norms (BM 125).
These statements are made in  the context of Butler’s  discussion of the movie  Paris is  
burning. Butler writes that this movie “calls into question whether parodying the dominant 
norms is enough to displace them; indeed, whether the denaturalization of gender cannot 
be a very vehicle for a reconsolidation of hegemonic norms” (BM 125). She also admits 
that there is a wide variety of drag performances, drag is for example not always an expres -
sion of homosexual rebellion against the heterosexual, “there are forms of drag that hetero-
sexual culture produces for itself” (BM 126). To conclude, Butler argues that drag cannot 
per se be seen as a subversive performance, but nevertheless continues to argue that her 
discussion of drag in Gender Trouble made a good point:
To claim that all gender is like drag, or is drag, is to suggest that ‘imitation’ is at the heart of the 
heterosexual project and its gender binarism, that drag is not a secondary imitation that presup-
poses a prior and original gender, but that hegemonic heterosexuality is itself a constant and 
repeated effort to imitate its own idealization. […] In this sense, then, drag is subversive to the 
extent that it reflects on the imitative structure by which hegemonic gender is itself produced 
and disputes heterosexuality’s claim on naturalness and originality (BM 125).
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Subversiveness has to be considered in connection with a specific hegemonic situation, a 
performance is only subversive in relation to hegemonic norms, thus it always needs to be 
contextualized. In the case of drag that means that not all forms of drag are subversive. 
Butler certainly suggests  that there are forms of drag that can be and will be subversive, 
but it would be wrong to say that drag is per se subversive. Thus, we have to distinguish 
between forms of drag that are subversive  and others that  are  not.  Already in  Gender 
Trouble, Butler formulated the decisive question: “And what kind of gender performance 
will enact and reveal performativity of gender itself in a way that destabilizes the natural-
ized categories of identity and desire” (GT 189)?73 The criterion for the distinction is the 
same as the one we have already seen in the previous  discussion of subversiveness in 
Butler’s earlier writings. Performances are subversive if they serve the purpose of denatur-
alization and destabilization of hegemonic norms. 
The situation in the case of parody is similar to the status of drag. Butler states clearly that 
parody is not  per se subversive, that there can also be parodies that stabilizes the given 
configurations.
Practices of parody can serve to reengage and reconsolidate the very distinction between a 
privileged and naturalized gender configuration and one that appears as derived, phantasmatic, 
and mimetic  – a failed copy, as it  were.  […] And yet  this failure  to become ‘real’ and to 
embody ‘the natural’ is, I would argue, a constitutive failure of all gender enactments for the 
very reason that these ontological locales are fundamentally uninhabitable (GT 200).
In other words, parody – just as drag – is subversive if it manages to show that not only the 
parody is a copy of the supposedly natural, but that the supposedly natural itself functions 
as a copy, and, as a consequence, that there is no natural after all. Butler adds an additional 
argument here, when she writes that the reason that a parody can be successful with this 
task is that it is principally impossible to enact the natural. ‘The natural’ is – as Butler 
names it – ‘an ontological locale’ – and as such ‘fundamentally uninhabitable’. In other 
words, nobody can be ‘the natural’ because it is simply impossible to be the natural. Parody 
is distinguished because it is the performance that understands this failure to inhabit the  
natural  that  is  inherent  to all  practices.  Therefore,  Butler  can speak of the “subversive 
laugher […] of parodic practices in which the original, the authentic, and the real are them-
selves constituted as effects” (GT 200). The notion of the ‘subversive laugher’ is a very 
strong image of the superiority of parody at this point. Butler’s explanation, however, is 
73 In this quote, Butler employs the crucial distinction between performance and performativity, to which 
she, however, does not always stick in Gender Trouble. To repeat the distinction once again: Performance 
is the name for a single act that intends to evoke what it says or does. Performativity, in contrast, involves 
the contingency of all norms and identities and their openness and dependency on iterability, which also 
implies the permanent possibility of alteration.
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partly mistaken. It is not the case that the original is constituted as an effect in parody, 
rather, parody only unveils that the original has always already been an effect. In other 
words, parody is subversive to the extent that it points to the fact that there is nothing like a 
original, that we are left with a collection of more or less powerful, more or less accepted 
enactments that pretend to be the original.
In the 1999 preface of Gender Trouble, Butler explains that she is “not interested in deliv-
ering judgments on what distinguishes the subversive from the unsubversive” and she goes 
on stating that she is convinced that “such judgments cannot be made out of context” and 
“that  they  cannot  be  made  in  ways  that  endure  through  time”  (GT xxii).  Thus,  she 
concludes that “the effort to name the criterion for subversiveness will always fail,  and 
ought  to”  (GT xxiii).  For  the  reader  of  Gender  Trouble this  has  the  already  familiar 
consequence: “The discussion of drag that Gender Trouble offers to explain the constructed 
and performative dimension of gender is not precisely an example of subversion. It would 
be a mistake to take it as the paradigm of subversive action or, indeed, as a model for polit-
ical agency” (GT xxiii). For the purpose of this inquiry it is important to highlight this last 
statement. Subversive performances such as drag are not the model of political agency, 
which Butler wants to defend. Butler’s concept of agency cannot be reduced to a notion of 
subversive performance. A notion of agency is – I feel a need to repeat myself at this point 
– not the purpose of her discussion of drag. 
What, then, is the actual purpose of Butler’s discussion of drag? She clarifies in the 1999 
preface: “The point of this text is not to celebrate drag as the expression of a true and  
model gender, […] but to show that the naturalized knowledge of gender operates as a 
preemptive and violent circumscription of reality” (GT xxiv). On the following page, she is 
even clearer: “The purpose of the example is to expose the tenuousness of gender ‘reality’ 
in order to counter the violence performed by gender norms” (GT xxv). The purpose of 
Butler’s employment of subversive performances can only be understood in connection 
with here investigation of normativity and normative violence.  In this light,  subversive 
performances not only function to denaturalize and destabilize hegemonic norms, but also 
to counter the violence exercised by those norms. If subversiveness can be linked to the 
general project of a contestation of hegemony, it loses its arbitrariness and gets contextual-
ized through a genealogy of hegemony. It is clear, then, that no act can be subversive in  
itself, but only in relation to a certain context determined by the hegemonic norms. What 
counts as subversive act can only be decided in each and every individual case, and it may 
not only depend on the specific norm that is supposed to be subverted, but also on the 
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agent that performs the act, the audience receiving it, the situation in which the act takes 
place et cetera. 
The Role of Ethics
The statement that “the effort to name the criterion for subversiveness will always fail, and 
ought to” (GT xxiii) and more general Butler’s refusal to name any ethical criteria never-
theless causes many critics to wonder about the normative dimension of Butler’s work. The 
question is:  Can something like an ethics or at  least  an ethical  dimension be found in 
Butler’s work? And if not, does Butler offer a justification for her refusal to provide such a 
dimension? Is her justification convincing?
Butler responded to the critique that she lacks a normative dimension in the 1999 preface  
to Gender Trouble. Butler first notes that ‘normative’ has at least two meanings. In the first 
instance, which is the one Butler usually uses, ‘normative’ refers to the ‘functioning of the 
norm’. In this sense, ‘normative violence’ can be synonymous with ‘violence of the norm’. 
In the second meaning,  which is – apart from Butler  – far more common, ‘normative’ 
refers to questions of ‘ethical justification’ (GT xxi). Butler is regularly concerned with 
normativity in the first sense, but just as regularly disregards the question of the normative 
dimension in the second sense.74 
But after this clarification of the terminology, I want to return to the question: Is there 
something like an ethical dimension in the second sense to be found in  Gender Trouble? 
Butler answers:
It  is  not  possible  to  oppose  the  ‘normative’ forms  of  gender  without  at  the  same  time 
subscribing to a certain normative view of how the gendered world ought to be. I want to 
suggest, however, that the positive normative vision of this text, such as it is, does not and 
cannot take the form of a prescription (GT xxii).
For Butler, a genealogy of gender norms cannot be based on a prescription of gender, as it 
ought to be, because in Butler’s view such a prescription would again evoke a notion of the 
norm  that  limits  the  field  of  the  livable  and  causes  violent  effects  on  those  that  are 
excluded from the norm. As a consequence Butler suggests the following distinction: 
[A] descriptive account of gender includes considerations of what makes gender intelligible, an 
inquiry  into its  conditions of  possibility,  whereas  a  normative account seeks to answer the 
question  of  which  expressions  of  gender  are  acceptable,  and  which  are  not,  supplying 
persuasive reasons to distinguish between such expressions in this way (GT xxii).
Butler is clearly concerned with the first account, but tries to avoid the second. To justify 
74 In this inquiry the term normative is – following Butler’s use of the word – usually used in the first sense 
– as has hopefully been understandable out of the context so far. To make the distinction clear, the term 
‘ethical’ is used to refer to the normative dimension in the second sense.
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her decision, she seems to present a couple of arguments. First, she argues that the norm-
ative account of gender in fact presupposes a descriptive account, because the normative 
judgement is based on a description of the forms of gender that appear. In other words, a 
normative judgement requires a set of given forms that can be judged. Thus, the normative 
account presupposes an inquiry of the conditions of the appearance of gender itself (GT 
xxii). Second, Butler argues that the descriptive account cannot entirely be separated from 
the normative dimension. “The question, however, of what qualifies as ‘gender’ is itself 
already a question that attests to a pervasively normative operation of power […]. Thus, 
the very description of the field of gender is in no sense prior to, or separable from, the 
question of its normative operation ” (GT xxii). However, this second argument has to be 
rejected, because Butler uses the homonymous character of the two notions of ‘normative’  
here to trick her reader. This sentence only makes sense if the notion of ‘normative’ in it 
refers to ‘the functioning of the norm’, however, that was not what the argument pretended 
to present, since we expected an argument about the ethical dimension of the text. Instead 
of openly refusing to answer questions about the ethical dimension of her work – as in her 
early writings – Butler now seems to try to trick her way around answering it. 
The main problem with Butler’s reluctance to engage with ethical questions is that  she 
nevertheless makes ethical claims herself. As she suggests herself, it might be necessary to 
do so;  it  could be that  even a  project  of  denaturalization and genealogy is  impossible 
without subscribing to some kind of normative view. For example, Butler’s aim to make  
the lives of those whose lives are not considered worth living livable is certainly such an 
ethical claim. However, Butler is highly reluctant to make this fact explicit. Her reservation 
towards any kind of ethics makes it impossible for her to designate her own ethical claims 
as such. As a consequence, she pretends to be able to ignore the need of an ethical justifica-
tion of her own claims. 
However, I want to argue at the same time that this reservation about ethics can also be 
seen as a strength of Butler’s theory, if we interpret it as a sign for Butler’s commitment to 
a racially political project. Already the heading of the conclusion of  Gender Trouble is a 
sign for  this  destination  of  Butler’s  theory:  “From Parody to  Politics”  (GT 194).  In  a 
discussion with William Connolly75, Butler says accordingly: “I tend to think that ethics 
displaces from politics, and I suppose for me the use of power as a point of departure for a 
critical  analysis  is  substantially  different  from an  ethical  framework”  (Butler/Connolly 
75 William Connolly is an American political theorist. He is currently the Krieger-Eisenhower Professor of 
Political Science at Johns Hopkins University.
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2000, 5). As I have already cited, Butler claims that criteria need to be “derived from a 
radical democratic theory and practice” (UG 224). These statements point towards Butler’s 
anchoring in politics, her engagement in a political project and her aim to account for new 
political opportunities. However, the question of the role of ethics and politics in Butler’s 
theory and the reservations concerning the status of Butler’s own ethical claims require a 
closer examination in the light of Butler’s more recent writings. This will be one of the 
topics of the following chapter. 
9. The Limits of Identity and the Ethics of Critique
If we have a look at Butler’s publications in the new millennium, it seems justifiable to 
speak of a ‘turn to politics’ in Butler’s work. Beginning with Precarious Life: The Power 
of Mourning and Violence, which is  Butler’s discussion of the consequences of 9/11, the 
war on terror and the Iraq war, Butler wrote several books such as Who Sings the Nation-
State?: Language, Politics, Belonging and Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?76 that 
deal with obvious political question. Additionally, Giving An Account of Oneself77 is often 
seen as the central text that indicates that this ‘turn to politics’ is accompanied by a ‘turn to 
ethics’. However, I want to follow Chambers and Carver and claim that these turns are in 
fact no real turns after all (Chambers/Carver 2008, 92). First, I want to argue that Butler’s 
work has always been oriented towards politics, and that her more recent writings – despite 
the apparent topics they are dealing with – have rather weakened than strengthened this 
link. Second, I want to defend the claim that if an ethics were to be found in Butler’s work 
– and in my opinion this is still an unsettled question – than it was not introduced in her 
recent writings, but has been there from the very beginning. Against this second claim, one 
might argue that one at least has to admit that this ethics remained latent in all the early 
writings and became more explicit only in the more recent writings. I certainly agree with 
this interjection, yet, I want to add two further comments . First, I think that this explica-
tion of Butler’s ethics in the recent writings is most notably due to a change in terminology,  
76 It is a significant shortcoming of the present inquiry that it does not take this latest book by Butler into 
account. This is due to the fact that I have not read it until the final stages of the writing process. I can 
only add here that the reading of this book would force me to rewrite chapter nine of this inquiry, or at 
least force me to add a subsection on Butler’s most recent development. It seems to me that Butler has 
reacted to several of the problems in her texts of the beginning of the decade – problems that will be 
discussed in this chapter – in this most recent publication. On the other hand, the first reading of Frames 
of War: When is Life Grievable? suggest that it is clearly supporting the main line of interpretation of 
Butler’s work presented in the present inquiry.
77 This book is a revised and extended version of the text which is based on the Adorno-lectures that Butler 
gave in Frankfurt in November 2002, and which was published in German in 2003 with the title Kritik 
der ethischen Gewalt. 
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and, second, I am afraid that – if this change is actually a change –is is quite problematic, 
because it intensifies Butler’s departure from politics.
The shift in Butler’s language from an investigation of discourse to an inquiry of the norm 
was discussed in the previous chapter. Again drawing from Chambers and Carver, we can 
look at this shift in terminology more general and highlight two of its main aspects. First, 
in Giving An Account of Oneself  Butler develops her argument in the language of ‘moral 
philosophy’. In this context, Chambers and Carver argue that, on the one hand, the argu-
ments which Butler presents in this book are in line with her overall project, which she has 
been following at least from  Gender Trouble  on. But, on the other hand, they have the 
suspicion that something was lost with the adoption of this new language, namely, this new 
language comes at the cost of a displacement from politics (Chambers/Carver 2008, 97). 
To put it another way, the adoption of the language of ‘moral philosophy’ in  Giving An 
Account of Oneself is not a sign of Butler’s ‘turn to politics’, but, on the contrary, it actu-
ally leads away from politics. Paradoxically, I want to suggest that precisely in this context 
it becomes most apparent why Butler should be read as a political theorist in the sense of 
the strong claim that was put forward in chapter one.
Second, in Giving An Account of Oneself it becomes also apparent that Butler moves away 
from “a discourse – common in most of her early works (and particularly in the Psychic 
Life of Power) – that mixes together the terms of Foucault with those of psychoanalytic 
theory, on to a new and distinct language of ontology” (Chambers/Carver 2008, 106). On 
the one hand, this is again merely a shift in language, but, on the other hand, her new 
language of ontology is also an indication of a more relevant relocation of her work. In 
Giving An Account of Oneself we can detect the emergence of an ontology of the self. This 
emerging ontology causes certain troubles for our interpretation of Butler’s work, because 
it is clearly in conflict with important aspects of Butler’s writings of the 1990s, while, at 
the same time, it might imply Butler’s return to her own origins, namely the French recep-
tion of Hegel and an existentialist interpretation of phenomenology. 
The Limits of Identity
In Giving an account of oneself, Butler – drawing from several authors, such as Nietzsche 
and Foucault but also Adorno and Levinas – investigates into the dimension of account-
giving. She begins with a discussion of the narrative form that such an account takes and 
the interaction of such a narration with the question of moral agency. Usually, we believe 
that it is our accountability and responsibility as moral agents that forms the basis of moral 
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conduct. Butler, however, argues that we cannot presuppose accountability and responsib-
ility,  but  that  we  have  to  consider  the  conditions  of  their  emergence.  She  claims that 
“narrative  capacity  constitutes  a  precondition  for  giving  an  account  of  oneself  and 
assuming responsibility for one’s actions through that means” (GA 12). Butler is especially 
interested in the limits of the ability to give an account of oneself.  Giving an Account of  
Oneself is actually for most parts an investigation into the limits of account-giving. She 
detects  these limits  in  at  least  four  instances:  our  own body,  our  unconsciousness,  the 
primary relationality to others, and the embedding into language and the norm. I want to 
take a brief look at these four limits. 
First, Butler points out that when I want to give an account of myself, “there is a bodily 
referent, a condition of me that I can point to, but that I cannot narrate precisely” (GA 38). 
“The singular body to which a narration refers cannot be captured by a full narration”, and 
the main reason is that “the body has a formative history that remains irrecoverable by 
reflection” (GA 20). My body has a history that I cannot recollect, but that nevertheless  
was formative for who I have become. I can and have to say that this body I am referring to 
in my account was  my body, but I cannot give a narrative account of this body that was 
mine. Even though there might be stories about this body, “the stories do not capture the 
body to which they refer” and we have to come to the conclusion that “the history of this 
body  is  not  fully  narratable”  (GA 38).  Butler  summarizes  her  conclusive  insight  very 
concise: “To be a body is, in some sense, to be deprived of having a full recollection of 
one’s life. There is a history to my body of which I can have no recollection” (GA 38). 
Every account of oneself has to account for the history of oneself’s body that is never fully 
accountable, thus, it has to account for the very limit of accountability.
Actually, this is not only true of my body, but it is also the case if I try to give an account 
of my emergence as a conscious self. In this case I am also confronted with “a limit to what 
the ‘I’ can actually recount” (GA 66). Butler goes so far as to suggest that the ‘I’ is “the 
most ungrounded moment in the narrative. The one story that the ‘I’ cannot tell is the story 
of its own emergence as an ‘I’ who not only speaks but comes to give an account of itself” 
(GA 66). The limit of the ability of the ‘I’ to give an account of its own emergence in 
Butler’s view introduces a limit into the very accountability of the ‘I’: 
Indeed, I am introduced as one for whom no account can or will be given. I am giving an 
account of myself, but there is no account to be given when it comes to the formation of this 
speaking ‘I’ who would narrate its life. The more I narrate, the less accountable I prove to be. 
The ‘I’ ruins its own story, contrary to its best intentions (GA 67).
A third limit of account-giving is located in our primary relationality to others. This rela-
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tionality has two aspects which are both not bound to the actual presence of other human 
beings at a given point of time. The first aspect is that “an account of oneself is always 
given to  another,  whether  conjured or existing,  and this  other  establishes  the scene of 
address” (GA 21) in which an account has to be given, thus already setting a limit for any 
reflexive attempt to give an account. But we also have to consider the second forms:
Moments of unknowingness about oneself tend to emerge in the context of relations to others, 
suggesting that  these relations call  upon primary forms of relationality that  are not always 
available to explicit and reflective thematizations. If we are formed in the context of relations 
that become partially irrecoverable to us, then that opacity seems built into our formation and 
follows from our status as beings who are formed in relations of dependency (GA 20).
That we are formed in primary relations to others that we cannot fully account for causes a 
“primary  opacity”  (GA 20)  of  the  self.  This  opacity  also  has  consequences  for  our 
encounter with others.
In the context of an encounter with others we also have to consider a fourth limit of our 
ability  to  give an account  of oneself.  Our encounter with others is  always bound to  a 
“language that frames the encounter, and embedded in that language is a set of norms” (GA 
30). But this dependency on a language is not only given in the relation to others, but in 
every attempt to give an account, because “the very terms by which we give an account, by 
which we make ourselves intelligible to ourselves and to others are not of our making. 
They are social in character, and they establish social norms” (GA 21). Thus, every attempt 
to give an account has its possibility and its limits in the language it is given in, a language  
that it did not create and that brings along a set of norms that one has not chosen either.
A few pages later, Butler gives another enumeration of the limits of account-giving, which 
does not fully correspond with the one presented so far, but can nevertheless help to clarify 
matters:
There is (1) a non-narrativizable exposure that establishes my singularity [which is due to the 
fact  that I have a body, G.T.],  and there are (2)  primary relations,  irrecoverable,  that form 
lasting and recurrent impressions in the history of my life, and so (3) a history that establishes 
my partial opacity to myself [located both in my body and my unconsciousness; G.T.]. Lastly, 
there are (4)  norms that facilitate my  telling about myself but that I do not author and that 
render me substitutable at the very moment that I seek to establish the history of my singu-
larity. This last dispossession in language is intensified by the fact  that I give an account of 
myself to someone, so that the narrative structure of my account is superseded by (5) the struc-
ture of address in which it takes place. (GA 39)
After the enumeration of these limits, it  is important to notice that they do not serve a 
pejorative purpose, for Butler, these limitations are not merely negative. On the contrary, 
she claims that “a theory of subject formation that acknowledges the limits of self-know-
ledge can serve a conception of ethics and, indeed, responsibility” (GA 19). In the discus-
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sion with Connolly in 2000 she suggests that the question is “whether a new sense of ethics 
emerges from that inevitable ethical failure” and her answer is a decisive affirmation of 
such a possibility:
I suppose that it does, and that it would center perhaps on a certain willingness to acknowledge 
the limits of acknowledgment itself, that when we claim to know and present ourselves, we 
will fail in some ways that are nevertheless essential to who we are, and that we cannot expect 
anything different from others (Butler/Connolly 2000, 6).
In her book Unbecoming Subject, Thiem presents an important argument that follows the 
direction in which Butler is moving here, as she tries to bring together impulses from post-
structuralism and moral philosophy. She summarizes that “while theorist drawing on post-
structuralism have been rediscovering ethics for several years now, the normative aspect of 
ethics seems to remain beyond what can be easily reappropriated“. On the other hand, 
“moral philosophers have tended to view poststructuralism with great suspicion at best, 
and for the most part appear to have chosen to ignore it entirely“. In this context, what 
Thiem wants to present is a “rethinking of moral philosophy through the challenges posed 
to it by Butler’s work, especially on subject formation” (Thiem 2008, 2). While this is 
certainly a very intriguing task – and I think that Thiem articulates many very good argu-
ments that not only help to clarify Butler’s work, but also present a significant contribution 
to the question of the possibility of a moral philosophy based on poststructuralist insights – 
I do not want to deal with this project here. Instead, I want to highlight the main purpose 
that an acknowledgment of the limits of account-giving eventually serves in the context of 
Butler’s political project.
Butler writes that ethical violence – Butler speaks of ethical violence instead of normative 
violence in Giving an Account of Oneself, I think that this is meant to indicate that moral 
norms function like others norms in a way that can exercise violence on those that cannot 
live according to the norms – is often caused by the demand to “manifest and maintain self  
identity at all time”. If this is the case, “suspending the demand for self-identity, or, more 
particularly, for complete coherence“ (GA 42) can be a way to counter this specific ethical 
violence.  I  am convinced that  this  statement  leads  to  a  political  project  rather than an 
ethics, nevertheless, one has to wonder what ethical assumptions this project eventually 
involves.
Butler’s Ethical Task
In  the conclusion of  Gender Trouble,  Butler  highlights  what  might  be won by the the 
subversion of gender norms: “The loss of gender norms would have the effect of prolifer-
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ating gender configurations, destabilizing substantive identity, and depriving the natural-
izing  narratives  of  compulsory  heterosexuality  of  their  central  protagonist:  ‘man’ and 
‘woman’ ” (GT 200).
Distelhorst showed that there are several problems with this statement. First, we must think 
that Butler refers to gender norms in their present form in this sentence, because it would 
make no sense, and even contradict everything Butler has written elsewhere, if she really 
wanted to suggests that we could get rid of all gender norms. Second, it is all but clear 
which aim Butler actually wants to set forth here. We have to consider that, on the one 
hand, a proliferation of gender configurations does not necessarily require a deprivation of  
the existing categories (‘men’ and ‘women’). On the other hand, we have to be aware that, 
if a proliferation should add up to the abolition of existing categories, then it is not a mere 
proliferation, but an invention of new configurations (Distelhorst 2007, 240).
The problem that presents itself here is basically the same as the one we have already seen 
in connection with the questions about the status of the outside and the criteria for subvers-
iveness. In a certain way, these problems coincide with each other in the question about the 
ethical task that forms the background of Butler’s work. Is the aim merely the diversifica-
tion of the norms in a way that allows the ones that are outside the norm now to also be 
included in it in a future that has to be envisioned as more inclusive? Or is the aim a radical  
overthrow of the norms that intents to modify them entirely and leads to their complete 
reconfiguration? The decision between the two options is  linked to the question of the 
criteria  that  allow to measure subversiveness.  But  more importantly,  it  is  linked to  the 
question of the ethical foundation of the desire for alteration. I think that it is fair to say 
that there is a lot of ambiguity surrounding this aspect of Butler’s approach.
I  suggest  going back to the 1999 preface of  Gender Trouble,  because Butler  seems to 
intend to clarify matters in this text. However, as I want to show, her clarification, in fact, 
only reproduces the same ambiguity. At one point, Butler writes that “the aim of the text 
was to open up the field of possibility for gender without dictating which kinds of possib-
ility ought to be realized” (GT viii). But does that mean that the aim is a radical transform-
ation of all gender norms or that it is merely the expansion of the existing norms so that 
they can include the ones that are excluded? A few pages later, Butler gives a clear answer 
to this question: “If there is a positive normative task in Gender Trouble, it is to insist upon 
the extension of this legitimacy to bodies that have been regarded as false, unreal, unintelli -
gible” (GT xxv). In this sentence it  becomes perfectly clear that the normative task of 
Gender Trouble is the expansion of gender norms – the first option described above. Butler 
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links this aim to her concern about normative violence, stating that it is meant “to counter  
the violence performed by gender norms” (GT xxv). And she makes that link even clearer 
when she writes: “The dogged effort to ‘denaturalize’ gender in this text emerges, I think, 
from a strong desire [...] to counter the normative violence implied by ideal morphologies 
of sex” (GT xxi), thereby reinvoking this link between the fight against normative violence 
and the aim of a proliferation of the norms.
However, if we also consider other essays, which Butler wrote around the time of the 1999 
preface, matters do not remain as clear any longer. In her second contribution to the discus-
sion with Laclau and Žižek, for example, Butler concludes with the following statement:
Indeed, the task will be not an assimilate the unspeakable into the domain of speakability in 
order to house it there, within the existing norms of dominance, but to shatter the confidence of 
dominance, to show how equivocal its claims to universality are, and, from that equivocation, 
track the break-up of its regime, an opening towards alternative versions of universality that are 
wrought from the work of translation itself (CU 179).
In  this  passage,  Butler  clearly  states  that  an  effort  which  only  aims  at  including  the 
excluded ones does certainly not reach far enough and that a transformation of the norms 
to make them more inclusive cannot be the final aim of our efforts. Butler suggests here 
that the aim must be a complete shake-up of the norms that does not settle for a transform-
ation with the goal of a proliferation, in other words, she claims that the status of the norm 
most be entirely subverted.
Thus,  we  are  again  confronted  with  the  same  ambiguity,  which  becomes  even  more 
obvious  in  Undoing Gender and  eventually  runs  through this  whole  text.  First,  Butler 
writes that “the task of all of these movements seems to me to be about distinguishing 
among the norms and conventions that permit people to breathe, to desire, to love, and to 
live,  and those norms and conventions  that  restrict  or  eviscerate  the conditions  of  life 
itself” (UG 8). One might wonder where the criteria for this evaluation come from. Maybe 
Butler can counter that  it  is the task of the movements themselves to also develop the 
criteria for the distinction, which is in line with her statement that the norms “have to be 
derived from a radical democratic theory and practice” (UG 224). Only a few sentences 
further, however, Butler actually prescribes a criterion for the evaluation, while paradoxic-
ally at the same time insisting on the situatedness of the critique: “The critique of gender 
norms must be situated within the context of lives as they are lived and must be guided by 
the question of what maximizes the possibilities  for a livable life,  what minimizes the 
possibility of unbearable life or, indeed, social or literal death” (UG 8). It is again all but 
clear at this point  if Butler wants to  suggest a transformation of gender norms or their 
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complete abolition, and the ambiguity becomes even more obvious when she continues: 
“What is most important is to cease legislating for all lives what is livable only for some, 
and similarly, to refrain from proscribing for all lives what is unlivable for some” (UG 8).
Butler is fluctuating in the description of the ethical task of her work with such a consist-
ency that one has to wonder if this ambiguity is in fact on purpose. Indeed, if we consider 
Butler’s notion of performativity and iterability and the related model of subversiveness, 
we may have to admit that our question was misleading because a distinction between a 
reformatory and a revolutionary approach, like the one we have employed in our question, 
does not make sense within a Butlerian framework (Distelhorst 2007, 243). As we have 
seen in previous chapters, Butler argues that an alteration of the norm can only happen in 
and through its  iteration.  In  this  context,  the norm is  seen as never  static,  but  always 
dependent on the stabilization through permanent iteration. As a consequence, the contesta-
tion, proliferation and reformulation of the norms as well as their stabilization go hand in 
hand in the iterability of the norms. Thus, the agent can neither be a reformer nor a revolu-
tionary, because the concept of agency deprived from a notion of iterability does not allow 
for any of these figures. Both figures fail to comply with the fact that the agent is never in 
full control of the effects of his action, that the action has, so to say, its own life and causes 
– depending on the situation which is never fully transparent – effects that are unpredict-
able for the agent. Sometimes an action might effect a radical shift of the norm, at other 
times only a slight modification, and most of the times it will eventually have no effect 
after all. Thus, we cannot theoretically predict which effects an action might cause. Agency 
implies this lack of predictability. It is located in this permanent, unavoidable and unpre-
dictable struggle with the norms and is bound back to the fact that the norm is not static, 
but itself dependent on its iterability that implies the permanent possibility of alteration.
Referring to this complex interdependency of agency and the norms, Butler  said in an 
interview in 2008:
Thus, gender performativity can be understood: the slow and difficult practice of producing 
new possibilities of experiencing gender in the light  of history,  and in the context  of very 
powerful norms that restrict our intelligibility as human beings. They are complex struggles, 
political in nature, since they insist on new forms of recognition (Birulés 2008, w.p.).
And Butler  seems  to  suggest  in  this  context  that  a  multi-level  and  multi-dimensional  
approach to this struggle with the norms is demanded.
I would say that it is not a question merely of producing a new future for genders that do not 
yet exist. The genders I have in mind have been in existence for a long time, but they have not 
been admitted into the terms that govern reality. So it is a question of developing within law, 
psychiatry, social, and literary theory a new legitimating lexicon for the gender complexity that 
we have been living for a long time. Because the norms governing reality have not admitted 
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these forms to be real, we will, of necessity, call them ‘new’ (UG 31).
In this passage we can see how the contestation, proliferation and reformulation of norms 
can work hand in hand in this struggle to make the lives of those that are suppressed by the 
norm – or, indeed, declared impossible or unreal – liveable as well.
But still, one might ask the question: Why is it actually a goal to make lives livable? What 
status does this  goal  have? Is  it  a  moral  obligation? Is  it  the expression of  a  political 
interest?  Interestingly  enough,  Butler  tries  to  delegitimize  these  questions  in  the  1999 
introduction to Gender Trouble,  when she writes: “One might wonder what use ‘opening 
up possibilities’ finally is, but no one who has understood what it is to live in the social 
world as what is ‘impossible,’ illegible, unrealizable, unreal, and illegitimate is likely to 
pose that question.” (GT viii) But even though this question might actually seem provoc-
ative and maybe even cynical in the eyes of those in whose name Butler claims to speak, I 
think that it is nevertheless a legitimate questions, at least, I insist that it is illegitimate to 
delegitimize  the  question  the  way Butler  does.  It  is  important,  however,  that  I  do not 
present this argument in order to disagree with Butler’s ethical claim, on the contrary, I 
want to support it. But I am convinced that if I want to justify my support, I cannot avoid 
questions about the ethical justification of this claim, because these questions rightfully 
demand an answer.
From Ethics to Politics
Lloyd detects a main tension in Butler’s work – especially her more recent publications – 
between her critique of all ontological claims by showing that they are not natural but 
constructed and discursively imparted, “and her own unacknowledged ontological presup-
positions” (Lloyd 2008, 92). Lloyd summarizes – in line with my reading of Butler – that 
Butler’s major concerns are the different forms of normative violence, and she goes on to 
ask if it is “accurate to interpret this concern as an ethical rather than political concern” 
(Lloyd 2008, 102). For Lloyd it is clear that the answer has to be no. She refers to the 
conversation of Butler with Connolly in 2000, in which Butler  – as I have cited in the 
previous chapter – after stating that she thinks that ethics tend to lead to a departure from 
politics goes on saying that “the use of power as a point of departure for a critical analysis” 
in  her  political  approach  “is  substantially  different  from  an  ethical  framework” 
(Butler/Connolly 2000, 5). Lloyd concludes that “this suggests to me that Butler would 
read her own work prior to 2000 as addressing political rather than ethical issues” (Lloyd 
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2008, 102). In a similar fashion Loizidou suggests that Butler’s “philosophy of ethics is 
really a philosophy of politics or law” (Loizidou 2007, 47). While Loizidou admits that this  
claim can be disputed, she specifies that the critical impetus of Butler’s work is that for her 
ethics  is  “not  pre-political  but  rather  emerge  as  matter  of  public  and  political 
concern“(Loizidou  2007,  47).  In  other  words,  the  impulse  that  comes  from  Butler’s 
approach is that she challenges ethics by showing, first, that any kind of ethics is itself 
politicized and, second, that a sharp distinction between ethics and politics leads to forms 
of ethical violence (Loizidou 2007, 48). Lloyd agrees with this interpretation, when she 
writes that Butler’s strength is her concentration “on exploring how power circumscribes 
the kinds of ethical encounters that take place – how existing normative frames operate to 
regulate and determine who counts (and how they count), as well as who is realized in the 
process” (Lloyd 2008, 103). But Lloyd suggests that this is only one side of the story: “At 
the same time, however, she appears to take for granted the existence of the ethical imper-
ative, by which I mean the factor or principle that makes possible the ethical encounter”  
(Lloyd 2008, 103). This ethical imperative lies in the ontological assumption that every 
individual has a desire to live and that, at the same time, there is some kind of (ethical) 
obligation to make lives (of others) livable. The problem is that “Butler argues  as if the 
ethical imperative is  apolitical” (Lloyd 2008, 103). The problem is that Butler does not 
even admit that this assumption is, indeed, an ethical imperative. Therefore, the question at 
stake here seems not to even appear for her. My suggestion is that, if this tension is to be 
dissolved, then this resolution can only be in the direction of politics. 
In line with this suggestion is Butler’s implicit demand for an ethics that is located within 
politics. In Giving an Account of Oneself, Butler suggests that it might be necessary to say 
“that the ethical demand gives rise to the political account, and that ethics undermines its 
own credibility when it does not become critique” (GA 124). In 2002, Butler wrote a very 
intriguing essay that presents a reading of Foucault’s lecture  What is critique?.  Thiem is 
deeply influenced by this short essay in her attempt to connect Butler’s poststructuralist 
approach with moral philosophy. In my reading of the essay, I want to follow Thiem’s 
interpretation, but I will also make clear where I differ from it. In “What is critique? An 
essay  on  Foucault’s  virtue”  Butler  claims  that  Foucault’s  notion  of  “critique”  is  an 
important contribution to a “progressive political philosophy” (WC 212). She writes that 
she hopes to show “that Foucault not only makes an important contribution to normative 
theory, but that both his aesthetics and his account of the subject are integrally related to 
both ethics and politics” (WC 212). This is, indeed, a very intriguing claim, considering 
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that in the reception of Foucault there is usually an agreement that precisely the ethical 
dimension  is  highly  underdeveloped  in  his  work.  In  contrast  to  this  reception,  Butler 
suggests that the concept of critique “offers a new practice of values based on that very 
suspension” of ethical judgment (WC 212).
Matters might  become clearer if we consider Butler’s  brief  but coherent critique of an 
Habermasian approach to ethics. Butler begins with a summary of Habermas’s criticism of 
the notion of critique:
Habermas made the operation of critique quite problematic when he suggested that a move 
beyond critical theory was required if we are to seek recourse to norms in making evaluative  
judgments about social conditions and social goals. The perspective of critique, in his view, is 
able to  call  foundations into question,  denaturalize social  and political  hierarchy, and even 
establish perspectives by which a certain distance on the naturalized world can be had. But 
none of these activities can tell us in what direction we  ought to move, nor can they tell us 
whether the activities in which we engage are realizing certain kinds of normatively justified 
goals. Hence, in his view, critical theory had to give way to a stronger normative theory (WC 
213).
We can see that the Habermasian criticism of critique is also relevant in the context of the 
present inquiry, because it shares several concerns about the ethical dimension in Butler’s 
work that have been expressed here as well. Hence, Butler’s answer to this criticism might 
also  provide  some solution  for  our  concerns  about  Butler’s  approach.  In  her  reply  to 
Habermas,  Butler  writes  that  “in  making  this  kind  of  criticism  of  critique,  Habermas 
became curiously uncritical about the very sense of normativity he deployed. For the ques-
tion ‘what are we to do?’ presupposes that the ‘we’ has been formed and that it is know, 
that its action is possible, and the field in which it might act is delimited” (WC 213f.). In 
other words, Butler’s critique of Habermas’s criticism of critique is that his own ethical 
approach presupposes a specific account of the subject – a subject with a fully coherent  
identity that is entirely familiar with its situatedness and the possibilities the specific situ-
ation offers. Butler continues with a critique of such an account of the subject, which we 
are already very familiar with. And she elaborates on the consequence for a critical theory: 
“But if those very formations and delimitations have normative consequences, then it will 
be  necessary  to  ask  after  the  values  that  set  the  stage  for  action,  and  this  will  be  an 
important dimension of any critical inquiry into normative matters” (WC 214).
Thiem interprets that the main critical aim of Butler’s approach is 
to understand and interrogate how questions of moral conduct are conditioned by social and 
historical circumstances and frameworks. More specifically, critique becomes central to moral 
philosophy insofar as social and historical contexts condition the form of moral conundrums, 
insofar in turn these contexts are determined through social norms and structures of power. 
Moral philosophy as a critical inquiry needs to examine how social norms and power determine 
situations within which moral questions arise and become available and urgent (Thiem 2008, 
189).
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By focussing on these contexts in which every moral conduct is situated, critique is located 
somewhere between epistemological critique and social criticism, in a way combining the 
two projects (Thiem 2008, 190). Butler describes “critique as a practice in which we pose 
the question of limits of our most sure ways of knowing” (WC 215). In this way, critique 
highlights the ways in which we run up against the epistemological and social limits of all 
knowingness, especially highlighting the incoherences of our knowledge that emerge at the 
borders, where the sphere of the intelligible and the constitutive outside are produced and 
conflict with each other (WC 215). Butler follows Foucault in the aspect that liberty – if 
we want to speak of this concept – “emerges at the limit of what one can know”, when the 
question of the limits  of our knowingness arises (WC 221).  Thiem concludes that one 
consequence  of  critique  is  that  it  “scrutinizes  the  central  and  foundational  role  of  the 
subject  in  contemporary accounts  of  moral  philosophy” (Thiem 2008,  196),  because a 
concept of the subject can not longer be presupposed as the foundation of moral conduct.
But, actually, in this essay on critique, Butler is by far not as critical and dismissing about 
the role of the subject as she was in her writings of the 1990s. She even speaks of a form of 
“self-transformation” (WC 217) which the subject has to conduct in relation of the norm, 
thus, focussing to a much greater extent on the role of the subject in this process of subject 
formation, which – in this new perspective – goes hand in hand with the subject’s self-
transformation.
The most important aspect of Butler’s essay, however, is “the demand that ethical reflec-
tion become critical as well as political” (Thiem 2008, 201). In this context, Butler speaks 
of an “ethics within politics” (WC 215). “One could suggest that with critique’s addressing 
questions of power and social, we are moving into the realm of politics and out of the 
realm of ethics”, writes Thiem, but her main argument is “that these questions do not move 
us beyond the scope of ethics but instead importantly belong to ethics in the perspective of 
social ethics” (Thiem 2008, 201). Drawing from this impulse, Thiem develops the notion 
of a “political ethics” and distinguishes three main aspects of such an ethics. First, to think 
about political ethics means to consider “how ethics itself becomes political”, that means, 
how ethics can no longer be seen as a set of principals, but that it has to be considered how 
ethical deliberations are situated in a political context and become themselves a matter of 
politics. Second, political ethics has to “act critically”, that means, “it will have to inter-
rogate  its  own categories  continuously“.  Third,  social  justice  must  become the  central 
perspective  for  political  ethics  (Thiem 2008,  231).  Thiem also  remarks  two questions 
which the project of a political  ethics has to face. On the one hand, it  has to face the 
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“crucial problem that political theory has with moral philosophy, which is that moral philo-
sophy has a tendency to depoliticize the issues it considers“. On the other hand, one has to 
wonder:  “What characterizes political  ethics such that it  might be considered a part  of 
moral philosophy” (Thiem 2008, 231)?
I am not convinced if this project of a political ethics can face both of these two challenges,  
or if it is rather riven in the no-man’s-land between the two disciplines. In a way, this is 
also my own tension – as a trained philosopher and political scientist. Hence, it is very 
difficult if not impossible for me to take sides in this discussion between political theory 
and moral philosophy. However, I think that for Butler’s approach it is easier to satisfy the 
political theorist – at least the political theorist in me – than to convince the moral philo-
sopher. In other words, I think that it is easier to interpret Butler as being on the side of the 
political theorist than on the side of the moral philosopher, and this is the reason why the 
present inquiry suggests that it is most productive to read her work in the field of political 
theory.
To sum up this matter in more general terms, one can say that this chapter focused on the 
problem of an ethical foundation of Butler’s work. This question appeared in connection 
with a shift in Butler’s work that has taken place in her more recent writings. After this  
shift certain ethical commitments in Butler’s theory have become more apparent. While the 
discussion of this problem might have lead away from matters of political theory, it turns 
out that the result is actually an argument in support of the approach to read Butler as a 
political theorist. In that way, this chapter provides an important argument for the approach 
of the present inquiry.
Two main aspects can be highlighted that make it worth reading Butler in the discipline of 
political theory rather than in the discipline of moral philosophy. First, her permanent focus 
on relations of power and domination and the way in which she intriguingly connects this 
focus with the question of the status of the norms and especially the concern about the viol-
ence enforced by the norms makes the critical analysis of power relations, enhanced by an 
emphases  on  dimensions  of  normative  violence,  the  starting  point  of  Butler’s  theory. 
Second, Butler’s refusal to ground politics in any non-contestable foundation – any time 
such a foundation is claimed, the power relations at work in making this claim have to be 
analyzed – reveals that the foundations of politics are political themselves, and leads to an 
insistence on the irreducible contextuality of all political struggles.
Butler’s work functions on two levels. First, it can be a strong contribution on the level of 
political  theory.  Butler’s  account  of  the  political  subject  discussed  in  part  two  of  this 
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inquiry, and the notion of performativity and iterability presented in the current part are, in 
my opinion, her most important contributions in this respect. But, second, Butler’s work 
also contains a political project. Especially the strategy of denaturalization is not only a 
matter of theory, but also a practical political intervention. In this context, I suggest reading 
Butler’s  ethical  commitment  as  a  political  project  that  has  to  be contextualized  in  her 
struggle against the current norms rather than as an argument in moral philosophy. Both 
levels of Butler’s work need closer examination in the light of the questions of Butler’s 
contribution to politics and political theory, which will be the topic of the following, final 
part of this inquiry.
Part 4: Towards a Conclusion: Agency and Politics
The connection of the notion of performativity with the critical analyses of the political 
subject will be the main issue of chapter ten. In a way, this matter has already been invest-
igated in  the discussion of  the  paradoxical  conflation  of  power  and the subject  in  the 
process of subjection. In this chapter, however, it can receive further explication against the  
background of an elaborated account of Butler’s notion of performativity. In this context, it 
can be shown that Butler’s notion of performativity and her account of the political subject 
lead to a strong theory of political agency. Butler’s approach to a theory of political agency 
has to be seen in the context of a tight link of subject and power, which is a crucial aspect 
of Butler’s political  theory.  The second subsection of chapter ten offers an outlook on 
Butler’s more recent writings, in which she seems to support a stronger notion of the self 
than she did previously.
Finally,  chapter  eleven investigates  the  concept  of  politics  that  emerges  from Butler’s 
notion of performativity and her account of political agency. This notion of politics is, first, 
not  based  on  any  fixed  foundations,  as  the  project  of  denaturalization  leads  to  the 
permanent possibility of resignification of all political categories. Second, any democratic 
politics requires a radical openness of all categories for resignification and the commitment 
to the futurity of politics implied by it. Third, this implies an undeniable contingency and 
contextuality of any political project. In this context, Butler’s own political struggle with 
the norms can also be contextualized.
In many instances, the discussion in this part will go beyond the scope of Butler’s writings 
in an attempt to reformulate her approach as a political theory. I want to insist, however, 
that this reformulation is never meant to be against Butler, it is certainly not a rejection of 
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Butler’s theory, but the effort to evolve it in the direction of political theory. Even though it 
is  questionable  if  Butler  would  approve  of all  the  modifications  made  in  the  present 
inquiry, this is not a matter of concern, since the validity of the claims presented here is not 
dependent on Butler’s approval. If this contribution to political theory is supposed to be 
convincing, then it has to be so by itself. In this light, this inquiry has already taken a step 
beyond a mere interpretation of Butler’s work.
10. Agency Reconsidered
One of the main objections against Butler’s theory was that she does not offer a sufficient 
conception of the political subject or, more specifically, that her account of agency is too 
weak. As a consequence, readers were worried that she could not adequately explain polit-
ical  action  and,  more  specific,  the  possibility of  alteration  and  resistance,  which  in 
consequence makes any notion of social change implausible. This is basically a summary 
of the main theme of the reception of Butler in the 1990s. 
With some distance, one might be surprised about the style and intensity of the early recep-
tion of Butler. As Thiem expresses it
For those with a bit of distance from these discussions, this concern and the great investment of 
time and effort spent in articulating, debating, and refuting this concern that a theoretical argu-
ment does not permit for thinking agency might seem bewildering. The level of the concern 
voiced seems to imply that one expects this argument would cause a paralysis in the world in 
general by philosophically denying the possibility of agency (Thiem 2008,73).
The level of concern seems to indicate that people attribute an implausibly high degree of 
power  to  a  philosophical  argument.  The  replies  that  Butler  received  –  at  times  very 
offensive and hostile – seem to stand in no relation to the actual influence that a theory 
such as Butler’s can eventually have. Hence, what seems to be indicated is a more sober 
dealing with Butler’s theory, treating it as what at is, a contribution to an ongoing academic 
debate. 
While this argument certainly has some validity, Thiem is aware that this is not the only 
way to look at it. One should not forget that the conception of agency, indeed, plays a very 
significant  role,  because  it  has  important  consequences  for  the  way  “we  think  about 
responsibility, ethical and political values, and social change” (Thiem 2008, 73f.). How we 
think about agency is, for instance, crucial for the way our political and legal systems are 
built. Hence, the sharp reactions to Butler's theory can actually be seen as a sign that polit-
ical  theory  does,  indeed,  matter.  More  importantly,  it  shows  that  our  thinking  about 
subjectivity is highly significant for our understanding of politics. Butler’s challenge of 
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traditional conceptions of agency – if convincing – has significant consequences for the 
way we think about the organization of our social and political life and its institutional 
settings – and this can lead to a demand for social and political change.
Thus, it is worth taking a closer look at Butler’s conception of agency that follows from her 
critical  encounter  with  processes  of  subjection.  The  main  question  is:  Does  Butler’s 
account of agency actually carry the terrible and frightening consequences that some of her 
critics were so concerned about? My claim is that this is certainly not the case. To support 
this claim and to reply to the critics, this chapter will present Butler’s contribution to an 
account of political agency, a contribution that stands for a much stronger agency than 
most critics have seen and admitted.
With reference to Butler’s writings of the 1990s, Thiem writes that  Butler’s account of 
agency seems to be twofold in:
First, her starting point has been […] that one cannot understand agency outside of relations of 
power  and the  formative  effects  of  social  norms.  Second,  she  has  repeatedly attempted  to 
formulate how undoing a voluntaristic conception of the subject and agency does not entail the 
abolition of agency. Her accounts aim to demonstrate precisely why a theory of subject forma-
tion by norms does not mean that the emergent subjects are predetermined by these norms 
(Thiem 2008, 86).
However,  Thiem  goes  on  to  argue  that  such  a  focus  on  the  formative  dimension  of 
dominant norms is quite problematic, because it tends to “consider agency only through the 
paradigm of resistance and the subversion of dominant norms and institutions” (Thiem 
2008, 86). The idea is that an account of agency needs to consider the whole spectrum of 
agency, not only forms of agency that are subversive and/or in resistance to the norms. It 
has been shown in chapter eight that Butler’s theory of performativity and iterability intend 
to  develop such a  broader notion of agency that  cannot  be reduced to  the question of 
subversiveness. Even though one has to admit that Thiem puts forward a sound argument 
when she writes that Butler’s publications of the 1990s at least imply a close tie between 
performativity/iterability  and  subversiveness/resistance  by  virtue  of  the  contexts  and 
examples that Butler has consulted for developing her account (Thiem 2008, 87), I have to 
disagree with her to the degree that I think that this is not the only way of reading Butler’s 
work. Thus, the claim that Butler’s notion of performativity can function as a political 
theory that offers a strong notion of agency and a convincing explanation for the relative 
stability of social and political institutions as well as for the possibility of social and polit-
ical change will be reiterated in this chapter.
An additional dimension is that Butler has seemingly developed a slightly modified notion 
of agency in her more recent writings, especially in Giving an Account of Oneself. Thiem 
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supports this shift, when she writes that “Butler has turned explicitly to theorize modes of 
self-transformation and the role of relations to others while continuing to argue that none 
of these relations are formed beyond the realm of social norms and relations of power” 
(Thiem 2008, 87f.).  As a consequence, this chapter is divided into two subsections. The 
first subsection will offer a summary of the account of the political subject and its agency 
that can be drawn from Butler’s account of subjection and her notion of performativity.  
The second subsection will continue with an interrogation of Butler’s more recent writings, 
trying to highlight the continuities but also investigating the differences and shifts with the 
account in her earlier writings. The notion of self-formation and the practice of critique 
will play a crucial role here.
Resignifying the Subject
Butler regularly uses the term subject. This is a very old term with a long-standing and 
complex tradition in the history of Western thought, and, in a way, it seems neither fashion-
able nor useful to use this term nowadays. Butler herself refers to the history of the term at 
one point,  pointing out that when “the term ‘subject’ appears to be too bound up with 
presumptions of sovereignty and epistemological transparency, arguments are made that  
such a term can no longer be used” (ES 144f.). We can see this move most famously in the 
case of Martin Heidegger, who – because of all the metaphysical implications the term 
invokes – strictly avoids to use the term ‘subject’ and refers to the kind of being which the 
human is as “Dasein” instead (Heidegger 2001, 11f.). But this Heideggerian avoidance of 
the term is clearly not the move Butler suggests, she, instead, recommends a resignification 
of the very term ‘subject’. She writes that “it seems that the reuse of such a term in, say, a 
post-sovereign  context,  rattles  the  otherwise  firm  sense  of  context  that  such  a  term 
invokes” (ES 145). We can see a similar move to the one that lead to the resignification of 
the term ‘queer’ – an originally negative term that was reclaimed as a self description by 
gay, lesbian, intersex, transgender, etc. people – here, even though on a more theoretical 
level. In Butler’s view, it is not the best strategy to avoid the term ‘subject’ because of its 
complex history, instead, she suggests that we should start reusing it in a way that might 
contradict its most notable tradition. Butler’s strategy is to inscribe herself into the history 
of the term, to reappropriate it in order to open it up for a continuous rewriting in contem-
porary political thought. As we have seen in chapter four, Butler tries to show that there are 
at least two notions of the term subject, which already implies that the metaphysical notion 
of subject is not the only available one, but that there is also a political tradition of the term 
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in which the subject was theorized as empowered and subjected at the same time (SUB 
1302f.). A reinvocation of this second tradition already serves the purposes of a reiteration 
and resignification that breaks up the restrictions of the predominant tradition in order to 
open up the term for reuse. In this way, we can say that Butler’s texts are a performative 
statement that functions to make the use of the term subject possible again by means of its  
subversive reiteration. 
In Butler’s writings of the 1990s, we can see two main tendencies of this resignification of 
the term subject. First, Butler insists continuously that an exploration of subject formation 
does not cause the end of the subject’s agency, but should rather be seen as an investigation 
into the conditions  of  its  possibility.  Second, such  an  exploration  shows the tight  link 
between the subject and politics.
In order to comprehend the consequences of these tendencies, I want to consider a state-
ment from Giving an Account of Oneself where Butler states that, indeed, a death of the 
subject might be caused by the resignification she intends,“but this death, if it is a death, is 
only the death of a certain kind of subject, one that was never possible to begin with, the 
death of a fantasy of impossible mastery, and so a loss of what one never had” (GA 65). It 
is not Butler’s aim to get rid of the subject altogether, but to let go a certain notion of the 
subject, a notion that implies untenable metaphysical assumptions that we can no longer 
support – if we ever could. As a consequence, the subject does not disappear in Butler’s 
analysis, it rather reappears even more prominent, but this time not as an epistemological, 
but as a political category. The task of denaturalization does not cause the abolition of the 
subject,  instead,  it  shows  that  the  subject  is  not  a  naturally  given  fact,  but  has  to  be 
considered as politically constituted all the way trough. But even this statement does not go  
far enough, because we also have to think of the relation of subject and politics as in itself 
political. The political link of subject and politics calls for a new thinking of the interplay 
of agency, power and domination as well as considerations about new forms of political 
strategy (Loyd 2005, 2).
I want to go back to Gender Trouble at this point in order to investigate this link of subject 
and politics in Butler’s first and maybe most famous formulation. With reference to Nietz-
sche’s claim that “there is no ‘being’ behind doing”, Butler draws her famous conclusion 
for the status of gender: “There is no gender identity behind the expression of gender; that 
identity is performatively constituted by the very ‘expression’ that are said to be its results” 
(GT 34). This leads to the main claim of  Gender Trouble that gender is not natural and 
predetermined, but constituted by its very performativity. But it is also important to note  
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that  this  does  not  mean  that  gender  is  something  free-floating  and  open  to  voluntary 
performances. Rather, Butler is very clear that gender is something that has been perform-
atively fixed and stabilized by the “regulatory practices of gender coherence” (GT 34). To 
repeat it once again, performativity does not mean voluntary performances. “In this sense, 
gender is always a doing, though not a doing by a subject who might be said to preexist the 
deed” (GT 34).  Instead,  performativity means the process  in  which the identity of  the 
subject is time and again constituted in relation to and in struggle with the established 
gender norms. In this process, the subject is not the foundation, but precisely the site where 
performativity takes place. Even though these formulations might sound odd if thought as 
an account of agency, Butler is very clear that this is what they are supposed to be. In the 
1999 preface of Gender Trouble she states:
In this text as elsewhere I have tried to understand what political agency might be, given that it 
cannot be isolated from the dynamics of power from which it is wrought. The iterability of 
performativity is a theory of agency, one that cannot disavow power as the condition of its own 
possibility (GT xxv).
Lloyd summarizes the consequences for the notion of the subject that follow from a theory 
of performativity very coherently when she writes that 
the subject  that Butler is  discussing is  very much a subject-in-process.  It  is  never  actually 
completed. Rather, the subject is in a state of perpetual constitution; subjected time and again. 
It  is  in  this  condition  because  of  the  nature  of  re-iteration.  Second,  and  significantly,  the 
performative subject is not the autonomous author of their constitutive performance; instead 
intentionality  (or  autonomy)  is  bounded  by  the  iterability  of  the  elements  making  up  the 
performance (Lloyd 2005, 98).
Precisely in  this  context,  “the question  of  ‘the subject’ is  crucial  for  politics” (GT 3), 
because if the subject is not pregiven and static but performatively constituted time and 
again, we have to become involved in the difficult task of a genealogy of subject positions  
that takes into account the various forms of subject formation that are available in the 
framework of the current norms. In this context, the link of subject and norms is always 
political in a double sense. First, the norms and the subject positions which are enabled by 
the norms are already political to begin with, even though their political nature is tradition-
ally  hidden through processes of  naturalization.  Therefore,  denaturalization and critical 
genealogy are necessary tasks to reveal the performative nature of these supposedly natural 
‘facts’. Second, these tasks are again political practices that make a critical, political atti-
tude towards the norms possible that nevertheless enabled the subject and its critique in 
first place. 
In this context I want to suggest once again to return to Butler’s essay “Contingent Founda-
tions”, because even though this essay was only a minor contribution to an ongoing debate 
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at the time of the publication of Gender Trouble, it is in my eyes the probably clearest and 
easiest accessible text Butler has ever written. In the following, I simply want to follow the 
argumentation  of  only  a  few  pages  of  this  essay,  because  they  anticipate  basically 
everything that Butler was writing subsequently in the 1990s and summarize the major 
aspects of the account of the subject established in these writings more coherently than 
anybody else  ever  could.  Butler  begins  with  citing  the  main  assumption  of  traditional 
accounts of political agency and her basic reply to it:
We may be tempted to think that to assume the subject in advance is necessary in order to safe-
guard the agency of the subject. But to claim that the subject is constituted is not to claim that it 
is determined; on the contrary, the constituted character of the subject is the very precondition 
of its agency (CF 46).
In a way, this is also a restatement of the main claim that what Butler puts forward is, 
indeed, a theory of the political subject and its agency.
My suggestion is that agency belongs to a way of thinking about persons as instrumental actors 
who confront an external political field. But if we agree that politics and power exist already at 
the level at which the subject and its agency are articulated and made possible, then agency can 
be presumed only at the cost of refusing to inquire into its construction (CF 46).
In other words, it is the veiling process of naturalization that sets up the subject and its 
agency as pregiven and independent of political contexts of constitution. “In a sense, the 
epistemological  model  that  offers us a  pregiven subject  or agent is one that refuses to 
acknowledge that agency is always and only a political prerogative” (CF 46f.). Therefore, 
this epistemological model of the subject is not only naturalizing, but at the same time also 
depoliticizing. In this context, “it seems crucial to question the conditions of its possibility, 
not to take it for granted as an a priori guarantee” (CF 47) in order to respond to this devi-
ation from politics.
In this sense, denaturalization is a movement of repoliticization. The main claim is that 
agency is not an epistemological capacity, but a possibility under certain political condi-
tions.  The  main  question  is:  “What  are  the  concrete  conditions  under  which  agency 
becomes possible, a very different question than the metaphysical one, what is the self such 
that its agency can be theoretically secured prior to any reference to power” (CR 136f.)? In 
the traditional view, which we are no longer able to support if we accept Butler’s project of 
denaturalization, “agency is an attribute of persons, presupposed as prior to power and 
language, inferred from the structure of the self” (CR 137). Butler, in contrast, wants to 
defend the view that “agency is the effect of discursive conditions which do not for that 
reason control  its  use;  it  is  not  a  transcendental  category,  but a  contingent  and fragile 
possibility opened up in the midst of constituting relations” (CR 137). 
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Such a notion of agency that takes into account its social conditions of possibility can also 
be found in Butler’s later writings, in fact, it remains a crucial element of her theory that 
she has never departed from. In Undoing Gender she writes: “My agency does not consist 
in denying this condition of my constitution. If I have any agency, it is opened up by the 
fact that I am constituted by a social world I never chose. That my agency is riven with 
paradox does not mean it is impossible. It means only that paradox is the condition of its 
possibility” (UG 3). Butler goes on to specify this insight with reference to more concrete, 
political circumstances:
Indeed, individuals rely on institutions of social support in order to exercise self-determination 
with respect to what body and what gender to have and maintain, so that self-determination 
becomes a plausible concept only in the context of a social world that supports and enables that 
exercise of agency. Conversely (and as a consequence), it turns out that changing the institu-
tions by which humanly viable choice is established and maintained is a prerequisite for the 
exercise of self-determination. In this sense, individual agency is bound up with social critique 
and social transformation (UG 7).
In this passage it becomes clear that Butler’s account of agency is not only a theoretical 
impulse, but at the same time also a practical task. If agency is supposed to be possible, it 
needs to be made possible in a concrete social context. This requires an interrogation of 
this  context  in  order  to  critically  evaluate  if  it  enables  and enhances agency or  rather 
suppresses it.
But we also have to note that it is not enough to engage into this critical inquiry of the 
social  conditions  only  once,  rather  what  is  needed  is  a  permanent  struggle  with these 
conditions that will not come to an end.
For if the subject is constituted by power, that power does not cease at the moment the subject 
is constituted, for that subject is never fully constituted, for that subject is never fully consti-
tuted, but is subjected and produced time and again. That subject is neither a ground nor a 
product,  but  the  permanent  possibility  of  a  certain  resignifying  process,  one  which  gets 
detoured and stalled through other mechanisms of power, but which is power’s own possibility 
of being reworked (CF 47).
The crucial aspect is again that this process of subject formation “is as such fully political; 
indeed, perhaps  most political at the point in which it is claimed to be prior to politics 
itself” (CF 47). The strategies of denaturalization and genealogy do not have the purpose of 
doing “away with the subject  or pronounce its  death,  but  merely  to claim that  certain 
versions of the subject are politically insidious” (CF 47). This has to be seen in connection 
with the depoliticizing effects of naturalization: 
For the subject to be a pregiven point of departure for politics is to defer the question of the 
political construction and regulation of the subject itself; for it is important to remember that 
subjects are constituted through exclusion, that is, through the creation of a domain of deau-
thorized subjects, presubjects, figures of abjection, populations erased from view (CF 47).
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At this point, Butler also binds together the investigation of processes of subject formation 
with the importance to draw attention to the processes of exclusion that it involves, and she 
highlights in this context that these exclusions produce spheres of the constitutive outside – 
a complex and vague term, as we have seen – which haunts the constituted subjects as well 
as the constituting norms.
The general aim of Butler’s account of the political subject can be described as “an effort 
to resignify the subject as a site of resignification”, which forces us to “rework that notion 
outside the terms of an epistemological given” (CF 48). Butler admits that there is talk 
about the death of the subject, but she suggests that it is very clear to her that “the death of 
that subject is not the end of agency, of speech, or of political debate” (CF 48). Butler 
continues with a reference to the criticism of Benhabib, who claims that Butler’s account 
makes agency principally impossible and that this is especially problematic in the context 
of  a  strong feminist  movement  that  enables  women for  the  first  time to occupy equal 
subject positions. In this context, Butler clarifies her position once again:
To take the construction of the subject as a political problematic is not the same as doing away 
with the subject; to deconstruct the subject is not to negate or throw away the concept; on the 
contrary, deconstruction implies only that we suspend all commitments to that to which the 
term, ‘the subject,’ refers, and that we consider the linguistic functions it serves in the consolid-
ation and concealment of authority (CF 48f.).
In other words, a deconstruction of the subject has the consequence that it enables us to 
reappropriate  the  term as  a  critical  category in  the context  of  a  genealogy of  political 
authority. Thus, the aim is a resignification of the political subject as a critical category of 
political theory in order to investigate into the social conditions of possibility of agency in 
a concrete social context.
This is the main impulse of Butler’s account of the political subject and its agency, which 
has significant consequences for our understanding of the relation of subject and politics 
and of the task of political theory. To sum it up, the subject is not prior to politics, but a 
major investment in the political process itself. Accordingly, agency is not a transcendental 
capacity, but a fragile possibility that has to be achieved and secured in political contexts. 
Political theory has to get involved in a genealogy of naturalization processes – which are 
an effect of hegemonic practices – in order to achieve a repoliticization of the subject 
through strategies of denaturalization.
Self-formation and Critique
The remainder of this chapter will look into a few passages of Butler’s more recent writ-
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ings. The task is to detect similarities and shifts in her theory.  In  Giving an Account of  
Oneself, Butler investigates into a shift in Foucault’s account of the subject. This investiga-
tion is of significance, because it seems to correspond with Butler’s own shift concerning 
that matter. Butler summarizes Foucault’s shift in the following way:
Whereas in his earlier work, he treats the subject as an ‘effect’ of discourse, in his later writings  
he nuances and refines his position as follows: The subject forms itself in relation to a set of 
codes, prescriptions, or norms and does so in ways that not only (a) reveal self-constitution to 
be a kind of  poiesis but (b)  establish self-making as part of the broader operation of critique 
(GA 17).
Actually, this shift enables Butler to formulate a critique of her own theory of subjection 
given in  The Psychic  life  of  Power –  and I suppose it  is  justified to  say  that she has 
supported this theory in all her writings from the 1990s – namely, that she was too quick to 
accept the notion of the formation of the subject through the subjection under the norm by 
virtue of an interpellation78 (GA 15). In  Giving an Account of Oneself, Butler points out 
that this subjection has to be seen in connection with a self-constitution of the subject. 
However, the main insight still remains the same as in her earlier writings, namely that 
“this work on the self, this act of delimiting, takes place within the context of a set of 
norms that precede and exceed the subject” (GA 17). In other words, “there is no making 
of oneself (poiesis) outside of a mode of subjectivation (assujetissement) and, hence, no 
self-making outside of the norms that orchestrate the possible forms that a subject may 
take” (GA 17). Nevertheless, we can also see a significant shift at least in focus, when 
Butler no longer speaks of a process of subjection, but of an act of “self-crafting, which 
always takes place in relation to an imposed set of norms” (GA 19).
In this inquiry, I want to focus on the consequences that this shift has for an account of 
agency. Butler concludes with reference to the act of self-crafting: 
If there is an operation of agency or, indeed, freedom in this struggle, it takes place in the 
context of an enabling and limiting field of constraint. This ethical agency, is neither fully 
determined nor radically free. […] This struggle with the unchosen conditions of one’s life, a 
struggle – an agency – is also made possible, paradoxically, by the persistence of this primary 
conditions of unfreedom (GA 19).
In her essay on “What is critique”, Butler also deals with this complex interplay of self-
formation and formation by the norms, in other words, of the subject as being formed and 
forming. Butler suggests that the moment in which being formed by the norms turns into 
the subject’s self-formation is the very moment of the subject’s reflexivity. In this complex  
reflexivity, it will be very difficult – if not impossible – to distinguish the forming from the 
78 The notion of interpellation is taken from Louis Althusser and has some influence on Butler’s account of 
subjection. In the present inquiry, however, subjection is discussed without reference to interpellation or 
Althusser.
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being  formed  (WC  225).  For,  again,  “there  is  no  self-forming  outside  of  a  mode  of 
subjectivation, which is to say, there is no self-forming outside of the norms that orches-
trate the possible formation of the subject” (WC 226). 
It is worth noting that in this essay Butler is also exceptionally keen about the shift in her 
own account, when she writes in the concluding paragraph: “We have moved quietly from 
the discursive notion of the subject to a more psychologically resonant notion of ‘self’, and 
it may be that for Foucault the later term carries more agency than the former” (WC 226). 
Indeed, it may even be that Butler agrees with this opinion and that she implicitly wants to 
suggest that her own account of agency, which she put forward in the 1990s, was, perhaps, 
too weak. It is very hard to determine what Butler’s opinion concerning this matter eventu-
ally is, because there is simply not enough evidence in her texts.
An interview, which Butler gave in 2008, might give a few hints about the shift in her 
account. In this interview, Butler actually gives the ‘I’ a much stronger role than she has on 
previous occasions. Even though she keeps on insisting that the ‘I’ can only exist insofar as 
it has been constituted by the norms, insofar as it has been credited with intelligibility by 
the established categories, Butler also grants it with the ability to say ‘no’ or to ask ‘why?’. 
According to this interview, the moment when the formation of the subject turns into a 
self-formation is precisely the moment when the ‘I’ turns against the norms and starts ques-
tioning them. And she continues that this turn against the norms is the practice of critique. 
Critique can never be made from the outside, because we cannot escape the domain of the 
norms. The norms in question are the ones that form the very conditions of one’s existence. 
Hence, it is not without risk for the subject to perform critique, because questioning the 
norms that function as the basis for our existence means questioning our own status as 
subjects. In other words, we put our own intelligibility at stake when conducting critique of 
the norms that regulate the domain of intelligibility (Birulés 2008). In Giving an Account  
of Oneself,  Butler confirms that struggling with one’s status as a subject always means 
struggling with the norms that made this subject position possible, and, as a consequence if 
the subject wants to investigate “the conditions of its own emergence, it must, as a matter 
of necessity, become a social theorist” (GA 8).
But the question is, where does this ability for critique, this ability to break with the norms, 
come from? Butler is at least very close here to a reintroduction of an account of the self 
that grants it with certain intrinsic features – the ability to say ‘no’ and to ask ‘why’, for 
instance. That must not  per se be bad,  but it  raises the question how these ontological 
assumptions can be matched with Butler’s insistence on the project of denaturalization, or 
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if they mark a departure from it.
It has already been made clear that I tend to think that Butler’s ontological commitments in 
her more recent writings cause more problems than they solve. It has also been noted that 
the particular concern is that these commitments effect a weakening of Butler’s critical 
political project and a certain departure from politics. Hence, the suggestion of the present 
inquiry is that the account of agency, which has been presented in the first subsection of 
this chapter, is not only better suited for the reception of Butler in the discipline of political 
theory, but it is actually also much more convincing. The connection of subject and politics 
–  the  reformulation  of  the  subject  as  a  critical  political  category  –  is  an  particularly  
intriguing prospect that needs to be developed further.
11. New Modes of Politics
In this final chapter, I want to begin with the distinction between two main camps in the 
reception  of  Butler’s  political  thought.  According  to first  camp,  which  was  generally 
prevalent in the early  reception of Butler’s thought, Butler has a very limited notion of 
politics that  is not very useful  for political  analysis  or  political  action Usually,  critical 
readers that belong to this camp point to the narrow focus on language in Butler’s work 
and conclude that Butler’s notion of politics is restricted to linguistic practices of resigni-
fication. Distelhorst, for instance, argues that Butler’s project of deconstruction is without 
prospects  and  offers  no  political  strategy  whatsoever.  He  claims  that  it  turns  out  that 
Butler’s analysis is in fact unpolitical, because its intervention into a linguistic discourse 
offers no prospects to change the discourse in a strategic  way (Distelhorst  2007, 15f.). 
Bublitz enforces this criticism when she speaks of Butler’s politics as a “semiotic guerilla 
war” [“semiotischer Guerillakrieg”] (Bublitz 2002, 118), which – as she expresses in line 
with Distelhorst – offers no sufficient political options and strategies. This interpretation is 
based on the agreement that it is verified that Butler’s political project can be sufficiently 
characterized as the resignification of discourse (Distelhorst 2007, 161f.). Indeed, if we 
agree with this restricted characterization of Butler’s project, it seems justified to conclude 
that such a project – that only focuses on practices of resignification and, maybe, similar 
practices like parody and drag – is too narrow to provide a comprehensive theory of polit-
ical action.
But, luckily, we do not need to agree that it is verified that Butler’s project can be reduced 
in this way. Against this restriction, we have to consider the fact that it has already been 
shown that Butler’s theory of performativity at least intends to give an account of political 
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agency and social change that goes further than the notion of resistance and subversive-
ness. In addition to that, I want to argue in this chapter that it is in fact a misreading of 
Butler’s account to think that she argues that resignification is the only possible political 
strategy. On the contrary, we have to consider that Butler’s opinion about political strategy 
and action is much more complex than that.
Supporters of the second camp differ from the first in two distinct ways. First, some of 
them argue that the strategy of resignification is actually a richer political  project  than 
Butler’s critics want to believe (Salih 2002). Second, others point out that Butler’s theory 
of politics consists of more elements than the strategy of resignification and that it needs to 
be seen in its whole complexity. Chambers and Carver, for example, suggest that “we can 
think of Butler’s work as ‘troubling politics’,  in that it  refuses the static conception of 
politics“. For Butler, politics is neither “the production of consensus” nor the “mere admin-
istration of affairs […]. She insists on a politics of struggle,  strife,  conflict  – a radical 
democratic politics that is disturbing in that it literally  disturbs by interrupting the given 
order” (Chambers/Carver 2008, 9). Lloyd is maybe even clearer about the consequences of 
a Butlerian view on politics, when she writes that if the question is ‘What is politics?’ then 
the question has to be refused in case an answer in the form of a definition is  expected 
(Lloyd 2005, 6). For Butler’s project indicates “that the political sphere is not fixed. It 
changes as dissonant or alternative forms of politics irrupt into it” (Lloyd 2005, 3).  In 
short, the question what politics is, is a political question and requires a political answer 
(Lloyd 2005, 6). 
The argument presented here is certainly in favor of the second camp. I am convinced that 
Butler’s theory – even though she does not often speak explicitly about politics in her writ-
ings – can be a significant contribution to a political theory. In addition to the arguments of 
the second camp, two further aspects of Butler’s notion of politics can be highlighted. First, 
we have to note Butler’s insistence on a radical openness as the main characteristic of all 
kinds of politics that can be described as democratic; in this context, we can also see how 
Butler’s  notion  of  politics  is  linked to  a  notion of  radical  democracy as employed by 
Laclau and Mouffe. Second, we need to focus on Butler’s emphasis on the contingency and 
contextuality of all political strategies and actions. But before the argumentation returns to 
these matters, Butler’s understanding of resignification will be discussed in order to show 
that it can be generalized in a way that allows to appreciate it as an account of political 
change.
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Politics of Resignifiability
The notion of politics which Butler presents in her writings of the 1990s and especially in 
Gender Trouble, can be characterized as a politics of resignifiability. Resignifiability is the 
term I want to suggest as the name for an understanding of politics that is based on the 
denaturalization of identity categories, which implies that all such categories are irredu-
cibly open for the possibility of resignification. Drawing from the conflation of linguistic 
and political representation in the introduction of Gender Trouble (GT 2), and the notion of 
discourse developed by Laclau and Mouffe,  it  is important  to  note  that  resignifiability 
cannot be reduced to linguistic resignification, but effects all articulations – in the sense of 
Laclau and Mouffe’s use of the term – of political categories.
I want to begin the discussion of Butler’s understanding of the possibility of resignification 
with an examination of the conclusion of Gender Trouble, which has the misleading title 
“From Parody to Politics“. The title is misleading insofar as it might suggest that parody is 
already a mode of politics or that politics should be organized after the model of parody. 
This might actually one of the main reasons why many readers got such a restricted view 
of Butler’s politics. However, I do not think that Butler wants to suggest that parody is a 
mode of politics or that political action should become like parody. Actually, the title indic-
ates a movement away from parody and towards politics.
At the beginning of the conclusion, Butler reminds the reader that the opening question of 
Gender Trouble was “whether feminist politics could do without a ‘subject’ in the category 
of women” (GT 194). The conclusion which Butler wants to draw in  Gender Trouble  is 
that “the feminist ‘we’ is always and only a phantasmatic construction” (GT 194) and that a 
deconstruction of the category ‘women’ – as well as all identity categories in general – is 
required. This, however, does not mean that it  is impossible to refer to specific subject 
positions in the context of concrete political struggles. On the contrary, it might turn out to 
be a political necessity:
Within feminism, it seems as if there is some political necessity to speak as and for women, and 
I would not contest that necessity. Surely, that is the way in which representational politics 
operates, and in this country, lobbying efforts are virtually impossible without recourse to iden-
tity politics. So we agree that demonstrations and legislative efforts and radical movements 
need to make claims in the name of women (CF 49).
But we have to be aware that this necessary representation within politics is only one side 
of the story, and, as Butler insists, we are never allowed to forget the other side: “The 
minute that the category of women is invoked as  describing the constituency for which 
feminism speaks, an internal debate invariable begins over what the descriptive content of 
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that term will be” (CF 49). Even though it might turn out to be necessary to speak in the 
name of a certain group of people, in other words, to represent them at the political stage, 
we are not allowed to forget that this representation is not a simple description, but rather a 
performative constitution of the very group it supposes to represent.79 Butler clarifies this 
complex situation the following way:
Identity categories are never merely descriptive, but always normative, and as such, exclu-
sionary. This is not to say that the term ‘women’ ought not to be used, or that we ought to 
announce the death of the category. On the contrary, if feminism presupposes that ‘women’ 
designates an undesignatable field of differences, one that cannot be totalized or summarized 
by a descriptive identity category, then the very term becomes a site of permanent openness 
and resignifiability. I would argue that the rifts among women over the content of the term 
ought to be safeguarded and prized, indeed, that this constant rifting ought to be affirmed as the 
ungrounded ground of feminist theory. To deconstruct the subject of feminism is not, then, to 
censure its usage, but, on the contrary, to release the term into a future of multiple significa-
tions, to emancipate it from the maternal or racialist ontologies to which it has been restricted, 
and then give it play as a site where unanticipated meanings might come to bear” (CF 50).
For Butler, the denaturalization of identity categories is the condition of possibility for the 
resignifiability of these categories, which opens up the possibilities for a political struggle 
over the content of these categories.
This has significant consequences for politics: “The radical instability of the category sets 
into question the  foundational restrictions on feminist political  theorizing and opens up 
other configurations, not only of gender and bodies, but of politics itself” (GT 194). This 
destabilization of foundations is the prerequisite for a radical process of democratization. 
Keeping the basic categories open  for resignification is not the end of politics, but the 
condition for its democratic future (CF 51). In  Gender Trouble Butler writes about this 
connection of identity categories and politics: “The deconstruction of identity is not the 
deconstruction of politics; rather, it establishes as political the very terms through which 
identity  is  articulated”  (GT 203).  This  statement  is  very  important,  but  also  slightly 
misleading, because it explains how denaturalization can function as a starting point for 
political  engagement.  The  project  of  denaturalization  wants  to  reveal  the  ungrounded 
79 Butler repeats this argumentation several times in her work, for instance in Bodies that Matter, where she 
writes: “To understand ‘women’ as a permanent site of context, or as a feminist site of agonistic struggle, 
is to presume that there can be no closure on the category and that, for politically significant reasons, 
there ought never to be. That the category can never be descriptive is the very condition of its political 
efficacy. In this sense, what is lamented as disunity and factionalization from the perspective informed by 
the descriptivist  ideal  is  affirmed by the anti-descriptivist  perspective as  the open and democratizing 
potential of the category“ (BM 221). And one page further she clarifies once again that a “double move-
ment” is required: on the one hand “to invoke the category and, hence, provisionally to institute an iden-
tity and at the same time to open the category as a site of permanent political contest. That term is ques-
tionable does not mean that we ought not to use it, but neither does the necessity to use it mean that we 
ought not perpetually to interrogate the exclusion by which it proceeds, and to do this precisely in order to  
learn how to live the contingency of the political signifier in a culture of democratic contestation” (BM 
222).
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nature of all identity categories. The corresponding genealogy of identity categories reveals  
the power relations that are at work in the stabilization and naturalization of such iden-
tities.80
Summarizing the main aim of Gender Trouble, Butler states that “this theoretical inquiry 
has attempted to locate the political in the very signifying practices that establish, regulate, 
and deregulate identity” (GT 201). And she continues that “this effort, however, can only 
be accomplished through the introduction of a set of question that extend the very notion of  
the political” (GT 201). Hence, what is required are new modes of politics: “If identities 
were no longer fixed as the premises of a political syllogism, and politics no longer under-
stood as s set of practices derived from the alleged interests that belong to a set of ready-
made subjects, a new configuration of politics would surely emerge from the ruins of the 
old” (GT 203). However, this outlook forms the end of Gender Trouble and Butler does not 
offer further guidance what such a new configuration of politics might look like.
In  Bodies that Matter, Butler tries to fill  this void with reference to a theory of radical 
democracy.  In this context, Butler again refers to the work of Laclau and Mouffe, as she 
begins with a brief  summary of Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of radical  democracy. For 
Laclau and Mouffe, the main point is that all political signifiers are related to each other in 
a contingent way. Hegemony is the name for the articulation of these relations of the polit-
ical signifiers. Hegemony is itself ungrounded, but nevertheless steadily produces its own 
necessity as its effect. In other words, hegemony regulates the contingent political signi-
fiers and effects the appearance of their necessity. Antagonism, on the other hand, is the 
name of the ungrounded nature of the permanent processes of articulation, the perpetual 
rearticulation of political signifiers in relation to each other  (Laclau/Mouffe 2001, 105ff. 
and BM 192f.).
The fact that every discursive formation is subjected to a permanent rearticulation of polit-
ical  signifiers  “constitutes  the  temporal  order  of  democracy  as  an  incalculable  future, 
leaving open the production of new subject-positions, new political  signifiers, and new 
linkages to become the rallying points for politicization” (BM 193), an aspect that is partic -
80 In a way, we can say that Butler works on a resignification of the very notion of identity, which previ-
ously functioned as the foundation for political action through stabilizing the political subject, and now 
designates what is at stake in an ungrounded political struggle. Thus, the term identity – resignified by its 
denaturalization – reemerges  as  a  basic  category  of  politics.  Sarah Salih’s  introduction puts  a  lot  of 
emphasis on this political character of identity. But, in my opinion, her interpretation goes too far when 
Salih concludes that “construction and deconstruction […] are the necessary – in fact the only – scenes of 
agency”  (Salih 2002, 67f.),  because this reinforces  a  limited view on Butler’s account of  agency. In 
general, I think that Salih’s book is still the best available introduction to Butler’s work. It is specially 
remarkable that she starts with a discussion of Butler’s dissertation  Subjects of Desire, designating the 
whole first chapter of the introduction to this early work. 
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ularly  important  for  Butler.  In  a  footnote,  she  writes  that  “this  non-theologically 
constrained notion of futurity opened up by the necessary incompleteness of any discursive 
formation within the  political  field  links the project  of  radical  democracy  to  Derrida’s 
work” (BM 278(5)). Derrida was especially keen on this futurity of politics, an uncloseable 
openness of all categories for its future resignification, that is constituted by their iterab-
ility. Butler leaves no doubt that she believes that Laclau and Mouffe do not go far enough 
at this point and that their theory of radical democracy needs to be radicalized by a stronger  
notion of incalculable futurity. Butler clarifies this insight once again with reference to the 
category ‘women’:
The ‘subject-position’ of women, for instance, is never fixed by the signifier ‘women’; that 
term does not describe a preexisting constituency, but is, rather, part of the very production and 
formulation of that constituency, one that is perpetually renegotiated and rearticulated in rela-
tion to other signifiers within the political field. This instability in all discursive fixing is the 
promise of a teleologically unconstrained futurity for the political signifier. In this sense, the 
failure of any ideological formation to establish itself as necessary is part of its democratic 
promise, the ungrounded ‘ground’ of the political signifier as a site of rearticulation (BM 195).
To sum up, what is required is a theory that accounts for the radical contingency as well as 
the incalculable futurity of all political  categories. The term resignifiability is meant to 
designate this permanent openness of every category.
Thus,  naming  Butler’s  account  a  politics  of  resignifiability  means  to  emphasize  her 
commitment to this contingency and futurity. For Butler, it is crucial to account for this 
contingency and openness of politics that must involve even its most constitutive terms. 
Whenever this openness is closed or this contingency resolved with reference to a founda-
tion, we are confronted with a strategy of depoliticization that has to be countered by an 
insistence on the political character of all categories and the permanent possibility of resig-
nification.
This new configuration of politics is tightly linked with Butler’s account of the political 
subject. Butler writes that “this converging and interarticulation is the contemporary fate of 
the subject” (BM 230). Butler draws the same conclusion for the political use of identity 
categories as in Gender Trouble, when she states that “it is in this sense that the temporary 
totalization performed by identity categories is a necessary error” (BM 230). It is necessary 
to  speak  in  the  name  of  certain  groups,  in  other  words,  to  articulate  certain  identity 
categories in their name, but at the same time, every such attempt must necessary fail in 
order to avoid to once again perform a certain naturalization that immunizes itself against 
further contestation.
Butler explains the consequences of this insight with reference to the notion of ‘queer’. On 
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the one hand, “the assertion of ‘queer’ will be necessary as a term of affiliation”, but, on 
the other hand, we have to be aware that it 
will not fully describe those it purports to represent. As a result, it will be necessary to affirm 
the contingency of the term: to let it be vanquished by those who are excluded by the term but 
who justifiably expect representation by it, to let it take on meanings that cannot now be anti-
cipated by a younger generation whose political vocabulary may well carry a very different set 
of investments (BM 230).
The term ‘queer’ is specially designated in Butler’s eyes for this openness for future resig-
nifications, because the term has already been used as a label  for those who were not 
represented  but  nevertheless  seek  representation.  Hence,  Butler  suggests  that  the  term 
‘queer’ has the potential to become a discursive site that serves not only the “purpose of 
continuing  to  democratize  queer  politics,  but  also  to  expose,  affirm,  and  rework  the 
specific history of the term” (BM 230). But, in fact, this potential is not restricted to the 
term ‘queer’, in other words, this potential is not linked to this specific term. Every polit-
ical category has the potential to become the site of this radical openness, hence, every 
category can become queer in the sense that it stands for this constitutive resignifiability of 
all categories. If we understand queer in this very broad sense, we can understand why 
queer politics is  not  at  all  only a  politics of queer,  but  another possible  name for this  
contingency and openness that constitutes all politics.
We have seen that Butler’s notion of politics cannot be reduced to traditional liberal models  
of politics, which basically see politics as the system of  bargaining among established – 
individual and collective – subjects with defined interests. Butler refuses any such model, 
because she rejects  the premises that  such a  model  presupposes,  most  importantly,  the 
notion of established subjects with defined interests. For Butler, the constitution of those 
very  subjects and their political identities and interest is the main political question and 
concern.  She  particularly  focuses  on  the  role  of  power  in  the  constitution  of  political 
subjects and the influence of hegemonic norms that regulate the field of possible subject 
positions.
It is in this context that the notion of iterability can be reformulated as a politics of resigni-
fiability. In order to do so, however, it is important to focus on the social and political 
conditions of  resignification. Resignification always takes place under hegemonic condi-
tions. The naturalization of categories leads to their immunization against further political 
contestation. Therefore, the project of denaturalization is required in order to  repoliticize 
those supposedly natural categories. Denaturalization is a political intervention in the name 
of  a  radical  politicization.  In  this  context,  resignifiability  is  not  only  the  condition  of 
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possibility of the contestation and resignification of political categories, but also something 
that requires a permanent struggle. It requires a struggle with the hegemonic norms that 
regulate the field of possible identities and subject positions; and a struggle against the  
permanent  risks  of  naturalization  and  depoliticization.  In  short,  what  is required  is  a 
commitment to and an intervention for the constitutive openness of all politics.
Contingency and Contextuality
In order to conclude this chapter, we have to take into account that Butler herself points 
towards certain shortcomings of her account in Gender Trouble in subsequent writings. We 
have to consider how that effects the politics of resignifiability developed in the previous 
subsection.
In a footnote to the 1999 preface of  Gender Trouble, Butler thanks Jacqueline Rose for 
pointing out “the disjunction between the earlier and the later parts of this text”, namely 
that the text seems to forget the “melancholic construction of gender” it investigates in the 
earlier chapters when it comes to its conclusion. Butler states that this perhaps “accounts 
for some of the ‘mania’ of the final chapters” (GT 206 (9)). In other words, the notion of 
politics presented in the conclusion of Gender Trouble is too simple and too optimistic, as 
it  forgets  about the dependency on the norms and the process of exclusion that haunts 
every political identity. Butler clarifies these matters in The Psychic Life of Power in the 
context of her elaborated theory of subjection: She writes that “social categories signify 
subordination and existence at once” (PLP 20). For a subject to gain an intelligible exist-
ence, it is necessary to embrace the social categories that are available in the domain of 
intelligible life. These categories exist prior to the making of the subject, and because no  
existence outside these categories is possible, “the vulnerability of the subject to a power 
not of its own making is unavoidable” (PLP 20). The subject cannot elude the power that 
regulates the categories of social existence: “Where social categories guarantee a recogniz -
able and enduring social existence, the embrace of such categories, even as they work in 
the service of subjection, is often preferred to no social existence at all” (PLP 20). Thus, 
we can almost speak of a desire to be subjected under the norms, a desire that is synonym 
with the desire to life (PLP 28). In The Psychic Life of Power, Butler focusses on psychical 
dimensions of subjection precisely because “to the extent that norms operate as psychic 
phenomena, restricting and producing desire, they also govern the formation of the subject 
and circumscribe the domain of a livable sociality” (PLP 21). This regulation of desire that 
produces and represses it at the same time, causes a melancholia in the process of subject 
126
formation. In every subject formation a loss takes place for which no account can be given 
(PLP 23f.). This forms the psychic limit for all resignifiability, which is not as open and 
unlimited as the conclusion of Gender Trouble may have indicated.
The other limit that a politics of resignifiability has to be aware of is that Butler herself 
clearly  indicates  at  several  occasions  that  resignification  cannot  be  the  only  political 
strategy. In the discussion with Laclau and Žižek, Butler states that “it is no doubt right to 
claim that resignification cannot be the only political strategy” and she adds: “Luckily, I do 
not  believe  that  I  ever  claimed that”  (DC 277).  Indeed,  already the  final  sentence  of 
Gender Trouble  pointed in this direction: “What other local strategies for engaging the 
‘unnatural’ might lead to the denaturalization of gender as such?” (GT 203) This conclu-
sion already indicates that a plurality of strategies is useful and required to follow a project 
of denaturalization.
But more importantly, Butler is convinced that theory can neither substitute concrete polit-
ical action and engagement nor prescribe its concrete shape and content. In an interview in 
1999, Butler said that she thinks “that political decisions are made in that lived moment 
and they can’t  be predicted from the level of theory” (Bell  1999, 167).  Thus,  political 
action  and  strategy  is  “contingent  and  contextual  and  […]  it  cannot  be  predicted  or 
prescribed but rather is dependent upon decisions  taken at opportune political moments” 
(Lloyd 2005, 173)  In this  context we can come back to Nussbaum’s criticism in “The 
Professor of Parody”, in order to understand how important it is for the reception of Butler 
to  emphasis  her insistence on the complexity  and contextuality  of political  action.  For 
Nussbaum, Butler is the most famous – and therefore also most dangerous example – of 
new “feminist thinkers” who “believe that the way to do feminist politics is to use words in 
a subversive way, in academic publications of lofty obscurity and disdainful abstractness” 
(Nussbaum 1999, 2), because they suffer from a “fatal blindness” about the actual suffering 
of “women who are hungry, illiterate, disenfranchised, beaten, raped” (Nussbaum 1999, 
11) and a dramatic “loss of a sense of public commitment” (Nussbaum 1999, 13). I am not 
aware of any direct  reply to  these accusations, but  Butler  seems to address Nussbaum 
implicitly, when she writes in Precarious Life:
We  could  have  several  engaged  intellectual  debates  going  on  at  the  same  time  and  find 
ourselves joined in the fight against violence, without having to agree on many epistemological 
issues.  We could disagree on the status  and character  of  modernity and yet  find ourselves 
joined in asserting and defending the rights of indigenous women to health care, reproductive 
technology, decent wages, physical protection, cultural rights, freedom of assembly (PL 48).
For Butler,  intellectual  disagreement  does not rule out the possibility  of having shared 
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political opinions and committing to joined political actions. For Butler it is even essential 
to leave room for these intellectual debates, because otherwise every political commitment 
comes at the risk of being forced to comply with a certain academic position or a certain 
identity once again. Political commitment should neither presuppose that one belongs to a 
specific intellectual camp, nor should it require that one has a fixed identity. 
It  is crucial  for Butler  to insist on the fact that  an account of the ungroundedness and 
contingency of politics does not mean that political action becomes implausible. One can 
easily imagine Butler directly addressing Nussbaum at this point: “If you saw me on such a 
protest  line,  would you wonder how a postmodernist was able to muster the necessary 
‘agency’ to get there today? I doubt it. You would assume that I had walked or taken the 
subway” (PL 48). And she can continue speaking in more general terms:  “By the same 
token, various routes lead us into politics, various stories bring us onto the street, various 
kinds of reasoning and belief. We do not need to ground ourselves in a single model of 
communication, a single model of reason, a single notion of the subject before we are able 
to act” (PL 48). Intellectual agreement is not required as the foundation of political action. 
Accordingly, intellectual disagreement – even if it goes down to the grounds of our under-
standing of  politics  –  does  not  lead to  the impossibility  of  joined  political  action.  We 
cannot theoretically prescribe why people should become involved in politics and in what 
ways. This is not a disadvantage or weakness, but a consequence of the contingency of 
politics and the impossibility to ground it on a secured knowledge.
It seems that the consistent factor that leads Butler into politics is the struggle with the 
norms that define what counts as an intelligible life. For Butler, this struggle is the ultimate 
political task. In the 1999 preface of Gender Trouble, she refers to this moment when one 
realizes that the borders between the real and the unreal, the possible and the impossible do 
no longer stay in their supposedly natural place, because they can no longer be secured by 
a knowledge about given facts. “Although this insight does not in itself constitute a polit-
ical revolution, no political revolution is possible without a radical shift in one’s notion of 
the possible and the real. And sometimes this shift comes as a result of certain kinds of 
practices that precede their  explicit  theorization,  and which  prompt a rethinking of our 
basic categories” (GT xxiv).  In  Undoing  Gender,  Butler  specifies that  what is  required 
from us is that we “ask, as we asked about gender violence, what humans require in order 
to maintain and reproduce the conditions of their own livability [sic] And what are our 
politics such that we are, in whatever way is possible, both conceptualizing the possibility 
of the livable life and arranging for its institutional support” (UG 39)?
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Butler assures us that there will never be agreement about the answers to these questions, 
but she is convinced that “this is only because to live is to live a life politically” which 
implies to live “in relation to power, in relation to others, in the act of assuming responsib-
ility for a collective future” (UG 39). At this point, Butler insists again on the openness of 
the  futurity  of  politics,  when  she  writes  that  “to  assume  responsibility  for  a  future, 
however, is not to know its direction fully in advance, since the future, especially the future 
with and for others, requires a certain openness and unknowingness” (UG 39). The future 
that politics may take is unpredictable and must remain open to permanent contestation. 
The questions: What is right? And: What is good? must remain undecided in advance, for 
they “consist in staying open to the tension that beset the most fundamental categories we 
require, in knowing unknowingness at the core of what we know, and what we need, and in 
recognizing the sign of life in what we undergo without certainty about what will come” 
(UG 39).
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Summary
The present inquiry has tried to show that Butler’s work can be read as an important and 
convincing  contribution  to  political  theory.  First  of  all,  Butler  provides  an  elaborate 
account of the political subject and its agency. For Butler, the subject does not serve as a 
foundation, but as the result of a complex process of subjection, and, thus, she highlights 
the importance of an analysis of modes of subject formation and the subject position made 
possible. In this context, we have seen that the question of the constitution of the subject is 
tightly linked with the analysis of power and the functioning of the norm, and that it is in 
this respect an immanently political concern.
The subject, however, is not only the passive result of its subjection, but at the same time 
the very site of  iterability, which signifies not only the possibility of a stabilization of 
established  power  relations,  but  also  an  alteration  that  might  eventually  lead  to  social 
change.  In this way, iterability serves as an explanation of social  and political  change. 
Power is not a static entity, but a complex relation that is dependent on its reiteration by the 
subject in its subordination. Correspondingly, the agency of the subject lies in this neces-
sary reiteration of the norms, which is not a mechanic repetition, but leaves room for alter-
ation and – if one wants to use the term – freedom.
However, I have also pointed out that if we want to read Butler’s theory in this way, a few 
new are required. Most notably, the central role of the norm for the notions of perform-
ativity and iterability needs to be highlighted. Iterability does not mean the voluntary and 
optional iteration of an arbitrary action, but a reiteration that takes place in the context of 
regulatory, hegemonic norms. In the same way, performativity does not signify a voluntary 
performance by a sovereign agent, but the necessary and forced constitution of the subject 
in and through permanent performances. To sum up, iterability and performativity can only 
be understood adequately when regarded in connection with the power of the norms.
We have seen that Butler puts special emphasis on the social limits of iterability, which at 
the same time form the social condition of possibility of agency. Given the ungrounded and  
contingent nature of political categories, the main question is: What is possible here and 
now under the given set of norms? This question requires an analysis of the power of the 
norms, in other words, of the normative force that defines the sphere of socially possible 
categories of political identity. Additionally we have to rethink this power of the norms in 
the light of a theory of hegemony, which makes it also possible to take the material as well 
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as the bodily dimensions of power into stronger consideration. Finally, we have to consider 
the violence that these norms enforce when defining the realm of the socially possible, 
banning a set of lives outside the realm of sociality.
This inquiry has also discussed certain shifts in Butler’s account. In her writings of the 
1990s, the project of denaturalization and the complementary genealogy of naturalization 
processes were predominant, which went hand in hand with a focus on discursive forma-
tions. In this context, the subject was established as a critical category of social theory and 
the task was a genealogy of the subject, with other words, the critical analysis of various 
processes  of  subject  formation and the subject  positions they enable.  In  Butler’s  more 
recent writings, however, her focus has shifted from the power of discourse to the func-
tioning of the norms. Simultaneously, the question of the ethical foundation of the struggle 
with  the  norms has  become urgent.  The reading  of  this  shift  presented  in  this  inquiry 
suggests that this new focus comes at the risk of a departure from politics. Accordingly, we 
can also observe a shift in Butler’s conceptualization of the subject, which moved from a 
strictly critical notion of the subject as a position within a discursive formation to a more 
psychologically grounded notion of the self. This new notion of the self inevitably implies 
more  ontological  commitments  from  Butler’s  side,  which  is  questionable  considering 
Butler’s critical attitude towards any ontology.
A consistent factor in Butler’s whole work has been the definition of the main task, even 
though this definition has become more explicit in her recent writings. We can identify the 
critique of the hegemonic norm, the fight against all forms of normative violence and the 
struggle to make lives livable as the driving force behind Butler’s work. I have suggested 
that this task should be seen as the final aim of Butler’s political project rather than an 
ethical foundation in the traditional sense. The critical impetus of Butler’s project is that all 
norms produce certain exclusions that restrict the possibilities to live and make the lives of 
those that do not fall under the norm virtually unlivable. To strive for this aim requires the 
denaturalization  of  established  categories  which  appear  to  be  natural  but  are  in  fact 
produced as natural by strategies of naturalization. In contrast to the naturalization of basic 
categories, Butler insists on the openness of all categories to  resignification, the contin-
gency and  contextuality of all politics and the commitment to a democratic project that 
accounts for its incalculable futurity.
For an appreciation of Butler’s in the discipline of political science, two adaptations seem 
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to be required. First, Butler’s analysis needs to be historically and culturally contextual-
ized. To be clear at this point,  I  think that the common criticism of Butler’s work that 
accuses her of being ahistorical is certainly wrong, and I want to suggest that Butler offers 
one of the few theories that actually try to explain the historicity of political configurations 
without simply taking it for granted. Butler, however, does not carry out historical investig-
ations herself. It is the lack of concrete investigations of processes of social transformation 
which is most notable. Thus, not so much an alteration of Butler’s theory is required, but 
rather  an application  of  her  theoretical  tools  in  specific  political  contexts.  The  second 
adaptation is concerned with the theory of political and social institutions, or, rather, the 
lack  of  such  a  theory  in  Butler’s  work.  A political  theory  of  performativity  must  be 
advanced by a theory of political institutions that is able to consider their relative stability 
as well as the possibility of alteration and change.
But most importantly, we need to consider the strengths of Butler’s theory that make it 
worth to receive it in the discipline of political science. A theory that is inspired by Butler 
can contribute to political theory in six respects: (1) Butler’s theory leads to a reintroduc-
tion of the subject into the realm of politics and political analysis. Traditionally, the subject  
has not played a role in political theory. Butler, however, reveals that the traditional view 
that the subject is prior to the scope of political analysis is itself the result of a process of 
naturalization, and that this naturalization immunizes the subject against further political 
contestation  and,  thereby,  secures  a  specific  configuration  of  politics.  For  Butler,  the 
subject can no longer be seen as a given fact and, thus, the constitution of the subject 
becomes a major political concern. (2) In this context it is possible to highlight the connec-
tion of subject and power in the process of subjection. Power is not only enforced by one 
subject on another, but is also at work in the subjection of the subject. Butler puts special 
emphasis on the role of power in the constitution of the subject. (3) This leads to an expan-
sion of the scope of analyses of power, because if we only analyze the power which is 
enacted between already established subjects,  we ignore the fact  that  power is  already 
enforced in the constitution of those very subjects. Butler’s notion of normative violence 
highlights the violence enforced by the norms that regulate the processes of subjection and 
define the realm of possible  subject positions.  Butler  is  especially concerned about  the 
status of those that cannot confirm with the norms and who are, therefore, banned from the 
realm of the possible subject positions. In Butler’s view, the power that declares one to be 
excluded from the realm of the possible subjects is the most violent form of power. (4) 
Butler’s account of the political subject also leads to a theory of a conditioned, but never-
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theless strong agency. For Butler, agency is not an inner capacity of the subject,  but a 
contested possibility within a political context of power and domination. This leads again 
to a critical analysis of power relations, as we have to raise the questions, under which 
conditions agency becomes possible and which ones hinder its development. (5) A refor-
mulation of Butler’s notion of performativity and iterability in the light of a theory of hege-
mony offers a convincing explanation of the relative stability of political institutions as  
well as the possibility of change. In this context, Butler’s strategy of denaturalization can 
be characterized as a project of radical  repoliticization. She shows that even the founda-
tions of politics are themselves political. (6) In this context Butler’s theory, finally, requires 
new modes of thinking about politics itself. I have called the notion of politics that follows 
from an understanding of the contingency and ungroundedness of all political categories 
and the corresponding openness of these categories for permanent contestation and resigni-
fication a politics of resignifiability. It has also been highlighted, however, that resignifiab-
ility is  not in itself  a  political  strategy,  and that Butler,  thus,  supports  the necessity of 
multiple political strategies that need to be contextualized in contingent and open political 
contexts.
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Abstract
Die vorliegende Arbeit hat das Ziel, eine Lektüre Judith Butler als einer politische Theore-
tikerin zu präsentieren. Dies impliziert erstens die Forderung nach einer Aufnahme Butlers 
in den Kanon der politischen Theorie und inkludiert zweitens die weiterführende These, 
dass Butlers Werk selbst als immanent politisch zu verstehen ist. Bei der Untersuchung von 
Butlers Beitrag zur politischen Theorie konzentriert  sich diese Arbeit  auf zwei  zentrale 
Themenfelder:  1.  Butlers  Konzeption  des  politischen Subjekts  und 2.  ihre  Theorie  der 
Performativität und der Iterabilität.
Während das Subjekt traditionell in der politischen Theorie keine bedeutende Rolle spielt, 
fordert Butlers Werk eine Wiedereinführung des Subjekts in die Analyse von Politik, indem 
sie zeigt, dass das Subjekt keineswegs der Politik vorgängig ist, sondern dass die Konstitu-
tion des  Subjekts  vielmehr  als  eine zentrale  politische Angelegenheit  begriffen werden  
muss. Durch ihre Enthüllung, dass subtile, aber sehr wirkungsvolle Machtformen bereits in 
der  Konstitution  des  Subjekts  am Werk  sind,  ermöglicht  Butler  eine  Erweiterung  von 
Macht-  und  Herrschaftsanalysen  um  Dimensionen  der  Subjektkonstitution.  In  diesem 
Zusammenhang  ist  vor  allem ihr  Konzept  normativer  Gewalt  beachtenswert,  das  dazu 
dient, die Gewalt hervorzuheben, welche von den die Sphäre der sozialen Intelligibilität 
regulierenden Normen auf jene ausgeübt  wird,  die  vom Feld der intelligiblen Subjekte 
ausgeschlossen sind.
Diese Arbeit schlägt vor, Butlers Konzept der Performativität vor dem Hintergrund einer 
Hegemonietheorie einer Relektüre zu unterziehen, indem die These vertreten wird, dass 
das Konzept der Performativität nur dann angemessen verstanden werden kann, wenn es in 
Zusammenhang mit der Macht der hegemonialen Normen bedacht wird. Zugleich gilt es zu 
berücksichtigen, dass weder Macht noch Normen statische Entitäten sind, sondern auf ihre 
ständige Wiederholung angewiesen bleiben, um in ihrem Status bestehen zu können. Die 
daraus  folgende,  prinzipielle  Iterabilität  liefert  eine  Erklärung  für  die  Möglichkeit  von 
sozialem  und  politischem  Wandel.  Das  Subjekt  ist  der  Ort  dieser  Wiederholung  und 
entsprechend stellt die Handlungsfähigkeit des Subjekts auch den Ort möglichen Wandels 
dar.  Handlungsfähigkeit  wird dabei  nicht  als  eine intrinsische Eigenschaft  des Subjekts 
gedacht, sondern als eine Möglichkeit, die in politischen Kontexten errungen und bewahrt 
werden muss. Ziel ist die Resignifizierung des Subjekts als einer kritische Kategorie der 
politischen  Theorie,  um Untersuchung  der  sozialen  Bedingungen  der  Möglichkeit  von 
Handlungsfähigkeit in konkreten politischen Kontexten zu ermöglichen.
Butlers  Herausforderung der  traditionellen politischen Theorie  zwingt  schließlich dazu, 
neue Wege zu suchen, um über Politik nachzudenken. Butler vertritt ein Projekt der Dena-
turalisierung, das heißt sie zeigt, dass sogar die Grundlagen der Politik selbst durchgängig 
politisch sind. Daher kann das Projekt der Denaturalisierung auch als eine Strategie radi-
kaler Politisierung charakterisiert  werden. Für das Konzept von Politik, dass aus dieser 
Kontingenz aller politischen Kategorien und deren entsprechender Offenheit für ständige 
Anfechtung und Resignifizierung folgt,  schlägt  diese Arbeit  den Titel  einer  Politik  der  
Resignifizierbarkeit vor.
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The aim of this inquiry is to present a reading of Judith Butler as a political theorist. That 
implies, first, to support the claim that Butler should be included into the canon of political 
theory. Second, it means to suggest that politics is at the core of Butler’s work. In order to 
discuss Butler’s challenging contribution to political theory, the inquiry focusses on two 
main themes: 1. Butler’s account of the political subject and 2. her theory of performativity 
and iterability. 
Whereas  the  subject  traditionally  does  not  play  a  significant  role  in  political  theory, 
Butler’s work asks for a reintroduction of the subject into the realm of politics and political 
analysis by showing that the subject is not prior to politics, but rather that the constitution 
of the subject is a major political concern. She reveals that subtle, but very forceful forms 
of power are already at  work in the constitution of the subject.  Thereby, she makes it  
possible to expand the scope of an analyses of power and domination to the critical invest-
igation of processes of subject formation. In this context, her notion of normative violence 
is meant to highlight the violence enforced by the norms that define the realm of social 
intelligibility on those that are excluded from counting as intelligible subjects.
This inquiry suggests to reread Butler’s notion of performativity in the light of a theory of 
hegemony. In other words, it claims that performativity can only be adequately understood 
when regarded in connection with the power of the hegemonic norms. At the same time, 
neither power nor the norms are static entities, rather, they are dependent on a permanent 
reiteration in order to sustain there status. The principal iterability that follows from this 
necessity of reiteration offers an explanation of the possibility of alteration and social and 
political change. The subject is the site of this reiteration and, thus, the subject’s agency is 
also the site of possible alteration. In this context, agency is not thought as an inner capa-
city of the subject, but as a possibility that needs to be achieved and secured in political 
contexts. In other words, the aim is a resignification of the political subject as a critical 
category of political theory in order to investigate into the social conditions of possibility 
of agency in concrete political contexts.
Finally, Butler’s challenge of traditional political theory forces us to consider new ways to 
think about politics itself. Butler supports a project of denaturalization, that means, she 
shows that even the foundations of politics are themselves political. Hence, the project of 
denaturalization can be characterized as a strategy of radical politicization. This inquiry 
labels the notion of politics that follows from the contingency and ungroundedness of all 
political categories and their corresponding openness for permanent contestation and resig-
nification as a politics of resignifiability.
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